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Abstract 
In the first paper, I introduce a new framework to estimate household climate risk exposure based on 
a combination of climate and microeconomic data. I apply it to the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey 
(1994-2009) and find that households living at low altitudes are the most vulnerable to weather shocks. 
The second paper is based on a combination of open and double-blind randomized controlled trials 
(RCT) conducted in Tanzania in 2013 with 560 farmers.  By comparing the results between the 
participants in the open and double-blind groups, we find that more than 50% of the total effect of 
improved seeds estimated in traditional open RCTs depends on farmers’ behaviour. The third paper, 
based on the RCT mentioned above (only the open one is used), tests the hypothesis that farmers try 
to escape forced solidarity when facing favourable conditions. We find that farmers having received 
the improved seeds decrease their number of social interactions. We interpret this as a sign that 
farmers seek to hide from the pressure to redistribute. In the fourth paper, I leave Africa for the 
Republic of Ireland and show that a large Irish agri-environmental scheme does not increase farmers’ 
risk exposure. 
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Summary 
According to the median estimates of the United Nations Population Division (United Nations 2015), 
the world population will reach 9.7 billion in 2050. In order to feed this larger, richer and more urban 
population, food production will have to increase by 70% above 2009 levels (net of bio-fuels use) while 
livestock demand could already be up by 68% by 2030 (FAO 2009). Assuming that the goal is to meet 
this challenge with no agricultural land expansion in order to limit deforestation, currently responsible 
for 17% of greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC 2007), a yield growth of 1.07% per annum (p.a.) is required 
globally, while this figure goes up to 4.6% p.a. for Africa. However, yield growth has declined over the 
last decades and is projected to be around 0.7% p.a. (half their historical trend) for the decades to 
come (FAO 2009). Furthermore, it is very likely that climate change will cause, by 2050 in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, a 7% yield loss for the main food crops while its impact on rain-fed agriculture could be even 
more severe (up to 50% in some areas, IPCC 2007). There is hence a need to increase the yield of food 
production, to decrease its vulnerability to climate risk while limiting its impact on the environment. 
This tryptic has been labelled as the need a for a ‘doubly-green revolution’ (Conway 1998).  
The first chapter provides an overview of the literature on the link between risk, poverty, and 
agricultural technology adoption with an emphasis on empirical studies conducted in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. I start with an introduction to the expected utility theory and its limitations. The classic risk 
estimation framework in agricultural economics and recent developments are then discussed. The rest 
of the review surveys empirical studies on the link between risk, poverty and technology adoption. 
Social networks in developing countries play an important role in technology diffusion and household 
risk-management strategies. They are hence discussed in corresponding sections. We conclude by 
highlighting the contribution of the thesis to some of the topics introduced in this literature review. 
In the second chapter, we introduce a new framework to estimate climate risk exposure with the 
standardized precipitation evapotranspiration index (SPEI) as its building block. The approach is simple 
enough to accommodate quantile regressions and hence offer the opportunity to broaden the scope 
of the analysis to different categories of the population. The main contribution of the chapter is to 
provide an estimation framework where the various measure of risk, such as variance and skewness, 
can be directly derived from the regression parameters estimates of the SPEI. The methodology is 
illustrated with a case study on Ethiopia. In accordance with previous studies, the results show that 
households located at low altitudes are the most exposed to climate risk. 
In the third chapter, we assess the role of farmers’ behaviour in driving the yield increase of improved 
maize seeds. The study is based on the combination of open and double-blind randomized controlled 
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trials (RCTs) conducted in 2013 in two regions of Tanzania with 560 farmers. The advantage of 
combining open and double-blind RCTs is to allow the distinction between the effects of the improved 
seeds per se from the effects resulting from a change in the management of the farm. The empirical 
contribution of this study is to show that this behavioural response plays a central role in driving the 
increase in yields brought about improved seeds. In our experiment, more than 50% of the increase in 
yield estimated in the traditional open RCT would not have materialized without the behavioural 
response. 
Social networks play an important role in the livelihood of rural communities in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The more successful members of the network must help the least successful or unlucky members of 
the social network. Recently, some observational and experimental evidence has indicated that these 
obligations may trigger an evasive response. In the fourth chapter, we investigate if participants to the 
RCT conducted in Tanzania try to escape forced solidarity when facing favourable conditions by hiding 
from their network. We find that farmers who were allocated improved seeds decreased the number 
of their social interactions, particularly if they have numerous relatives in the village. We interpret this 
as a sign that farmers attempt to escape forced solidarity and that the pressure to share increases as 
the size of the social network increases. To our knowledge, this constitutes the first set of evidence of 
evasive behaviour based on data from a RCT involving real interactions (i.e. not in a choice experiment 
or with observational data).   
In the fifth chapter, we investigate the impact on Irish farmers’ risk exposure of the Rural Environment 
Protection Scheme (REPS), an agri-environmental scheme. It has been shown in the literature that 
organic and, more generally, low input agriculture tends to increase risk exposure while risk aversion 
plays a role in the low adoption of sustainable production techniques. We show that REPS does not 
increase risk exposure, and adequately compensates farmers for foregone returns, which might be one 
of the reasons of its large success among farmers. Addressing risk considerations in policies aimed at 
making farmers eco-friendlier is an important dimension to the challenge of preserving both farmers’ 
quality of life and the environment. 
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1 Literature Review 
Xavier Vollenweider 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature on the link between poverty, risk, and technology 
adoption. We start by an introduction to the expected utility theory and discuss briefly the violation of 
the independence axiom and ambiguity aversion. The classic risk estimation framework in agricultural 
economics and its recent developments are then discussed in the following section. The rest of the 
review surveys empirical studies on the link between risk, poverty, and technology adoption. Social 
networks in developing countries play a role both in risk-coping and technology diffusion. They are 
hence discussed in corresponding sections. We conclude by highlighting the contribution of the thesis 
to some of the topics introduced in this literature review. 
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1.1 Introduction  
According to the median estimates of the United Nations Population Division (United Nations 2015), 
the world population will reach 9.7 billion in 2050. In order to feed this larger, richer and more urban 
population, food production will have to increase by 70% (net of bio-fuels use) above 2009 levels while 
livestock demand could be up by 68% already by 2030 (FAO 2009). Assuming that the goal is to meet 
this challenge with no agricultural land expansion in order to limit deforestation, currently responsible 
for 17% of greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC 2007), a yield growth of 1.07% per annum (p.a.) is required 
globally, while this figure goes up to 4.6% p.a. for Africa. However, yield growth has declined over the 
last decades and is projected to be around 0.7% p.a. (half their historical trend) for the decades to 
come (FAO 2009). Furthermore, it is very likely that climate change will cause, by 2050 in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, a 7% yield loss for the main food crops while its impact on rain-fed agriculture could be even 
more severe (up to 50% in some areas, IPCC 2007). There is hence a need to increase the yield of food 
production, to decrease its vulnerability to climate risk while limiting its impact on the environment. 
This tryptic has been labelled the need for a ‘doubly-green revolution’ (Conway 1998). 
The present thesis addresses some of the methodological and empirical aspects of this challenge. 
Chapter 2 provides a simple framework for estimating climate risk and climate vulnerability with a case 
study on Ethiopia. Chapter 3 analyses the role of effort allocation in driving the productivity increase 
of improved seeds thanks to the combination of open and double-blind randomized controlled trials 
(RCT) conducted in Tanzania. The open RCT data are also used in chapter 4 in an analysis of evasive 
response to social pressure to share risk and income among kin in village economy. Lastly, chapter 5 
studies the effect of an agri-environmental scheme on risk exposure of Irish farmers. In order to set 
the scene, we provide below a survey of the literature on risk and technology adoption in developing 
countries.  
For the sake of concision, some important streams of research are left out of this review 
notwithstanding their contribution to the general debate, notably the Ricardian approach 
(Mendelsohn et al. 1994), because its assumption of a well-functioning property market is rarely met 
in developing countries (Di Falco et al. 2011); the stochastic budgeting approach, because it relies on 
scenario analysis and simulation, rather than on empirical evidence; and the state-contingent 
approach (e.g. Chambers and Quiggin 1998), because there are only a few empirical studies based on 
it and it is not used in the present thesis. 
The seminal paper by Sandmo (1971) showing that risk leads to underinvestment and underproduction 
contributed to establishing the economics of production under uncertainty as an important research 
stream in economics, with agriculture as one of its favourite case studies. If production risk is a major 
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topic in the agricultural economics literature, it is probably because ’the most singular aspect of 
agricultural production is its randomness’ (Chambers and Quiggin 1998). Disparities are large in terms 
of farms’ risk exposure between developing countries (wherein traditional farming practices based on 
rain-fed agriculture dominate), and developed countries (wherein high-tech farms supply a large part 
of the alimentary needs and agricultural subsidies seek to shelter producers from market instabilities). 
Despite this heterogeneity, farming systems share the common attribute of being at the nexus of the 
markets and the environment. 
Admittedly there are different types of risk faced by a farm (Hardaker et al. 2004; Hazell 1992): 
production risk (e.g. pest and animal diseases, droughts and floods), market risk (e.g. inputs and 
outputs price volatility); resource risk (e.g. fertilizers, seeds and labour supply shocks), institutional risk 
(e.g. changes in policy), financial risk (e.g. changes in the interest charged on farm debt), personal risk 
(e.g. health issues, accidents), asset risk (theft or fire damage to buildings, machinery and livestock). 
While price risks are the dominant source of income shocks in OECD countries, production risk is of 
major concern among small-scale subsistence farmers in developing countries.  
The common understanding of risk is often associated with negative impacts but rarely articulated in 
terms of probabilities (Fafchamps 2009). Knight (1921) distinguished risk, wherein a probability set can 
be assigned to the set of possible outcomes, from uncertainty, wherein no probabilities can be 
assigned. Savage (1954) largely discarded this distinction by grounding subjective probability as the 
relevant concept to model agent perception of risk. The agricultural economics literature has adopted 
the expected utility theory first formalised by Bernoulli in 1738, and applied to modern economics by 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), as the backbone of its decision-theoretic framework. Although 
this approach was challenged as early as 1953 by Allais and more generally by the field of behavioural 
economics (e.g. 1979; Machina 1987; Tversky and Kahneman 1974), no other theoretical decision 
framework has really succeeded in superseding it in the agricultural and development economics 
literature. We will nevertheless review briefly some of the main departures from expected utility 
theory reported in choice experiments.  
In section 1.2, we provide an introduction to the main decision theoretical framework of agricultural 
and development economics, the expected utility theory, and flesh out some of its limitations. Section 
1.3 presents the main risk estimation framework and recent developments. Section 1.4 provides an 
overview of the empirical findings on the link between risk and poverty. Section 1.5 looks at the 
determinants of new technology adoption. Social networks in developing countries play a role both in 
risk-coping and in technology diffusion. They are hence discussed in sections 1.4.3 and 1.5. We 
comment briefly on the role of risk in agri-environmental policies of developed countries in section 
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1.4.2. Section 1.6 concludes and discusses the contribution of the present thesis to the various research 
streams presented in this literature review. 
1.2 Expected utility theory and risk aversion 
We present the expected utility framework by relying on a series of examples and keeping the 
mathematical presentation as limited as possible. The goal is to introduce the decision theoretical 
framework in which most agricultural and development studies related to risk are grounded. We also 
review at the end of the section some of its limitation identified in the field of non-expected utility 
theory. 
Let us assume that an agent can choose either to toss a coin giving him a one in two chance of winning 
£10 or to be directly paid a sure amount of money. The amount of sure money he asks for can inform 
us on his degree of risk aversion. A risk-neutral agent will be indifferent between betting and receiving 
straight away the exact average of the gamble (£5). By contrast, a risk-averse agent might prefer £3 to 
the risk of having nothing, because, as Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) put it, ‘a bird in the hand is worth 
two in the bush’. The risk-seeking agent, by contrast, will require a higher sure amount of money (let 
us say £7), because he prefers to play for the chance of earning £10.  
This sure amount of money is called the certainty equivalent (CE). We see that the smaller the CE is, 
the bigger the risk aversion. The difference between the expected gain (i.e. the average of the gamble) 
and the certainty equivalent is the risk premium: the risk-averse player has a risk premium of £2 (£5-
£3), which is bigger than the risk neutral (£5-£5=£0) and risk-seeking one (£5-£7=-£2). 
One can directly apply these insights to the interaction between risk aversion and agricultural 
production choices. Replacing the choice between coin toss and the sure sum of money by, 
respectively, the choice between planting a risky crop (e.g. coffee) or a riskless but low return crop 
(e.g. sweet potato), we can see that a risk-averse farmer will choose to plant sweet potatoes while a 
risk-seeking one will prefer planting coffee. The difference between the profit of the sweet potato and 
the coffee is the risk premium. Risk premium is also called the private cost of risk bearing, as it is the 
foregone returns paid for lower risk. This example suggests that risk can have an important cost for 
risk-averse farmers: to renounce more lucrative activities and, potentially, to be trapped in poverty.  
From this simple example, we see that it is important to stress the difference between risk as a 
probability measure and the event to which these probabilities are attached, e.g. droughts or price 
collapse (Fafchamps 2009). Although the latter is directly tangible, the example illustrates that the risk 
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in itself can constitute a constant draw on farmers’ livelihoods, as they might adopt low-risk strategies 
at the cost of lower expected revenues.  
Let us define these concepts a bit more formally. Figure 1.1 plots the utility function of a risk-averse 
(left) and a risk-neutral (right) agent defined in the domain of the coin toss example. For the risk-averse 
player, the sum of the utilities of the payoffs of the game, 1 2⁄ 𝑈(0) + 1/2𝑈(10), is less than the utility 
of the average payoff of the game, 𝑈(5). By contrast, both quantities are equal for the risk neutral 
agent. Hence his indifference towards playing, or directly receiving £5. 
Figure 1.1: Utility function of a risk averse and risk neutral agent 
  
The risk premium is represented on the left panel by the thick straight line under the utility curve 
between 3 and 5. It equals the average payoff of the game, £5, minus the CE payoff of the game, £3, 
which is £2. By contrast, we see that under risk neutrality, the utility function is linear and the CE payoff 
equals the average of the game, £5. The difference between these utility functions is their curvature 
which is captured by their second derivatives.  
The Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion, AP, (Pratt 1964) is based on the curvature of the 
utility function: 
𝐴𝑃 = −
𝑈′′(𝜋)
𝑈′(𝜋)
 
(1)  
where 𝜋 represents the payoffs of the game in our example. The second derivative of the utility 
function is normalized by the first derivative in order to offer comparable metrics at different level of 
wealth. Lastly, as 𝑈’’ is negative, one adds a negative sign in order to end up with a more intuitive 
metric: a higher AP value means higher risk aversion. 
To better understand the implication of choosing a particular functional form for the utility, let’s 
specify it as an exponential function: 
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𝑈(𝜋) = 1 − exp⁡(−𝛼𝜋) (2)  
Then the AP is: 
𝐴𝑃 = −
𝑈′′(𝜋)
𝑈′(𝜋)
= −(
−𝛼2𝑒−𝛼𝜋
𝛼𝑒−𝛼𝜋
) = 𝛼 
(3)  
We see that the level of absolute risk aversion, 𝛼, is independent of wealth and constant for the whole 
domain of the utility function. This means the agent exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). 
This implies that, under an exponential utility function specification, the multi-millionaire owner of a 
hacienda is as afraid of losing 1 dollar as landless farmers living on one dollar per day. Other utility 
functions allow more flexibility in terms of the structure of risk aversion.  
Let us examine risk aversion in more detail by modifying the choice offered to our gamblers. Now, we 
ask them to choose between two different gambles: (1) if they score Heads, they receive £10, Tails £0, 
(2) if they score Heads, they receive £9, Tails £1. Although the expected gains are the same, the risk-
averse player prefers the second gamble, because the spread between both payoffs is smaller, while 
the risk neutral player is indifferent. This aversion to the spread of payoffs is precisely what is captured 
by the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion, hence it is also called the coefficient of 
aversion to mean-preserving spread (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970). In the case of agriculture, a farmer 
expecting a yield between 200 kg/ha and 4,000 kg/ha would have a higher spread than a farmer 
expecting a yield between 1,800 kg/ha and 2,200 kg/ha for instance. The spread is generally computed 
as the variance of the distribution of yield or output. 
One peculiarity of betting with fair coins is that they are symmetrically distributed. However, payoffs 
linked to economic activities might not be so. The distribution of probabilities between good and bad 
events is also an important characteristic of risk. Let’s take a simple example from the paper of 
Menezes et al. (1980) to illustrate this concept. Mao (1970) questioned executives in several industries 
about their preferences concerning two lotteries with payoffs 𝑥 and corresponding probabilities 𝑝𝑟(𝑥) 
described in (Table 1.1): 
Table 1.1: Choice experiment on downside risk aversion 
𝑓(𝑥) 𝑔(𝑥) 
𝑃 𝑟(𝑥 = 1) = 75% 𝑃 𝑟(𝑥 = 0) = 25% 
𝑃 𝑟(𝑥 = 3) = 25% 𝑃 𝑟(𝑥 = 2) = 75% 
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Mao (1970) found unambiguous preferences for 𝑓(𝑥) over 𝑔(𝑥) although these distributions have 
equal mean and variance, and despite the fact that the most likely outcome of 𝑔(𝑥), its mode, is higher. 
He interprets this preference as evidence of the importance of downside risk (here the risk of having 
0) captured by the coefficient of asymmetry of payoffs, the skewness. In other terms, agents prefer 
positively skewed distribution to negatively skewed one because they dislike downside risk. Menezes 
(1980) and Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2005) show that the coefficient of downside risk aversion is 
given by: 
𝐷𝑆 =
𝑈′′′(𝜋)
𝑈′(𝜋)
 
(4)  
In summary, we have stressed the differences between risk as a probability concept and the 
consequences that are attached to it. We then detailed two aspects of risk: the spread (variance) of 
the possible outcomes and their asymmetry (skewness, i.e. downside risk). The expected utility theory 
provides an elegant framework to represent the agents’ preferences with respect to these various 
facets of risk. 
Nevertheless, the expected utility rests on three assumptions: the ordering, continuity and 
independence of preferences with respect to the set of pairs of probability and payoffs (hereafter, 
prospects). The ordering axiom and continuity axiom imply that choice must be consistent, transitive. 
The evaluation of each prospect via the utility function can therefore be carried to any degree of 
precision, so that a certainty equivalent exists for each prospect (e.g Buschena 2003; Wakker 2010). 
The independence axiom implies that the choice between two pairs of prospects should not be 
affected if a third pair of prospects is mixed in with the first two pairs. The independence axiom was 
questioned as early as 1953 by Allais in choice-experiments. We follow below the presentation of 
Starmer (2000). Participants were offered the choice between the two lotteries presented in Table 1.2: 
Table 1.2: Lottery 1, choice-experiment on the independence axiom 
𝑓1(𝑥) 𝑔1(𝑥) 
𝑃 𝑟(𝑥 = £1m) = 100% 𝑃 𝑟(𝑥 = £5m) = 10% 
 
𝑃 𝑟(𝑥 = £1m) = 89% 
𝑃 𝑟(𝑥 = £0) = 1% 
Most of participants chose the lottery 𝑓1(𝑥) as it provides £1 million with certainty. Participants were 
then asked to choose between the two lotteries presented in Table 1.3:  
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Table 1.3: Lottery 2, choice-experiment on the independence axiom 
𝑓2(𝑥) 𝑔2(𝑥) 
𝑃 𝑟(𝑥 = £1m) = 11% 𝑃 𝑟(𝑥 = £5m) = 10% 
𝑃 𝑟(𝑥 = £0⁡) = 89% 𝑃 𝑟(𝑥 = £0) = 90% 
Most participants chose 𝑔2(𝑥) because the chance of winning in 𝑓2(𝑥) and 𝑔2(𝑥) appear very similar 
while the prize of 𝑔2(𝑥) is much higher. However, this constitutes a violation of the independence 
axiom. 
Indeed, let us now rewrite the gamble 𝑓1(𝑥) = {£1𝑚, 11%;£1𝑚, 89%⁡} and 𝑔1 =
{£0, 1%; £5, 10%;£1𝑚, 89%}. Both 𝑓1(𝑥) and 𝑔1(𝑥) have (£1𝑚, 89%) in common. Now, let rewrite 
𝑓2(𝑥) = {£1𝑚, 11%;£0,89%⁡} and 𝑔2(𝑥) = {£0,1%;£5,10%; £0,89%⁡}. Both 𝑓2(𝑥) and 𝑔2(𝑥) have 
as common consequence (£0,89%). The only change between the first and the second pairs of lotteries 
is the change in the common consequence from (£1𝑚, 89%) to (£0,89%). Under the independence 
axiom, a change in the common consequence should not affect the choice between 𝐟 and 𝐠 lotteries. 
Many studies have confirmed that the choice between prospects was influenced by change in the 
common consequence (Starmer 2000)1. 
So far, the probabilities of each possibility where known. What happens when probabilistic judgments 
are hard to make? This is a situation which is much closer to decision-making in real conditions. For 
instance, a farmer will have only a vague idea of the weather conditions over the next three years 
when deciding to plant a coffee crop.  As mentioned in the introduction, the distinction between risk, 
where probabilities can be attached to the events and uncertainty, where no probability are attached 
to the event, was largely discarded in favour of the notion of subjective probability proposed by Savage 
(Savage 1954). The decision under uncertainty can be reduced to decision under risk, with the 
assumption that agents hold subjective probabilistic beliefs which are used linearly.  
However, Ellsberg (1961) showed that one could not discard the distinction between uncertainty and 
risk. The following though experiment will illustrate his point (see Etner et al. 2012). Say an individual 
faces two urns, with 100 balls in each urn: in urn I, he knows that there are 50 black and 50 red balls 
(he can open the urn and count them); in urn II, he does not know the proportion of black and red 
                                                          
1 Another violation of the independence axiom is the common ratio effect (Starmer, 2000). Say you have to 
choose between the following lotteries: 𝑓1′(£3000,100%; £0,1 − 100%) and 𝑔1′(£4000,80%; £0,1 − 80%). 
Many people would go for 𝑓1′ because of the certainty of getting £3000. Now say you have to choose between 
𝑓2′(£3000,25%; £0,1 − 25%) and  𝑔2′(£4000,20%; £0,1 − 20%). Many people would go for 𝑔2′. However, 
expected utility theory predicts that one would go either for 𝒇′ or 𝒈’ gambles as the chance of winning as only 
been divided by 4 in both lotteries.   
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balls. He can choose a colour and then pick at random one ball, but he has first to decide from which 
urn he will pick the ball. Most people would strictly prefer urn I. If they were ‘probability-sophisticate’, 
this would imply that they think that there are fewer than 50 red balls in urn II. They should therefore 
rather prefer to bet on drawing a black ball from urn II. This paradox suggests that people are not 
probability sophisticated and dislike a situation where probabilities are unknown, i.e. they are 
ambiguity-averse. 
The observation that participants in choice-experiments tended to deviate systematically from the 
prediction of expected utility theory has led to the hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk 
and uncertainty accommodating non-linear probability weighting, heterogeneous valuation of bad and 
good events, and ambiguity aversion. The prospect theory proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
gained a wide acceptance in the field of non-expected utility theory and could provide a worthy 
alternative to expected utility theory. Nevertheless, despite the large set of experimental evidence 
showing that alternate models are better for choice evaluation under conditions of risk and 
uncertainty, the use of non-expected utility models in empirical studies is still rare in agricultural and 
development economics. We will therefore not delve into more details. Interested readers are referred 
to literature reviews from Etner et al. (2012) and Starmer (2000) and the books from Gilboa (2009) and 
Wakker (2010) for a in depth treatment of this subject matter. We turn now to estimation of risk 
exposure with empirical data. 
1.3 Estimating risk exposure 
The goal of risk estimation in development and agricultural economics could be summarized as the 
estimation of the mean, variance and skewness of the probability distribution of production, yield, 
profit or consumption. More generally, the mean, variance and skewness are defined as the first, 
second and third central moments of a probability distribution. We will use both terminologies below. 
The stochastic production approach has been the dominant approach for estimating risk in the 
agricultural economics literature. The key insight of Just and Pope (1978) was to split the production 
function into a deterministic part and a stochastic part, allowing inputs to be risk increasing, risk 
neutral or risk decreasing: 
𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥, 𝛽1) + ℎ(𝑥, 𝛽2)𝜀 (5)  
where 𝑦 is the quantity produced, 𝑓(𝑥, 𝛽) is the mean, 𝑥 the input and ℎ(𝑥, 𝛽)2𝜀2 is the variance. As 
Antle (1983) put it, the idea is basically to specify a deterministic model to which an error term is 
appended. Antle (1983) showed that although input effects on variance are not determined by their 
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effects on the mean, this specification restricts the inputs’ effect to have the same direction on 
variance and higher moments.  
Antle (1983) proposed an alternative model wherein the central probability moments are directly 
specified as: 
𝜇1(𝑥, 𝛽1) = ∫𝑦𝑓(𝑦|𝑥)𝑑𝑦 
(6)  
𝜇𝑖(𝑥, 𝛽𝑖) = ∫(𝑦 − 𝜇1)
𝑖𝑓(𝑦|𝑥)𝑑𝑦⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖 ≥ 2 (7)  
where 𝛽𝑖 relates the input 𝑥 to the moment 𝜇𝑖. This approach relaxes the cross-moment restrictions: 
the inputs’ elasticity with respect to variance does not restrict their elasticity with respect to higher 
moments2. Antle (1987) showed that the different central moments can be estimated using feasible 
Generalised Least Squares estimators.  
Antle (2010) extended his model to allow inputs to have asymmetric effects on the central moments 
of the probability distribution. The approach is based on the estimation of partial moments, i.e. 
probability moments below and above a given threshold of the yield or output. Once the effect of a 
given input on the higher partial moments is netted out from its effect on the lower partial moments, 
the conclusion regarding the risk effects of this input can change radically. It is illustrated with data 
from Ecuador where labour is shown to be risk increasing according to the central moments approach 
and to be risk decreasing according to the partial moments approach. 
Kim et al. (2014) recently proposed an estimation framework based on quantile regressions. The first 
stage consists of estimating a production function. The second stage consists of using the residuals of 
this first stage regression as dependent variable in a series of quantile regressions. The authors also 
provide a derivation of the risk premium in terms of the quantiles of the probability distribution. Based 
on the analysis of farm data in South Korea, they show that 90% of the cost of risk, defined as the risk 
premium, comes from downside risk. The method has also been applied to compare the effect of 
genetically modified crops on corn yield distribution (Chavas and Shi 2015). 
The models presented above rely on the residual of the production function to estimate risk. By 
contrast, in the field of efficiency analysis of agriculture production, a different interpretation is given 
to the residual: it represents farmers’ inefficiency. The field of stochastic frontier analysis sought to 
                                                          
2 The model from Antle (1983) has been labelled the flexible method of moments because it relaxes the 
assumption on cross-moment elasticity of inputs, and more recently, the linear method of moments because of 
its assumption that the central moments of the probability function can be approximated by a linear function 
(Tack et al., 2012). 
  
23 
 
unify both approaches by extending the stochastic production function from Just and Pope with a one 
sided error terms capturing the distance from the efficiency frontier (Battese et al. 1997; Sabul C 
Kumbhakar 1993; Subal C. Kumbhakar 2002; Subal C. Kumbhakar and Tveterås 2003; S. Kumbhakar 
and Tsionas 2010) or by estimating risk as the variance of the inefficiency terms (Bera and Sharma 
1999; Jaenicke et al. 2003; Wang and Schmidt 2002). As the residual is ultimately determined by what 
is left out of the regression model, the decomposition of the residual into an inefficiency term, risk 
term, misspecification error and noise is made difficult: ‘whether the residuals represent the ignorance 
of the firm under study or [the ignorance of] the analyst’ is often unclear (Saastamoinen 2013).3 This 
is likely one of the major weaknesses of risk estimation models based on the error term.  
A novel semi-parametric approach has been proposed by Tack et al. (2012) to circumvent this issue. 
Instead of estimating equation (6) and (7), Tack et al. (2012) estimate the raw moments of the 
conditional distribution of output via the following equation: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑗 = 𝑓(𝑥, 𝛽1) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (8)  
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the output at time 𝑡 for observation 𝑖 put to the power 𝑗 and each 𝑗 equation corresponds 
to each 𝑗 raw moment. These raw moments provide all the required information to estimate the mean, 
variance and skewness of the conditional distribution, estimated as a maximum entropy density 
distribution. This distribution contains as a special case the normal, beta, chi-square, beta and many 
other distributions. The advantage of the raw moments approach is to decrease the risk of obtaining 
biased results caused by misspecification of the first moment equation, i.e. equation (5) in the model 
of Just and Pope and equation (6) in the model from Antle (1983). This method has notably been used 
to estimate the effect of the El Niño Southern Oscillation on US corn production and downside risk (J. 
B. Tack and Ubilava 2013). 
The availability of climate data has led to an explosion of the number of studies on the link between 
climate and the economy. This ‘new climate-economy literature’ (Dell et al. 2014) does not seek to 
recover conditional output distribution and is hence not focused on risk per se, but rather on how 
weather shocks affect various dimensions of the economy, from aggregate output, labour productivity, 
health and mortality, conflict and political stability, and, naturally, agriculture.  
In order to estimate the relationship between weather shocks and the economy, these studies use a 
similar reduced-form panel specification which can be generalized as (Dell et al. 2014): 
                                                          
3 Interested readers are referred to the literature review of Saastamoinen (2013) for a detailed presentation of 
the issue. 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝛾𝒁𝒊𝒕 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (9)  
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the outcome of interest for unit 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑪𝒊𝒕 is the climate variable, 𝒁𝒊𝒕 is a set of control 
variables, 𝜇𝑖  is a unit fixed effects, 𝜃𝑟𝑡 is a time fixed effects which might vary between regions, 𝑟,  and 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an error term. Most of these studies, when focusing on agriculture, are conducted at the 
aggregate level (county, district, state or country level) with the few exceptions such as the studies of 
Yang and Choi (2007) and Welch et al. (2010) where  farm and household level data are used. The 
outcome variable is either yield, profit or revenue and the climate variable is either temperature, 
precipitation or a combination of both.  
As the climate variable is exogenous and varies randomly over time, the studies based on equation (9) 
do not suffer from reverse causality bias. Furthermore, the use of fixed effects, 𝜇𝑖, and time fixed 
effects, 𝑟, account for possible omitted variable bias (e.g. unobserved spatial characteristics) and allow 
for different trends across subsamples. Studies based on equation (9) ‘makes relatively few 
identification assumptions and allows unusually strong causative interpretation’ (Dell et al. 2014). Dell 
et al. (2014) provides an extended survey of the new climate-economy literature. 
Most of these studies use a non-linear specification of the climate variable, 𝑪𝒊𝒕, be it temperature or 
precipitation, with a preference for quadratic specification: precipitation or temperature increases the 
output variable, 𝑦𝑖𝑡, up to a point where higher precipitation or temperature has an adverse impact 
on 𝑦𝑖𝑡, each additional degree or precipitation amount decreasing 𝑦𝑖𝑡  (e.g. Hidalgo et al. 2010; Lobell 
et al. 2011a; Lobell et al. 2011b; Schlenker and Roberts 2009; Schlenker and Lobell 2010). Another 
interesting insight from the ‘new climate-economy’ literature is the clear distinction between weather, 
defined as the realisation of the distribution of possible weather events, and climate, defined as the 
distribution of these possible weather events. 
We reviewed above some of the core techniques for estimating risk at the farm level. Most models are 
based on the residual of a regression of profit or output, with the exception of the raw moments 
approach of Tack et al (2012). Recently, the availability of climate data has led to the burgeoning 
studies on the link between various aspect of the economy and weather shocks. The latter studies are 
however not concerned per se with risk; rather, they look at the impact of shocks. The contribution of 
chapter 2 is to propose a model based on climate data and a model similar to equation (9) in order to 
assess climate risk exposure and vulnerability. 
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1.4 Empirical studies on the link between risk and poverty 
The absence of effective risk management strategies leaves farmers exposed to the vagaries of the 
weather, resulting in large fluctuations in agricultural production, income and household consumption. 
In Zimbabwe, for instance, Kinsey et al. (1998) report that household maize production dropped from 
more than 3 ton in 1991 to half a ton during the 1992 drought. In 1981-1985 in Burkina Faso, a period 
marked also by a major drought, the standard deviation in crop income  was half the long term average 
income (Kazianga and Udry 2006). Furthermore, half of the variation in crop income was directly 
passed into consumption, resulting in median caloric intake 30% below the World Health 
Organization’s recommendations. In Ethiopia, even relatively common weather conditions, such as a 
rainfall deficit expected to occur every five years on average, can  decrease consumption by 10 to 20 
percent (Porter 2012). The impact of a drought is rarely felt equally by all members of the household. 
Hoddinot (2006) shows that during the 1994-1995 Zimbabwean drought, women and children under 
the age of 12-24 months bore the brunt of the shock, the males’ body mass index staying relatively 
stable over the same period. As there are large seasonal variations in rural households’ consumption 
and, as data collection occurs only once a year at best, a large part of consumption fluctuations might 
even go unnoticed in most studies (Dercon and Krishnan 2000). 
Weather shocks not only bring short term fluctuation in income and consumption, they can also have 
long lasting consequences on households’ well-being by pushing them in poverty traps, i.e. 
‘equilibrium levels of poverty in which one may slide relatively easily, but from which there is no 
possible recovery without outside intervention’ (Dercon 2008). It took Ethiopian households on 
average 10 years to rebuild their cattle herd following the 1983-1985 drought, while consumption 
growth in the 1990’s of the most affected households remained 16% lower than the least affected 
(Dercon 2004). The 1984-1985 Ethiopian famine had a large and irreversible impact on children under 
the age of 36 months at that time. Dercon and Porter (2014) observe that adult height shortfall caused 
by poor infant nutrition is associated with a 3-8% p.a. income loss over adult life. Even marginal 
changes in rainfall have long-lasting effects. Although the 1994-1995 Zimbabwean drought was a 
relatively mild drought by African standards (no famine or emergency appeal for food aid), it lowered 
the growth velocity of children aged 12-24 months at that time (Hoddinott 2006). While the children 
living in wealthier households were able to recover, those living in poor households never did.  
The 2002 drought in Ethiopia is considered to have been well-managed: no famine death was reported 
despite it being of a similar magnitude than the 1983-1985 one. Two years later, the 2002 drought 
nevertheless still had a negative and significant impact on consumption (Dercon et al. 2005). More 
generally, a 10 percent decrease in rainfall depresses consumption growth by 1 percentage point four 
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to five years later in Ethiopia (Dercon and Porter 2014). This high level of path dependence in poverty 
has been observed in several other studies (e.g. Bigsten and Shimeles 2008; Yesuf and Bluffstone 
2009).  
Households do not stay passive: they implement a wide array of strategies to deal with these shocks 
and decrease risk exposure. These strategies are generally classified into two types: ex-ante risk 
management strategies and ex-post risk coping strategies (Alderman and Paxson 1992). The aim of ex-
ante strategies is to decrease income risk (e.g. decrease variance and skewness of the conditional 
distribution of income). The aim of ex-post strategies is to reduce the impact of income shocks on 
consumption. Ex-ante strategies include the diversification of income sources and the adoption of low 
risk production techniques. Ex-post strategies include self-insurance in the form of asset holding ready 
to be sold in case of adverse shocks and informal insurance via solidarity networks of friends and family 
ready to be called upon in case of need.  
Theses ex-post and ex-ante strategies can have several adverse consequences such as holding a sub-
optimal amount of productive assets (e.g. cattle) or the selection of activities less sensitive to rainfall 
variations but less profitable, contributing to the trapping of households in poverty. Although ex-ante 
and ex-post strategies should not be analysed separately as the availability of ex-post strategies 
typically influence the choice of ex-ante strategies (e.g. Dercon 1996; Rosenzweig and Binswanger 
1993), we discuss each type of strategy separately for the sake of clarity. We start by surveying the 
literature on risk aversion as risk aversion determines the price one is ready to pay to decrease risk.  
1.4.1 Risk aversion 
There are two main approaches for estimating risk aversion: analysing production choices or 
conducting choice-experiments. Models using production data are based on the insight that risk-averse 
farmers will choose a mix of inputs that decrease risk at the cost of forgone output, whereas risk-loving 
farmers will choose a riskier input mix with higher returns. Two sets of parameters need hence to be 
estimated: the technology parameters which describe the effect of inputs on risk and profit and the 
utility parameters mapping the input mix into risk aversion. These two stages can be carried either 
recursively (John M. Antle 1987, 2010; Foudi and Erdlenbruch 2011; Groom et al. 2008; Simtowe et al. 
2006) or jointly (e.g. Chavas and Holt 1996; Koundouri et al. 2009; Subal C. Kumbhakar 2002; Subal C. 
Kumbhakar and Tveterås 2003; S. Kumbhakar and Tsionas 2010; Love and Buccola 1991; Pope and Just 
1991; Saha et al. 1994).  
The core assumption of these models is that producers maximise expected utility. Most of these 
studies, carried out in developed countries, points toward a DARA and IRRA risk preference structures. 
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A large heterogeneity in risk preferences has been found among farmers’ populations. Antle (1987) 
finds that farmers in the Aurepalle village in India were both Arrow-Pratt and downside-risk-averse but 
at very different levels, ranging from risk neutrality to risk premiums as high as 25%. Lence (2009) calls 
into question the validity of estimating risk aversion with production data, particularly when shocks 
are not large or the sample is small, which is the case in most of the studies cited above. Furthermore, 
Just et al. (2010) show that although the models can be locally identified, they are not globally 
identified: an infinite set of pairs of technology and utility functions can equally well fit the data. These 
two articles are a serious blow to the whole field of risk preferences estimation based on production 
data. 
The use of choice-experiments to recover risk aversion in developing countries dates back at least to 
the 1980 Binswanger study on risk aversion in India (1980). The use of choice-experiment has provided 
a fertile ground for testing the validity of the expected utility theory in developing countries.  
Deviation from expected utility theory has been found in Uganda by Humphrey and Verschoor (2004) 
and by Mosley and Vershoor (2005) in Ethiopia, Uganda and Andhra Pradesh (India): rank dependent 
utility function and non-linear probability weighting function were found to explain better the data.  
Harrison et al (2010), with the same data than Mosley and Vershoor (2005), show by contrast that 
there is equal support both for expected utility theory and prospect theory. When both models are 
used simultaneously to explain the choices made in the experiment, they find that subjects behaving 
according to expected utility exhibit risk aversion and subjects behaving according to prospect theory 
exhibit risk loving behaviour. Risk aversion has also been found to vary geographically. Tanaka and 
Munro (2014), with results holding both under expected utility theory and prospect theory, found that 
farmers in the less favourable agro-climatic zones in Uganda were also the most risk averse. Several 
authors also find that the exposure to large shocks such as a severe drought was correlated with higher 
risk aversion (Gloede et al. 2013; Yesuf and Bluffstone 2009). Choice experiments are however not 
immune to bias. Cilliers et al. (2015) showed for instance that in an experiment in Sierra Leone the 
presence of a foreigner, typically a white researcher from a Western country, altered the behaviour of 
participants. 
Mosley and Verschoor (2005) suggest that there could be a mutually self-reinforcing cycle between 
risk aversion and poverty. Ex-ante risk management strategies by asset-poor households are not 
adequate to deal with important shocks. Asset-poor households have hence no other choice than to 
deplete their asset stock in order to smooth out the effect of shocks. This increases the risk of failing 
into chronic poverty, which, in turn, increases risk aversion, reducing their willingness to undertake 
  
28 
 
riskier and more profitable investments or to adopt new technology4. As a result, this further traps 
them in poverty. Dercon (2008) stresses rather the lack of insurance, credit and investment options 
among the poor as the main explanation behind the uptake of costly ex-ante risk management 
strategies. Innate differences in risk aversion between the rich and the poor would not play a central 
role in the larger adoption by the poor of costly ex-ante risk management strategies.  
1.4.2 Ex-ante strategies 
As discussed in section 1.2, risk might have a detrimental effect on well-being as it is hard to reduce 
risk without reducing expected income. This results in ‘efficiency losses, more inequality, [..] and 
poverty traps.’ (Dercon 2002). We discuss below one of the main ex-ante strategies: diversifying the 
source of income. The choice of low-risk low-return income generating activities constitutes a second 
major ex-ante strategy. We will discuss it in section 1.5 when presenting the role of risk aversion in the 
low rate of technology adoption. 
Diversification of the household activities into uncorrelated income sources is a key strategy to reduce 
risk. Non-farm income may already account for more than 40 percent of average household income 
(Barrett et al. 2001). However, risk mitigation cannot explain all diversification as ‘it is widely believed 
that risk aversion decreases with wealth but it is observed that diversification increases with wealth’ 
(Barrett et al. 2001).5 One reason for the lower diversification among the poorest households is the 
barriers to entry into non-farm enterprise such as capital constraints and education (Reardon et al. 
2000). Furthermore, finding income sources not correlated with the agricultural sector is difficult in 
rural areas. Fafchamps et al. (Fafchamps et al. 1998) find that ‘droughts adversely affect not only crop 
income but also non-farm income’. The authors state that these results are ‘consistent with Sen (1981) 
who remarked that droughts lead to a collapse of the demand for local services and crafts’.  
Several authors have shown that preserving biodiversity could be an effective ex-ante risk 
management strategy, as ecologically diverse agricultural systems tend to be both more resilient to 
climate shocks, pest invasion and crop diseases and more productive (Di Falco and Perrings 2005; Di 
Falco and Chavas 2006, 2009; Smale et al. 1998). As bio-diversity plays a role in ex-ante risk mitigation, 
risk aversion has been found to increases bio-diversity both in developing and developed countries 
(Bezabih and Sarr 2012; Di Falco and Perrings 2005; Nastis et al. 2013).  
                                                          
4 The impact of risk aversion on technology adoption is discussed in more detail in section 1.4.3. 
5 Several other factors explain diversification (Barrett et al. 2001). The push factors include risk diversification, 
ex-post coping strategies such as looking for alternative income or food consumption source after a crop failure, 
limited access to inputs forcing households to diversify their activities. The pull factors include complementarities 
between activities (e.g. intercropping), economy of scope or skill endowments.  
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Before presenting the ex-post risk coping strategies, let us consider for a moment the challenge of 
preserving the environment in developed countries. Many OECD countries have set up agri-
environmental schemes (AES) aimed at financially rewarding farmers for adopting eco-friendly 
practices. It is however as yet unclear what impact they have on risk exposure. Some production 
standards imposed by AES, such as a reduction in fertiliser and pesticide application rates, might have 
a direct impact on risk exposure. Indeed, organic and low input farmers are generally more exposed to 
production risk than conventional farmers (Berentsen et al. 2012; Finger 2014; Gardebroek 2006; Serra 
et al. 2008). Corroborating these findings, organic farmers tend to be less risk averse than conventional 
farmers (Gardebroek 2006; Serra et al. 2008). Morris et al. (2000) report a concern among English 
farmers that the rigidity of their local AES reduced their ability to take remedial action in case of pest 
infestation or severe weed events. Similarly, AES contract length was found to affect negatively the 
decision to join an AES because it tied up farmers’ hands over a long period of time (Peerlings and 
Polman 2009). The change in agricultural practices required to join an AES is also generally perceived 
as a risk (Wynn et al. 2001). It is however as yet unclear if joining an AES is objectively riskier or if it is 
perceived as such because of the uncertainty linked to the change in long tried farming practices. We 
will investigate this in more detail in chapter 5, studying the effect of joining an AES on Irish farmers’ 
risk exposure.  
1.4.3 Ex-post strategies 
A typical feature of weather shocks is that they tend to be covariate: many households are hit at the 
same time. While households manage to deal relatively well with idiosyncratic shock, i.e. shocks 
affecting only one household at a time (e.g. illness) (e.g. Porter 2012), they are ill-equipped to deal 
with covariate shocks such as drought or price swings.  Naturally, successive shocks are more difficult 
to deal with than a single one (Alderman 1996, cit. in Dercon, 2002). We review below two important 
ex-post strategies adopted by households to deal with shocks: self-insurance in the form of asset 
holding, risk sharing via solidarity networks of friends and family. We then briefly comment the link 
between ex-post coping strategies and environmental degradation and a weather index insurance. 
One the main strategies for coping with adverse shocks is asset holding, typically in the form of cattle, 
crop inventory or jewellery. In case of need, households can sell an asset in order to buffer the effect 
of the shock. It is hence often described as a self-insurance. However, their effectiveness at decreasing 
the impact of covariate shocks is limited, as shown in the case of the 1981-1985 drought in Burkina 
Faso where livestock sales compensated at most 30% of village-level income shocks (Fafchamps et al. 
1998). Running down crop inventory or decreasing food consumption was more a common response 
than selling livestock (according to the study from Kazianga and Udry, 2006, with the same dataset). 
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When all households seek to sell livestock at the same time, as when they are all affected by large 
drought, the terms of trade for livestock against food will collapse.  
The lumpiness of asset limits also their use for consumption smoothing: they are very costly to acquire, 
representing often several months of crop income, and are hence not easily disposed-of. Furthermore, 
livestock are key productive inputs used to plough the fields or providing manure for the crops. 
Hoddinott (2006) finds that in Zimbabwe, during the 1994-1995 minor drought, more than half of the 
households owning at least two oxen sold at least one ox. By contrast, only 15% did so when they 
owned only one or two oxen. Disposing of all the oxen can indeed have long-lasting consequences such 
as forcing households to rent each following year an ox at a high price, decreasing their ability to save 
money in order to buy another ox and get back on their feet. The risk of falling into such asset poverty 
traps could explain why asset rich households pursue consumption smoothing while asset poor 
households pursue asset smoothing (e.g. Zimmerman and Carter 2003).  
However, some behaviour observed during time of famine is hard to reconcile with the idea that asset-
poor households maximise the expected utility of consumption over time by protecting their assets. 
During the Ethiopian famine of 1984-1985 for instance, many households declined to sell their livestock 
even when it could have saved their family members, and their own, lives. Dercon (2008) suggest that 
non-expected utility models of choice under risk and uncertainty could explain this behaviour: 
individuals would exhibit risk-loving attitudes when faced with large shocks, clinging to the hope of 
conserving their status quo, however remote is this possibility. 
A second important ex-post strategy is to rely on the solidarity of friends and family as a form of 
informal insurance. Its effectiveness is however limited mostly to idiosyncratic risk. Bramouillé and 
Kranton (2007) show that social networks provide higher welfare gains when they link individuals 
across different villages and communities, but geographical proximity and kinship are the major 
determinants of risk-sharing network formation (Fafchamps and Gubert 2007). The result is that risk-
sharing networks rarely include people with uncorrelated risk (Fafchamps and Lund 2003). They are 
hence of limited use against covariate shocks such as drought or price swings. As all the individuals in 
the social network are affected at the same time, there is no surplus to share. Several studies tested 
and rejected the hypothesis of full risk pooling at the village level (e.g. Townsend 1994). Kazianga and 
Udry (2006) find almost no risk sharing in Burkina Faso over the 1981-1985 period. Reardon et al. 
(1988, cited in Dercon, 2002) report that transfers represented ‘only 3 per cent of the losses for the 
poorest households in the Sahel’ during the 1981-1985 drought. Nor does Yilma (2014) find evidence 
for reliance on gifting from friends and family to deal with shocks in Ethiopia, in a survey conducted in 
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2011. Morduch (1999) gives many other examples of a limited role for transfers in smoothing income 
shocks.  
A disadvantage of these risk sharing networks is that they can lead to unequal patron-client 
relationships between the poorest households and wealthier ones (Fafchamps 1992) when the poorest 
households are not simply excluded (e.g. Santos and Barrett 2011). Furthermore, Di Falco and Bulte 
(2011) find that forced sharing norms in social networks diverted investment away from sharable liquid 
assets toward assets not sharable, but with lower returns. Jakiela and Ozier (2016) find that sharing 
norms ‘distort incentives towards less visible, but potentially less profitable, investments, and may 
consequently slow economic growth’. Baland et al. (2011) provide anecdotal evidences that some 
individuals in Cameroon attempt to fend off network requests by contracting costly credit in order to  
‘pretend to be poor’. As Chuang and Schechter (2015) put it, ‘this suggests that we should be interested 
both in how social networks work as a conduit for financial transactions, but also how social networks 
enforce these transactions’. There could be indeed a ‘dark side’ to social capital (Di Falco and Bulte 
2011). 
Lastly, households may rely on income or food sources with detrimental effects on the environment 
such as wildlife poaching (Barrett and Arcese 1998), firewood and charcoal selling (Little et al. 2001) 
The resulting environmental degradation can then itself increases risk exposure (e.g. decreases in 
water availability due to deforestation) and contribute to establish a mutually self-reinforcing cycle 
between poverty and environmental degradation (Barbier 2010; Barrett et al. 2011; Dasgupta et al. 
2005). 
A new blend of insurances has emerged on the policy arena since the beginning of the nineties: 
weather index insurance and affiliated instruments, also known under the generic term of index-based 
risk transfer product (IBRTP). The concept of index insurance is that the indemnities are not paid 
according to the actual loss but on the basis of an index highly correlated with the loss. Examples of 
such indexes are rain gauges, area-yield, wind speed or bio-mass as captured by satellite imagery.  
Index insurance might prove adequate in developing countries where governments can ill-afford the 
heavy subsidies needed for standard multiple peril crop insurance (Ibarra and Skees 2007). Weather 
index insurance is indeed much cheaper. For instance, rainfall insurance could be triggered objectively 
and remotely monitored based on satellite or rain gauge data. There is no need to send an employee 
to check that each policy holder is affected by a drought. Furthermore, it decreases the cost linked to 
asymmetric information (moral hazard and adverse selection) as the risk can be objectively assessed 
thanks to historical rainfall data. However, the uptake of weather insurance has been lower than 
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expected, the explanations ranging from a lack of information, the complexity of the product or 
behavioural biases.  
Clark (2011) showed recently that the basis risk was the main determinant of non-adoption. Hill et al. 
(2013) find that wealthier households were more likely to purchase weather index insurance and that 
risk aversion decreased the propensity to adopt it. Dercon et al. (2014) found that basis risk in weather 
insurance makes it a complement to informal risk sharing, implying that weather insurance could 
reinforce existing informal risk sharing networks and that communities with well-functioning informal 
risk sharing networks should be targeted first for weather insurance. Despite these promises, weather 
index insurance availability is still very low in Sub-Saharan Africa. As reviewed above, the traditional 
ex-post strategies adopted by households are not very effective at dealing with covariate and recurrent 
shocks such as drought and price swings.  
To sum up, traditional on-farm risk management strategies might be effective against idiosyncratic risk 
such as illness, but they might prove very costly, lock farmers in poverty traps, increase inequality and 
are not adapted to covariate shocks such as drought. Lastly, recent studies point toward a positive 
relationship between bio-diversity preservation and risk management and the development of 
weather index insurance could provide an effective way for farmers to deal with risk. 
1.5 Adoption of agricultural technologies and their impact on well-
being 
New agricultural technologies, such as drought tolerant crop varieties, could play a crucial role in 
improving food security in Africa. High yield varieties and the adoption of modern farming practices 
drove the Green Revolution in Asia and could provide increases in agricultural productivity across 
Africa as well. The uptake of new agricultural technology in Africa is however still limited and far from 
complete (Foster and Rosenzweig 2010).  
One key reason for adopting a new technology is its profitability. The return on adoption is however 
not easy to estimate (Foster and Rosenzweig 2010). Even in the relatively simple case of profit 
maximising entities, where the return on adoption could be measured as the increase in profit caused 
by the new technology, some inputs might hard to measure, particularly when considering small-scale 
farmers in developing countries where a large part of the input invested on the farm consists of home-
labour, which is hard to measure and hard to value. For instance, Foster and Rosenzweig (2010) notes 
that Duflo’s study (2008) of the impact of fertiliser adoption on output neglects changes in labour 
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provision. As the change in labour provision represents a cost, the benefit from the adoption might be 
overestimated if not properly taken into account.  
There is also a large heterogeneity between farmers in terms of plot quality, agro-ecological 
conditions, management skills and access to capital and inputs. These differences might be hard to 
assess. The observation that high yield farmers use improved seeds does not imply that farmers with 
traditional seeds should use improved seeds. It might be the case that farmers with improved seeds 
would also perform better with traditional seeds (heterogeneity between farmers) or that traditional 
seeds are better suited to the marginal lands used by farmers with low yields (heterogeneity in the 
return on adoption). An estimation of the impact of a new technology based on observational data 
which does not properly account for the heterogeneity between adopters and non-adopters will be 
biased: a part of the estimated increase in yield attributed to the new technology is, in fact, caused by 
the better management skills of the adopters or the higher suitability of their plots, for instance.  
These issues have been dealt with via endogenous switching regressions (Asfaw et al. 2012a), 
propensity score matching methods (Becerril and Abdulai 2010; Kassie et al. 2014; Mendola 2007), the 
use of both methods side by side (Amare et al. 2012; Asfaw et al. 2012b; Khonje et al. 2015; Shiferaw 
et al. 2014), or panel data analysis (Bezu et al. 2014; Mathenge et al. 2014; Smale and Mason 2014; 
Suri 2011). In endogenous switching regression methods, the decision to adopt and the impact of 
adoption on output are analysed jointly. The identification of the causal effect of adoption on the yield 
rests on the assumption that at least one variable used to explain adoption is not correlated with yield 
(exclusion restriction). In the propensity score matching methods, a set of observable variables is used 
to build a comparable set of pairs of adopters and non-adopters. The assumption is that conditional 
on these variables, the decision to adopt is random. However, some characteristics determining 
adoption might be unobservable to the analyst, implying that the conditional independence 
assumption is violated. 
Most studies find a positive effect of improved seeds on farmers well-being, be it in terms of income, 
food security or reduced depth of poverty. For instance, Minten and Barrett (Minten and Barrett 2008) 
find that areas that ‘have higher rates of adoption of improved agricultural technologies and, 
consequently, higher crop yields enjoy lower food prices, higher real wages for unskilled workers, and 
better welfare indicators’. Some studies find also that the poor benefit particularly (Bezu et al. 2014; 
Mathenge et al. 2014). However, gains might vary across farmers, depending on geophysical 
conditions, farm size, and other characteristics affecting output. Heterogeneous treatment effects 
associated with adoption have been analysed in detail for the case of hybrid maize in Kenya by Suri 
  
34 
 
(2011). Suri shows that the return on adoption might be null for a large share of the Kenyan farming 
population. 
The studies have provided a plethora of explanations for the low adoption of modern agricultural 
technologies. Following a literature review from 1985 (Feder et al. 1985), they include: farm size,  risk 
exposure and risk aversion,  human capital, capital and credit constraints, limited access to 
information. Studies on the determinant of the adoption of modern seeds performed since 2000 show 
that farmers still face similar constraints:  the high price of seeds (e.g. Fisher et al. 2015; Wekesa et al. 
2003), their low availability (e.g. Amare et al. 2012; Asfaw et al. 2012a; Fisher et al. 2015; Wekesa et 
al. 2003), a lack of capital and credit access (e.g. Fisher et al. 2015; Lambrecht et al. 2014; Zeller et al. 
1998), inadequate information about their usage and yield (e.g. Amare et al. 2012; Asfaw et al. 2012a; 
Fisher et al. 2015). Other studies have shown that the low rate of adoption could be explained by 
behavioural bias such as high rate of time discounting (Duflo et al. 2008, 2011) while others still have 
shown that the improved seeds were not profitable for a large share of the population so that farmers 
may behave perfectly rationally when deciding not to adopt (Suri 2011). 
Risk aversion and risk exposure has also been shown to play an important role in the adoption decision 
(e.g. Richard E Just and Zilberman 1983). New technology such as fertilisers or improved seeds 
represent a significant investment for poor farmers, the benefits of which might be hard to ascertain 
without prior experience. Simtowe et al. (2006) showed that a high level of risk aversion, among other 
factors such as education, leads to a low level of adoption of hybrid maize among farmers in Malawi 
while Knight et al. found similar results in Ethiopia (J. Knight et al. 2003). Hill (2009) finds that more 
risk averse farmers were less likely to invest in a profitable but risky crop in Uganda (coffee), a fact 
which was particularly salient for poor farmers unable to insure against shocks.  
Brick and Visser (2015) also found that farmer with a high degree of risk aversion were more likely to 
use traditional agriculture techniques and less likely to use modern seeds even when insurance is 
available. By contrast, Dercon and Christiaensen (2011) and Berhane et al. (2015) find that fertiliser 
use in Ethiopia increases if insurance is offered. Karlan et al. (2014) even go a step further by showing 
that in Ghana the binding constraint for investing in new technology is risk and not credit access: when 
relaxing risk constraint by providing weather index insurance, households were actually able to find 
the credit required to increase expenditure on farm inputs. Zeller et al. (1998) suggest that these risk-
induced poverty traps are not inescapable, as high risk averse farmers in Malawi were able to adopt 
new technology, such as hybrid maize and tobacco, provided that ‘policies improve their access to 
credit, extension,  input and output markets’. 
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Education has also been shown to play a major role in the adoption process as it facilitates learning 
about the use and potential of new technologies. Weir and Knight (2000) show that education had two 
positive externality effects: ‘educated farmers are early innovators, providing an example which may 
be copied by less educated farmers; and educated farmers are better able to copy those who innovate 
first, enhancing diffusion of the new technology more widely within the site’. In related study, Knight 
et al. (2003) found that education reduced risk aversion and hence increased adoption. 
It is has also been long recognized that social networks play an important role in the diffusion of 
technology. For instance, Besley and Case (1993), in their discussion of the modelling and estimation 
of farmers’ adoption decisions, stress the importance of learning from the experience of early adopters 
and from discussion with peers. Several empirical studies confirm the importance of the learning 
effects, mediated by peers and extension agents, on the decision to adopt (e.g. Bandiera and Rasul 
2006; Conley and Udry 2010; Isham 2002; Moser and Barrett 2006; Munshi 2004).  
Furthermore, Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) found that the profitability of a seed increased with 
neighbours’ experience because better knowledge on the management of the new seed was gained 
by observing peers.  More recently, Van den Broeck and Dercon (2011) found similar effects among 
Banana growers in Tanzania and showed that the impact of information depended on the network 
type, the kinship network being the most effective at transforming information into higher yield. Barr 
(2000) also found some productive effects of social capital in the Ghanaian manufacturing sector 
thanks to better flows of technological information. Nevertheless, the impact of social networks on 
the adoption process might be complex. Bandiera and Rasul (2006) find that the probability of 
adoption follows an inverse-U shape in the size of the social network: when there is only a few adopters 
in the network, knowing one more adopter increases the probability of adoption; when there are many 
adopters in the network, some farmers might have an incentive to free-ride and rely on the solidarity 
of their peers. 
We propose in chapter 3 an impact evaluation framework based on a set of randomized controlled 
trials. It offers unbiased estimate of the effect of improved seeds on yield and allows us to estimate 
the role played by the input adjustment of farmers in yielding the full potential of the improved seeds. 
1.6 Conclusion 
Farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa are largely exposed to the vagaries of the weather. In order to deal with 
this risk, they adopt various ex-ante risk management and ex-post risk coping strategies. However, ex-
post strategies tend to break down when large covariate shocks, such as droughts, occur; while ex-
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ante strategies tend to be very costly and might contribute to trap households in poverty. Improved 
seeds and fertilisers could go a long way in improving food security. However, they are not widely 
adopted. A myriad of factors explain this situation, but risk and the heterogeneity of new technology 
returns likely play an important role. Although solidarity networks of kin and friends are generally 
inadequate to deal with large covariate shocks, they are a key channel for technology diffusion. 
Nevertheless, an emerging body of literature shows that the social pressure to share among social 
networks might also distort incentives to invest in lucrative activities because of the fear of being taxed 
by kin or friends. Lastly, while bio-diversity has been found to decrease risk exposure in developing 
countries, risk aversion might by contrast deter some farmers from adopting eco-friendly practices in 
developed countries. We summarize below the contribution of the current thesis to the various fields 
of research covered in this literature review. 
Chapter 2 aims at providing a simple framework to assess the climate risk exposure by combining 
climate data and household level consumption data. Instead of relying on the residual as in the classic 
risk estimation framework of the agricultural economic literature (e.g. John M Antle 1983; john M. 
Antle 2010; Richard E. Just and Pope 1978; Kim et al. 2014), we propose to estimate the impact of 
weather shocks on consumption variables with a regression model similar to the one used in the ‘new 
climate economy’ literature (Dell et al. 2014). The novelty comes from the use of the statistical 
properties of the Standardized Precipitation Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI), our climate variable, in 
order to estimate the shape of the conditional distribution of consumption and provide direct estimate 
of its variance, its skewness. Poverty risk and other vulnerability indices could be computed with this 
approach. 
Chapter 3 provides an analysis of the contested issue of the profitability of improved seeds. It is likely 
that no single factor can, on its own, explain the puzzle of their low adoption in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, Suri (2011) showed that some agricultural technologies might not be profitable for a large 
part of the population, while Rosenzweig and Foster (2010) highlight the fact that many studies may 
overestimate the benefit of adoption because they neglect farmers’ adjustment cost, i.e. they measure 
the total effect of adoption instead of the net effect. Based on open and double-blind randomized 
controlled trials (RCT) in Tanzania, we provide an assessment of the role of farmers’ behavioural 
responses in driving the increase in yield of improved seeds. We find that at least 50% of the increase 
in yield estimated in a traditional RCT would not materialise without an increase in labour, land 
allocation and other dimensions of effort. Our experimental design provides also a lower and higher 
bounds of the net effect improved seeds. 
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Based on the data from the RCT cited above, chapter 4 investigates if the participants adopt an evasive 
behaviour to fend off solidarity requests from their social network when exposed to a positive income 
shock, i.e. receiving improved seeds. We use here only the open RCT conducted in Tanzania, not the 
double-blind one: we want to observe the participants’ behaviour when they know that they have a 
positive income shock. The evasive behaviour is measured among farmers having received the 
improved seeds as a decrease in social interactions which could reveal to their social network that they 
received the improved seeds. We find that the propensity to adopt an evasive behaviour increases 
with the size of the kin network. To our knowledge, this constitutes the first set of evidence, based on 
a RCT design involving real interactions - i.e. not in a choice experiment as in Jakiela and Ozier (2016) 
or with observational data as in Baland et al. (2011) and Di Falco and Bulte (2011) - that hiding from 
the social network tax takes place in a village economy. Nevertheless, we stop short of concluding that 
this evasive behaviour bears any economic consequences. Indeed, although they asked for less help 
on the experimental plot at harvest time, the participants did not ask for less help at planting and 
weeding time where a decrease in labour could have decreased yields.   
Lastly, chapter 5 investigates the impact on Irish farmers’ risk exposure of the Rural Environment 
Protection Scheme (REPS), an agri-environmental scheme. Organic and, more generally, low input 
agriculture tends to increase risk exposure according to several studies (e.g. Berentsen et al. 2012; 
Finger 2014; Gardebroek 2006; Serra et al. 2008) while risk aversion is believed to play a role in the 
low adoption of sustainable production techniques (e.g.Gardebroek 2006; Morris et al. 2000; Peerlings 
and Polman 2009). We show that REPS does not increase risk exposure, and adequately compensates 
farmers for foregone returns. Although we do not analyse the decision to join REPS, this could be one 
of the reasons of its large success. 
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2 A Simple Framework for the Estimation of Climate Risk 
Exposure 
Xavier Vollenweider6 
Abstract 
This article introduces a new framework to estimate climate risk exposure at the household level with 
the standardized precipitation evapotranspiration index (SPEI) as its building block. The great 
advantage of using the SPEI is in knowing that it is distributed as a standard normal distribution. We 
have hence a proxy variable for the climate with a known distribution. Once the conditional 
expectation of consumption has been estimated as a function of SPEI, the probability density function 
of expected consumption conditional on SPEI can be derived by a change of variables. We use this 
probability density function as our measure of climate risk exposure. Furthermore, the approach is 
simple enough to accommodate quantile regressions and hence offers the opportunity to broaden the 
scope of the analysis to different categories of the population. Lastly, it offers a direct estimate of the 
central moments of the climate risk exposure function via the regression estimates on the SPEI 
(variance, skewness, kurtosis). It circumvents hence the use of the residuals as done in traditional 
model of production risk analysis. The methodology is illustrated with a case study on Ethiopia, 
combining data from the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) with climate data (African Rainfall 
Climatology Version 2 dataset and Climate Prediction Centre Global Land Surface Air Temperature 
Analysis, GHCN+CAMS, NOAA 2001). The results show notably that households located at low altitudes 
are the most exposed to climate risk.  
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2.1 Introduction 
The seminal paper of Sandmo (1971) showing that risk leads to underinvestment and underproduction 
contributed to establishing the economics of production under uncertainty as an important research 
stream in economics, with agriculture as one of its favourite case studies. If production risk is a major 
topic in the agricultural economics literature, it is probably because ’the most singular aspect of 
agricultural production is its randomness’ (Chambers and Quiggin 1998). The main framework for 
production risk estimation is based on the stochastic production analysis of Just and Pope (1978) and 
Antle (1983). These models, and their later extensions to skewness and efficiency analysis (Di Falco 
and Chavas 2006; Kumbhakar and Tveterås 2003), have been the backbone of a large number of 
studies. They have been applied to the estimation of risk preferences, and efficiency (e.g. John M Antle 
1987; Koundouri et al. 2009; Love and Buccola 1991), to estimate the role of biodiversity as a risk 
mitigating option (e.g. Di Falco and Chavas 2006; Di Falco and Chavas 2009; Smale et al. 1998) and to 
water resource management (e.g. Groom et al. 2008). See Saastamoinen (2013) for an recent and 
synthetic literature review. 
Although the existing estimation framework is appropriate for estimating short-term production risk, 
the estimation of climate exposure is more elusive: climate risk in the classical framework is lumped 
into the larger category of production risk; a catch-all term covering plant and animal diseases, pests, 
mushrooms, damage caused by animals as well as droughts and floods. Two main reasons can explain 
this gap in the literature. First, when the foundations of the stochastic production analysis framework 
were laid, i.e. the beginning of the 1980s, climate change was not yet on the political agenda. Second, 
weather data were not widely available in the 1980s and geographical information system (GIS) 
software was still the realm of a few specialists. 
Following the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), the emergence of climate 
change and climate adaptation as a serious challenge to policymakers at both national and 
international levels has highlighted the need for a precise estimation of household climate risk 
exposure. Furthermore, anyone can nowadays access daily satellite and weather station precipitation 
as well as temperature data over several decades, and link them with microeconomic data thanks to 
GIS software (e.g. Quantum GIS7, R8). Hence, a new methodology utilizing this climate data bonanza 
and answering these policy needs is required.  
                                                          
7 Quantum GIS Development Team (2013). Quantum GIS Geographic Information System. Open Source 
Geospatial Foundation Project. http://qgis.osgeo.org. 
8 R Core Team (2013). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation for Statistical 
Computing, Vienna, Austria. URL  http://www.R-project.org/. 
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So far, the focus has been on estimating the production risk of the average household. Indeed, the 
main tool to investigate changes in other parts of a population distribution, i.e. quantile regression 
analysis (Koenker and Bassett 1978), was still a novelty at the time of the pioneering work of Just and 
Pope (1978). It is, however, of interest to know how climate exposure varies between poor and rich 
households or if a particular development policy is effective at decreasing climate exposure among 
poorer parts of a population. Standard quantile regression routines are now widely available on 
common statistical software (e.g. STATA) and their extensions to panel data, still an active field of 
research, are readily available via the R CRAN project, for instance. The new methodology should hence 
be simple enough to accommodate quantile regressions in order to distinguish climate exposure in 
different categories of the population. 
The methodology proposed in the present article is built on the use of standardized measures of 
weather. The Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI), first introduced by McKee et al. (McKee et al. 
1993, 1995), is a locally and frequency based characterization of precipitation levels. Guttman (1998, 
1999) widely contributed to its popularisation by showing some of its key advantages over the Palmer 
Drought Severity Index (Palmer 1965), the index of choice at the time.9 The SPI allows the comparison 
of hydrological conditions across space and time (Hayes et al. 1999), is flexible enough to consider 
different kind of droughts (e.g. hydrological conditions on monthly scales affecting agriculture, or at 
yearly scales affecting large-scale water management), is simple and tractable, and is parsimonious in 
terms of data requirements.  
Note that climate change affects both changes in precipitation and temperature. Vicente-Serrano et 
al. (2010) have proposed the SPEI in order to take into account the influence of temperature on 
hydrological conditions. Its statistical conception and properties are essentially the same as the SPI. 
However, in the case of the SPEI, it is the difference between precipitation and potential 
evapotranspiration, i.e. the net balance of water, which is standardized. As both temperature and 
precipitation have an impact on agricultural production and the livelihood of rural populations, and 
since the SPEI is more sensible in the context of climate change, it was preferred as the standardized 
measure of weather. 
The use of the SPEI offers the opportunity to easily characterize average production or consumption 
under locally and frequency-defined weather scenarios. As the framework is very simple, it can easily 
                                                          
9 The Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) is based on a water balance equation taking into account 
precipitation, moisture supply, runoff and evaporation demand at the surface level. According to Vicente-Serrano 
et al. (2010), although some of the weaknesses of the PSDI have been solved by Wells et al. (2004), the main 
weakness of the PDSI identified by Guttman (1998) has not been addressed: the fixed temporal scale between 9 
to 12 months and the fact that PDSI values are affected by conditions up to four years in the past. 
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be extended to quantile regressions in order to broaden the scope of analysis to households at 
different quantiles of the population distribution. In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity, 
we rely on penalized quantile fixed effects quantile regressions as proposed by Koenker (2004). 
Once the climate risk exposure has been estimated, a vulnerability index is needed to summarize the 
information. We rely on three indices: (1) poverty risk, (2) expected shortfall, and (3) relative risk 
premium. We apply the proposed methodology to the consumption level of rural households in 
Ethiopia with data from the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS)10, a panel dataset with seven 
rounds conducted between 1989 and 2009, including more than 1,200 households. The climate data 
come from the African Rainfall Climatology Version 2 dataset and the Climate Prediction Center Global 
Land Surface Air Temperature Analysis dataset (GHCN+CAMS, NOAA 2001). All datasets used in the 
present study are freely available online.  
 
Section 2.2 presents the estimation framework starting with a brief review of the classical estimation 
framework of production risk analysis (2.2.1), following with the presentation of the SPEI (2.2.2) and 
the derivation of the climate consumption model (2.2.3). The vulnerability indices and the estimation 
strategy are then presented (2.2.4 and 2.2.5 respectively). Section 2.3 presents the data and results 
are discussed in section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.  
2.2 Estimation framework 
2.2.1 Production risk analysis 
The classical risk estimation methodology was developed when climate and weather data were not 
widely available. The emphasis was hence on production risk, a catch term for drought, flood, pest and 
animal diseases. In other words, production risk was viewed as all factors affecting production which 
are not under the farmer’s control, oscillating randomly from year to year and not related to market 
risk (e.g. inputs and outputs price volatility); resources risk (e.g. fertilizers, seeds and labour supply 
shocks), institutional risk (e.g. changes in policy), financial risk (e.g. changes in the interest rates 
                                                          
10 The ERHS data have been made available by the Economics Department, Addis Ababa University (Economics 
/AAU); the Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford (CSAE); and the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). Funding for data collection was provided by the Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID); the preparation of the public release version of these data was supported, 
in part, by the World Bank. AAU, CSAE, IFPRI, ESRC, SIDA, USAID and the World Bank are not responsible for any 
errors in these data or for their use or interpretation. 
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charged on the debt of the farm), personal risk (e.g. health issues, accidents), and asset risks (thefts or 
fire damages to buildings, machinery and livestock) (Hardaker et al. 2004; Hazell 1992). Note that 
financial risk, personal risk, and asset risk are rarely controlled for in applied studies and hence are 
lumped into production risk.  
Furthermore, the framework was designed to disentangle the impact of different inputs on production 
risk exposure. The impact of weather risk on the production process was hence not the main concern. 
Most studies in the literature on poverty traps have addressed the question of weather shocks and 
weather risk impact on consumption either by including a dummy variable equal to one if the 
household was exposed to extreme events or by using another weather risk index. In the latter case, 
the most popular weather risk measure has been rainfall variability, captured by the variance or the 
intra-year coefficient of variation. However, such measures are likely to introduce unobserved 
heterogeneity bias if the sample overlaps different weather regimes. For instance, a great level of intra-
year variation might be a characteristic of a particular weather regime and hence should not count as 
risk, while in another weather regime such variation would indeed imply erratic rainfalls. Dercon and 
Christansen (2011) use lower quantiles of the sample’s rain distribution to characterize weather 
shocks. This approach is the closest to the one introduced in the present paper. 
The goal of risk estimation could be summarized as the estimation of the different central moments of 
the probability distribution of production. The first central moment is the mean, i.e. the expected 
output or yield. The second moment, i.e. the variance, is a measure of the dispersion of the possible 
production levels. For instance, a farmer expecting a yield between 200 kg/ha and 4,000 kg/ha would 
have a higher variance than a farmer expecting a yield between 1,800 kg/ha and 2,200 kg/ha. Variance 
has hence been one of the first measures of risk. The third moment, summarized by the skewness, is 
a measure of the asymmetry of possible yields. Negative skewness implies that expected yield is lower 
than the most likely one and that if bad and good harvests with the same probability are compared, 
the bad harvest will cost more than the good one could have yield. It is hence often interpreted as a 
measure of downside risk.  
The key insight of Just and Pope (1978) was to split the production function into a deterministic part 
and a stochastic part, allowing inputs to be risk-increasing, risk-neutral or risk-decreasing. The 
production, 𝑦, is specified as follows: 
𝑦 = 𝑓(𝒙, 𝜷) + ℎ(𝒙,𝜸)1/2𝜀 (1)  
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where 𝑓(𝒙, 𝜷) is the deterministic production function, 𝒙  a set of inputs, 𝜷 a set of parameters to be 
estimated, ℎ(𝒙, 𝜸) the risk function, with parameters 𝜸 to be estimated, and 𝜀 a random noise 
identically and independently distributed (iid) according to a standard normal distribution.  
Antle (1983) showed that the Just and Pope approach restricts the effect of inputs across variance and 
higher moments. He proposed the so-called ‘flexible moment-based approach’ where the central 
probability moments (i.e. mean, variance etc.) are directly specified: 
𝜇1(𝑥, 𝛽1) = ∫𝑦𝑓(𝑦|𝑥)𝑑𝑦 (2)  
𝜇𝑖(𝑥, 𝛽𝑖) = ∫(𝑦 − 𝜇1)
𝑖𝑓(𝑦|𝑥)𝑑𝑦⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖 ≥ 2 (3)  
where 𝛽𝑖 relates the input 𝑥 to the moment 𝜇𝑖. This approach relaxes any cross-moments restrictions: 
the inputs’ elasticity with respect to variance does not restrict their elasticity with respect to higher 
moments. The different moments can be estimated using a feasible generalized least square estimator 
(FGLS). The first step is hence to estimate a classical production function with FGLS, the residuals of 
which are then put to the square and to the cube to estimate the variance and skewness function. The 
predicted values of this set of three regressions are respectively the mean, variance and skewness of 
the conditional distribution of each farmer’s production.  
A limitation of these approaches is that they are highly parametric. Indeed, specification errors in the 
first moment, respectively Equations (1) and (2), cascade across the whole model, directly affecting 
the estimation of the higher moments.  
A popular solution is to choose a flexible functional form such as the translog function, which 
corresponds to a second order Taylor approximation around the mean of the true production function 
(e.g. Greene 2003). Although mathematically appealing, the translog functions are notoriously hard to 
estimate with a sample of a few hundred observations (the usual sample size of rural household 
surveys): the set of covariates enters the function multiple times — in level, square and through the 
series of interaction terms — giving rise to important multicollinearity issues.11 It is hence difficult to 
obtain statistically significant estimates and no test provides an objective criterion to select which 
covariates to retain. Full information maximum likelihood estimation and general method of moments 
provide more efficient results, although issues persist. As Kumbhakar and Tveteras (2003) note: ‘[the] 
idea of dropping insignificant variables is not pursued […] due to several problems. First, it destroys 
                                                          
11 For instance, a production function with four explanatory variables, say labour, fertilizer, land and capital, 
implies fourteen parameters to estimate. 
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the flexibility of the mean output function. Second, dropping one insignificant variable caused other 
insignificant (significant) variables to be significant (insignificant) due to high multicollinearity (which 
is always present in flexible functions) and the use of a system approach. Furthermore, we found no 
natural order to select variables for exclusion in the present model’. Therefore, although the 
conditional expectation might well fit on average, marginal effects are difficult to ascertain. 
Recently, quantile regressions started to attract interest in the microeconomics of risk literature (as 
across most applied statistical disciplines). The first author to mention the possible application of 
quantile regressions to production risk analysis is probably Charles B. Moss (2010), and the first to 
propose an estimation framework of production risk based on quantile regressions were Kim et al. 
(2014).  
2.2.2 Definition of the climate variable 
Meteorologists have struggled to give a definition of drought general enough to be comparable across 
areas and time: light rains in the middle of the rainy season might be the first sign of an incoming 
drought in a given area, while the same level of precipitation can be considered as totally normal at 
other times of the year or in another area. The standardized precipitation index (SPI) addresses 
precisely these kinds of issues. The SPI is a localized and statistical measure of precipitation. It offers a 
comparable index across times and regions. Indeed, it is based indeed on local frequency: given a series 
of cumulative local monthly precipitation over an extended period (30 years is deemed acceptable), 
probability functions are fitted on each monthly distribution. Most commonly, a gamma distribution is 
fitted with a maximum likelihood estimator and then standardized. 
The SPI is symmetrically distributed around zero, a value of zero representing normal conditions, whilst 
below and above zero values represent dry and wet conditions respectively, with values between -0.5 
and 0.5 considered as nearly normal. Although the SPI is theoretically unbounded, values below -3 and 
above 3 are extremely rare as they occur with a probability of 0.1 %. Assuming that weather events 
are identically and independently distributed, catastrophic droughts and floods can be defined as SPI 
values above and below ± 2.3, i.e. a drought or flood with a return period of 100 years (Guttmann 
1999). Values above and below ± 1.9 can also be considered as extreme events as they have a return 
period of 35 years.  
Recently, Vicente-Serrano et al. (2010) have proposed focusing on the net balance of water in order to 
take climate change into account. The intuition is the same, the only change being that it is not 
precipitation, but the difference between precipitation and evapotranspiration that is standardized.  
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The calculation of the SPEI has four main steps. We follow here the presentation of Vicente-Serrano et 
al. (2010). The first step consists in computing potential evapotranspiration (PET), i.e. the demand of 
water in the hydrological process. The simplest PET index, used in the present study, is the 
Thornthwaite Index (1948): it requires only the temperature and the latitude at which the data have 
been gathered. The derivation of this can be found in appendix 2.6.  
The second step consists in computing the ‘water balance’ for a given month, say July, at time 𝑡, i.e. 
the difference between precipitation and evapotranspiration: 
𝐷𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝐸𝑇𝑡  (4)  
where 𝐷𝑡, 𝑃𝑡 and 𝑃𝐸𝑇𝑡 are respectively the water balance, the precipitation and the potential 
evapotranspiration measured in millimetres. A positive value for 𝐷𝑡 implies at time 𝑡 a water surplus 
and a negative one implies a water deficit. The step is then repeated on each month of July for which 
data are available in order to obtain a time series of the net balance of water in July over the last 30 
years for instance. 
The third step consists of fitting a distribution 𝐹(𝐷) on times series of 𝐷𝑡 gathered over the sample 
period. The longer the period, the better is the distribution fit, but 30 years of data, i.e. 30 observations 
of 𝐷𝑡, is deemed acceptable. Several candidate distributions were investigated by Beguería and 
Vicente-Serrano (2013): Pearson III, Lognormal, Log-logistic and General Extreme Value. As all the 
investigated distributions fit well with empirical probabilities, a selection is made based on their 
behaviour at extreme values. Following the latter criterion, the log-logistic distribution is preferred and 
its parameters are estimated with the unbiased probability weighted moments method (Beguería and 
Vicente-Serrano 2013). 
The last step consists of obtaining the SPEI values which are defined as the inverse of 𝐹(𝐷) once 𝐹(𝐷) 
is standardized.  Beguería and Vicente-Serrano (2013) use the formula 26.2.23 in Abramowitz and 
Stegun (1972):  
𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐼𝑝 = 𝑊 −
𝐶0 + 𝐶1𝑊 + 𝐶2𝑊
2
1 + 𝑑1𝑊 + 𝑑2𝑊2 + 𝑑3𝑊3
 (5)  
where 𝑝 is the probability that 𝐷𝑡 exceeds a given value ?̅?𝑡 and is given by 𝐹(𝐷), 𝐶0 = 2.515517, 𝐶1 =
⁡0.802853,⁡𝐶2 ⁡= ⁡0.010328, 𝑑1 ⁡= ⁡1.432788, 𝑑2 ⁡= ⁡0.189269, 𝑑3 = ⁡0.001308 and W is given by: 
𝑊 = √ln (
1
𝑝2
) = √−2 ln 𝑝 (6)  
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The approximation is valid for 𝑝 ≤ 0.5. For 𝑝 > 0.5, 𝑝 is replaced by 1 − 𝑝 and the sign of the resulting 
𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐼𝑝 is inversed.  
Figure 2.1: Standardization of the net balance of water 
 
 
The process is illustrated with simulated data in Figure 2.1. On the left-hand side, we plot the density 
of net balance of water simulated according to a gamma distribution. The simulated data is then 
standardised with the formula in equation (5) in order to obtain the normal density plotted on the 
right-hand side, i.e. the SPEI index. The colour shading indicates the frequency of net balance of water’s 
values, from very rare (dark red) to very frequent (bright green).  
2.2.3 Climate consumption model 
The great advantage of using the SPEI is in knowing that it is distributed as a standard normal 
distribution. We have hence a proxy variable for the climate with a known distribution12. Once the 
conditional expectation of consumption has been estimated as a function of SPEI, the probability 
density function of expected consumption conditional on SPEI can be derived by a change of variables. 
We use this probability density function as our measure of climate risk exposure. We present below 
how we recover climate risk exposure based on the relationship between consumption and SPEI.  
                                                          
12 Following the terminology used in new climate-economy literature, we define the word ‘climate’ as the 
distribution of all possible weather events (Dell et al. 2014). We reserve the word weather of a realisation of the 
climate, i.e. a random draw from the distribution of all possible weather events. 
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Let us assume that the relation between the SPEI and consumption is defined as follows: 
𝑐 = 𝑔(𝑆) (7)  
where 𝑐 is consumption, 𝑆 is the SPEI with probability density function 𝑓𝑠(𝑆), i.e. a standard normal 
density function, and 𝑔(𝑆) is a monotonic and increasing function.  
We can compute the probability density function of 𝑐 by a change of variables as (e.g. Casella and 
Berger 2002): 
𝑓𝑐(𝑐) = 𝑓𝑠(𝑔
−1(𝑐)) |
𝑑𝑔−1(𝑐)
𝑑𝑐
| (8)  
where 𝑔−1(𝑐) is the inverse function of 𝑔(𝑆) and 𝑓𝑠 is the probability density function of SPEI, i.e. a 
standard normal density function as shown in equation (5) and (6). 
In the case of a non-monotonous function, we have (e.g. Casella and Berger 2002):  
𝑓𝑐(𝑐) = ∑ |
𝑑𝑔𝑘
−1(𝑐)
𝑑𝑐
|
𝑛(𝑐)
𝑘=1
𝑓𝑆(𝑔𝑘
−1(𝑐)) (9)  
where 𝑔𝑘
−1(𝑐) = 𝑆 is the inverse function of 𝑔(⁡), 𝑛(𝑐) is the number of k solutions to 𝑔𝑘
−1(𝑐). 
For the sake of example, let us assume that consumption is a linear function of SPEI: 
𝑐 = 𝑔(𝑆) = 2𝑆 (10)  
so that the 𝑔−1(𝑐) = 𝑐/2 and 𝑑𝑔−1⁡(𝑐)/𝑑𝑐 = 1/2. Hence, the probability function of 𝑦 can be 
expressed as: 
𝑓𝑐(𝑐) = 0.5𝑓𝑠(
𝑐
2
) (11)  
We illustrate the change of variables in Figure 2.2 with a simulation. We start by generating a sample 
of 1000 observations for 𝑆 equally spaced over [-3, 3]. We then compute 𝑐 according to (10) as shown 
by thick black line in plot a in Figure 2.2. We also plot 𝑓𝑠 on its left axis (grey dashed line, plot a of Figure 
2.2). Applying the formula in equation (8), we obtain the density function 𝑓𝑐 and plot it in graph 1.b. 
Intuitively, each consumption level on the thick black line of 𝑐 is weighted according to the likelihood 
of the corresponding 𝑆 value shown in grey. 
Many of the studies in the ‘new climate-economy literature’ use a non-linear specification of climate 
with a preference for the quadratic specification (e.g. Hidalgo et al. 2010; Lobell et al. 2011a; Lobell et 
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al. 2011b; Schlenker and Roberts 2009; Schlenker and Lobell 2010). For instance, temperature 
increases yield up to a point where an increase in temperature has an adverse impact on yield, each 
additional degree decreasing it. We can expect the same to be true for consumption in rural areas of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, where weather conditions have a large effect on consumption (see section 1.4 of 
the literature review for a survey of the link between weather shocks and poverty). 
We therefore repeat the example above, specifying this time consumption as a quadratic function of 
SPEI:      
𝑔(𝑆, 𝛽) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑆
2 (12)  
Letting 𝛽0 = 10,⁡ 𝛽1 = 1 and 𝛽2 = −2, consumption reach a maximum in conditions slightly moister 
than normal and decreases both with positive and negative values (plot c of Figure 2.2). Applying the 
formula in equation (9), the density function of 𝑐 is: 
𝑓𝑐(𝑐) = ∑ |1/√𝛽1
2 − 4𝛽2(𝛽0 − 𝑦)|
2
𝑘=1
𝑓𝑆(𝑔𝑘
−1(𝑐)) (13)  
where 𝑔𝑘
−1(𝑐) =
−𝛽1±√𝛽1
2−4𝛽2(𝛽0−𝑦)
2𝛽2
. We show it in plot d of Figure 2.2.  
Figure 2.2: Recovering climate risk exposure 
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When 𝑔(𝑆) is a quadratic function, the probability density function 𝑓𝑐(𝑐) is a non-central chi-squared 
distribution. Indeed, let us rewrite 𝑔(𝑆) as: 
𝑐 = 𝑎(𝑆 − 𝐵)2 + 𝐷 (14)  
where 𝑎 = 𝛽2, 𝐵 = −𝛽1/2𝛽2, 𝐷 = 𝛽0 − (𝛽1/2𝛽2)
2𝛽2, 𝑆 − 𝐵~𝑁 (
𝛽1
2𝛽2
, 1) and (𝑆 − 𝐵)2 follows a 
noncentral chi-squared distribution with 1 of degree of freedom and noncentrality parameter⁡𝜆 =
(−𝐵)2 (Casella and Berger 2002), i.e. (𝑆 − 𝐵)2~𝜒1
2(𝜆). 
Substituting back the original 𝛽 parameters and taking into account the fact that 𝑐 is a linear 
transformation of a 𝜒1
2(𝜆) distributed variable, the first four central moments of 𝑓𝑐(𝑐) are given by: 
𝜇1(𝑐) = 𝛽2 (1 + (
𝛽1
2𝛽2
)
2
) + 𝛽0 − (−(
𝛽1
2𝛽2
)
2
)𝛽2 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽2 (15)  
𝜇2(𝑐) = 2𝛽2
2 (1 + 2(
𝛽1
2𝛽2
)
2
) = 2𝛽2
2 + 𝛽1
2 (16)  
a. Linear effect of SPEI on consumption 
b. Climate risk exposure as a normal 
distribution 
c. Quadratic effect SPEI on consumption d. Climate risk exposure as a non-central 
chi-squared distribution 
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𝜇3(𝑐) = 𝛽2
3(8(1 + 3(
𝛽1
2𝛽2
)
2
)) = 8𝛽2
3 + 6𝛽2𝛽1
2 (17)  
𝜇4(𝑐) = 𝛽2
4 [12(1 + 2(
𝛽1
2𝛽2
)
2
)
2
+ 48(1 + 4(
𝛽1
2𝛽2
)
2
)]
= 48 + 12𝛽2
4 + 6𝛽1
4 + 96𝛽1
2𝛽2
2. 
(18)  
While 𝛽0has only an impact on the mean, 𝜇1(𝑐), 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 have an impact on all the central moments 
of 𝑓𝑐(𝑐).  
The advantage of the approach proposed above is hence to offer a direct estimate of the central 
moments of the climate risk exposure function via the 𝛽 parameters. It circumvents the use of the 
residuals as done in traditional model of production risk analysis (John M. Antle 1983). 
Lastly, we can specify consumption not only as a function of SPEI, but also as a function of other 
determinants such as land tenure, agro-ecological zones, development intervention, etc. Furthermore, 
we can assess the impact of a given variable, say agro-ecological zones, on climate risk exposure by 
specifying the following function: 
𝑔(𝑆, 𝐺, 𝛽) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑆
2 + 𝛽3𝐺 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑆 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑆
2 (19)  
where 𝐺 is  a dummy variable equal to one for household living in a given agro-ecological zone. Solving 
this quadratic equation, the inverse function of  𝑔(𝑆, 𝐺, 𝛽) and its derivative in absolute terms are: 
𝑔(𝑐)𝑘
−1 =
−(𝛽1 + 𝛽4𝐺) ± √(𝛽1 + 𝛽4𝐺)2 − 4(𝛽2 + 𝛽5𝐺)(𝛽0 + 𝛽3𝐺 − 𝑐)
2(𝛽2 + 𝛽5𝐺)
 (20)  
and 
|
𝑑𝑔𝑘
−1(𝑐)
𝑑𝑐
| =
1
√(𝛽1 + 𝛽4𝐺)2 − 4(𝛽2 + 𝛽5𝐺)(𝛽0 + 𝛽3𝐺 − 𝑐)
. 
(21)  
Equations (20) and (21) are then inserted into equation (9) in order to obtain 𝑓𝑐(𝑐) and we can modify 
equations (15)-(18) accordingly in order to estimate the central moments in and out of the agro-
ecological zone of interest. 
We do not do address here any of the classic endogeneity issues: it provides only a framework to 
estimate various measures of risk under the assumption that the additional variables included in the 
model, 𝐺 in the equation above, are exogenous. 
  
60 
 
2.2.4 Vulnerability Indices 
Once the relationship between consumption and climate is established and the properties of climate 
risk exposure are derived (variance, skewness etc.), we need to summarize this information into a 
measure with an economic meaning. We use for this a set of vulnerability indices. Our first index is the 
consumption poverty risk. It has notably been used by Chaudhuri, Jalan, and Suryahadi (2002) and 
Christiaensen and Subbarao (2000) and it is defined as the probability that a household’s consumption 
falls below the poverty line.  
In the framework presented in section 2.2.3, poverty risk is computed by estimating the 𝛽 parameters 
of equation (9) or (12) with SPEI and consumption data. Then, we generate with a random number 
generator a sample of shocks following a standard normal distribution, i.e. an artificial sample of SPEI, 
and compute a consumption level under each scenario thanks to the 𝛽 parameters. Poverty risk is then 
approximated by the percentage of simulated consumption scenarios falling below the poverty line. 
In order to illustrate the versatility of the estimation approach introduced in section 2.2.3, we compute 
the expected poverty shortfall given weather conditions at least as bad as a weather shock of a 
magnitude expected to occur at most every 25 years.13 We start by defining a threshold such as an 
extreme weather event with a 5 years return period, be it a drought or a flood. We then compute the 
difference between the expected consumption under such conditions or worse the poverty line: 
𝑉2(𝑆) = 𝑧 − ∫ 𝑐𝑓𝑐(𝑐)d𝑐
𝑔(𝑆)
−∞
 (22)  
where 𝑧 is the poverty line and 𝑆 is defined in terms of the return period of the event in question. For 
instance, for drought expected to occur every 25 years, 𝑆 equals -1.9. The conditional expected poverty 
shortfall, 𝑉2(𝑆), will hence measure the average cash transfer required to bringing back a household 
to the poverty line in the case of a weather event with a magnitude expected to recur every 25 years 
at most.  
Lastly, we can compute the relative risk premium with:  
𝑅𝑅𝑃 ≈ (
𝐴𝑃
2
𝜇2 −
𝐷𝑆
6
𝜇3 +
𝐹𝑇
24
𝜇4) 𝜇1⁄  (23)  
                                                          
13 It could be summarized as the combination of the expected poverty shortfall commonly used in vulnerability 
analysis and the conditional values-at-risk measure used in the finance literature (e.g. Engle and Manganelli 
2004). We don’t attempt here at providing any rigourous derivation of this index, it is only used for illustrative 
purposes. Interested readers are referred to Foster et al. (2010) for a review of the use of the Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke class of poverty measures with illustration of recent vulnerability analysis, or Hoddinott and 
Quisumbing (2003)e.g. , e.g.  for a more detailed review on vulnerability measurement. 
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where 𝜇𝑖  are the i
th central moment as expressed in equations (15)-(18), AP is the coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion (Pratt) for mean-preserving spread aversion, DS is the coefficient of downside 
risk aversion (Menezes et al. 1980), for mean-spread-preserving skewness preferences and FT is the 
coefficient of kurtosis aversion (Rubinstein et al. 2006) for mean-spread-skewness preserving kurtosis 
aversion. We specify the utility function as follows: 
𝑈(𝑥) =
𝑈(𝑥)1−𝛾
1 − 𝛾
 (24)  
We will conduct some sensitivity analysis on the γ parameter as its values varies according to academic 
fields and authors (e.g. Holt and Laury 2002; Ligon and Schechter 2003; Yesuf and Bluffstone 2009). 
These three vulnerability indices give different perspectives on the climate risk exposure of 
households. The poverty risk is intuitive, but does not take into account the expected depth of poverty. 
The conditional expected poverty shortfall index captures downside risk and could be useful for 
contingency planning14. Lastly, the relative risk premium emphasizes the trade-off between expected 
profit and risk and could be used for targeting the roll-out of private agricultural insurance policies 
such as weather index insurance. Indeed, the relative risk premium, also known as the implicit cost of 
risk bearing, is an estimate of household willingness to pay for risk reduction.  
2.2.5 Estimation strategy 
In order obtain estimates of the 𝛽 parameters in equation (12), we will use ordinary least squares on 
the following regression line: 
𝑐 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑆
2 + 𝜀 (25)  
where 𝛽𝑖are the parameter to estimate, 𝑆 is the SPEI values of the peak rainfall month of the preceding 
season and 𝜀 is an error term. We will also investigate how weather sensitivity and climate risk 
exposure varies between as agro-ecological zones with the following regression line: 
𝑐 = 𝛽0 + (𝛽1𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑆
2 + 1)𝑨𝑬𝒁𝜷𝑨𝑬𝒁 + 𝜀 (26)  
where 𝑨𝑬𝒁 is a set of dummy variables for the agro-ecological zones and 𝜷𝑨𝑬𝒁 a vector of parameter 
to be estimated. Lastly, we will test the impact of access to basic service on vulnerability with the 
following specification:  
                                                          
14 A much more thorough examination of its properties would be required however before using it for any policy 
purpose. 
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𝑐 = 𝛽0 + (𝛽1𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑆
2) + 𝑨𝑬𝒁𝜷𝑨𝑬𝒁 +𝑿𝜷+ 𝜀 (27)  
where 𝑿 is a set of basic services we will describe in the data section.  
As the climate variable is exogenous and varies randomly over time, the regression should not suffer 
from reverse causality bias. In order to control for omitted variable bias, we use household fixed effects 
in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity between household. In each case, we will present 
results obtained both with pooled regression and panel fixed effects models.  
Given the serial correlation of the error term coming from the use of fixed effects as well as the likely 
heteroskedasticity, we computed heteroskedasitcity and autocorrelation robust standard errors 
following Arellano (Arellano 1987) with the plm R CRAN package (Croissant and Millo 2008). 
Furthermore, all explicative variables are measured at the peasant association (PA) level. It is therefore 
likely that the error exhibit a certain degree of clustering at the PA level despite the use of household 
fixed effects. We therefore apply a degree of freedom correction to the variance-covariance matrix of 
the parameter estimates 𝛽𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,… . , 𝑁. The resulting variance-covariance matrix is hence computed 
as:  
𝑉(?̂?) =
𝐺
𝐺 − 1
𝑁 − 1
𝑁 − 𝐾
(𝑋𝑇𝑋)−1∑𝑋𝑖
𝑇𝜀𝑖𝜀𝑖
𝑇𝑋𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
(𝑋𝑇𝑋)−1 (28)  
where 𝐺 is the number of PA, 𝑁 is the sample size and 𝐾 is the model rank. 
Note that the parameter estimates on SPEI have to be read in terms of standard deviation: a net 
balance of water one standard deviation away from normal causes a change of 𝛽 consumption units. 
The fact that the SPEI is standardized implies that the water balance is measured in terms of local 
frequencies. This help sorts another source of unobserved heterogeneity: typically, one can assume 
that a given level of net balance of water is going to have a heterogeneous impact across agro-
ecological zones. The standardization implies that we are comparing the net balances of water in terms 
of their local frequency so that passing from 0 to 1 on the SPEI scale means the same across the 
country, i.e. a one standard deviation compared to normal conditions. 
Lastly, note that the estimated climate risk exposure via OLS is valid for the average household in the 
sample. Instead of focusing on expected consumption, we can look at the consumption at other 
quantiles of the consumption sample distribution. It is likely that poorer farmers exhibit higher climate 
risk exposure because of a lack of ex ante and ex post risk mitigating options such as irrigated plots, 
liquid assets (e.g. bullocks and gold ornaments), off-farm jobs, savings and affluent social networks 
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(e.g. relatives working in a nearby town). We can therefore expand the analysis from the climate risk 
exposure of the average household to the climate risk exposure at different quantiles: 
𝑓𝑐𝜏(𝑐𝜏) = ∑ |
𝑑𝑔𝜏
−1(𝑐𝜏)
𝑑𝑐𝜏
|
𝑛(𝑐𝜏)
𝑘=1
𝑓𝑆(𝑔𝑘⁡𝜏
−1(𝑐𝜏)) (29)  
where 𝑐𝜏 = 𝑄𝜏(𝑐𝑖𝑡|𝑆) is the conditional quantile of consumption as a function of SPEI.  
Panel econometrics methods for quantile regression have been developed by Koenker (2004) and 
Abrevia and Dahl (2008). They have recently been applied by Bache et. al (2013) to study the impact 
of prenatal maternal smoking on the dispersion of birthweights and by Dahl et al. (2013) to study the 
impact of the decentralization of wage bargaining on wage dispersion. As in the classical mean 
regression panel methods, they allow for the control of unobserved heterogeneity within the sample. 
The standard errors were automatically computed with bootstraps thanks to the rqpd package on R 
(Koenker and Holst Bache 2014).  
It is interesting to note that there has been some confusion between risk and inequality in the 
literature using quantile regressions. A clear example of the ambiguity surrounding quantile 
regressions’ estimates is the twin papers of Peirera and Martins (2002, 2004) on the impact of 
education on wages. In a first version of the paper published in Economics Letters in 2002, the authors 
apply quantile regressions at each decile of the wage distribution with education as an explicative 
variable. Their goal is to estimate the impact of education on wage uncertainty across sixteen European 
countries. They interpret their results as follows: ‘[I]f there is a large difference in the estimated 
coefficients between the first and last decile, meaning that the return is much higher at the upper than 
at the lower decile, the individual faces a high risk, as the individual can end up at the lower decile. If 
the difference is small, there is almost no risk’ (Telhado Pereira and Silva Martins 2002). Other studies 
based on the risk interpretation of quantile estimates have followed, both in the banking sector and 
the literature examining the impact of education on wage. 
 A second version of the paper, with exactly the same set of data, econometric analysis, results and 
published by the same authors one year later in Labour Economics, is entitled ‘Does education reduce 
wage inequality?’. In the latter paper, the authors give the inequality interpretation of quantile 
regressions, i.e. a positive difference between higher and lower quantile estimates implies that 
education increases inequality: ‘[their] findings imply that schooling may have a positive impact upon 
  
64 
 
within-group wage inequality, as the spread of returns increases for higher educational levels’ (Martins 
and Pereira 2004).15  
In support of this interpretation, we observe that the law of iterated expectation does not apply in the 
quantile world. Therefore, while the conditional expectation can be interpreted as the expectation for 
an average household, the conditional quantile cannot be interpreted as the quantile of the conditional 
distribution of an average as household. The classic interpretation of quantile regressions’ parameters 
as indicative of sample inequality seems hence more appropriate. We will assume below that SPEI has 
a rank preserving effect: the rank of each household is not affected by a change in the SPEI value. We 
can hence interpret the results of a quantile regression estimated at the median for instance as the 
effect of SPEI on the median household. 
 To sum-up, we predict expected consumption thanks to a regression of consumption on the SPEI and, 
optionally, on a set of controls. As the SPEI is distributed according to a standard normal distribution, 
we can compute with a change of variable the probability density function of consumption, i.e. the 
climate risk exposure of the average household (or households at other quantile, for instance the 
poorest quintile). Climate risk exposure and weather sensitivity are then summarized in three indices: 
poverty risk, expected shortfall and the risk premium. 
2.3 Data 
The Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) is probably the longest running household survey 
available on development economics, conducted from 1989 to 2009 in seven rounds, with a 
staggeringly low level of attrition (see Dercon and Kirshan, 1998, for the sample frame design).  On top 
of being freely available on the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) website, it comes 
with a great amount of documentation and videos on the data collection process and data issues. For 
this paper, we use the data files on consumption and community level information.  
There are large seasonal fluctuations in consumption as documented by Dercon and Krishnan (2000). 
As the surveys have not been conducted exactly at the same period of the year over the rounds, we 
                                                          
15 The rationale behind this is that ‘the earnings increment associated to schooling is higher for those individuals 
whose unobservable characteristics place them at the top of the conditional wage distribution’ (idem). It is hence 
akin to the latent effect interpretation of quantile regression: inequality in conditional wage outcomes is the 
result of differences in innate ability revealed by quantile regression. Note that this interpretation is, in turn (and 
quite paradoxically), related to a special case of Kanbur’s model (1979) , where risk is represented by the ability 
risk that an entrepreneur faces when starting a business for the first time, i.e. the uncertainty about his own 
capacity to run it. Other earlier works (e.g. Friedman, 1953) have drawn the link between risk and inequality. It 
also echoes the concept of ‘veil of ignorance’ used in thought experiments by political philosophers to apprehend 
social contracts and redistribution (Rawls, 1971). 
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follow Dercon et al. (2012) and drop data from rounds 2, 3 and 4. Indeed, rounds 2 and 4’s data were 
collected in most villages just after harvest, when a household’s consumption is expected to be at its 
maximum. Round 3 is removed in order to have an equally spaced panel (1994, 1999, 2004, 2009) and 
avoid hence inconsistent estimates due to heterogeneous frequency (Dercon et al. 2012). The other 
rounds have been performed, on average, 6 to 9 months after harvest.  
Ethiopia changed in many aspects between 1989 and 2009. The country’s population increased from 
50 m to 83 m between 1992 and 2009 (FAO statistics). Meanwhile, the share of the rural population is 
quite stable although we do observe a slow and constant decline from 88% in 1989 to 83% in 2009. 
Lastly, the road network almost doubled between 1997 and 2007, although the share of paved roads 
did not follow suit (decreasing from 15% to 13.7%). In constant 2005 US dollars, GDP per capita had 
been oscillating around $140 until 2003 before experiencing a steep rise, reaching $213 in 2009, i.e. a 
52% increase in 6 years for an average GDP growth of 11% (World Development Indicators, The World 
Bank, 2014). The domestic food price index grew from 1.6 in 1990 to 1.9 in 2009. Hence it is not clear, 
a priori, if the food security of the rural population has increased or not over time.  
The poverty head count ratio at USD $1.25 PPP declined from 60% to less than 40% between 1995 and 
2005 (the only available period in the World Bank data bank). Although the share of agriculture in the 
GDP declined from 61% to 47% over the period 1989-2009, cereal yields and production increased 
greatly. The yield hovered around 1,180 kg/ha until 2004 before reaching 1,650 kg/ha in 2009, while 
production had started its climb up by the beginning of the 1990s thanks to a large increase in land 
under cereal production. In the 2000s’, the increase in production is due, in equal proportion, to the 
increases in yield and area farmed (Taffesse et al. 2011). In 2007, 96% of the cultivated land dedicated 
to the main crops (cereals, pulses, oilseeds, vegetables, roots crops, fruits and cash crops) was still 
farmed by smallholders and their harvest in the main production season (Meher), represents 93% of 
the Ethiopian cereal production (Taffesse et al. 2011). It is hence of primary concern to better assess 
smallholders’ exposure to climate shocks.  
We used two sets of data for the computation of the SPEI thanks to the R package SPEI (Beguería and 
Vicente-Serrano 2013) with the Thornthwaite evapotranspiration index. The precipitation data come 
from the African Rainfall Climatology Version 2 dataset (ARC2, Novella and Thiaw 2013), providing daily 
estimates at a resolution of 0.1 decimal degree from 1983 to the present, and are based on a 
combination of gauge and satellite data. The dataset has been developed as a key input of the Famine 
Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET), one of the main indicators used by international 
humanitarian agencies to monitor food security. The temperature data comes from the Climate 
Prediction Center Global Land Surface Air Temperature Analysis (GHCN+CAM, Fan and Van den Dool 
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2008).16 They come as monthly mean surface air temperatures at a 0.5 decimal degree resolution over 
the period from 1948 to the present. One of its recommended uses is precisely the computation of 
evapotranspiration indices. Both ARC2 and GHCN+CAMS datasets are matched with the ERHS thanks 
to a ward-level (kebele) administrative boundaries shapefile (Ethiopian Statistical Agency, 2007 
census).  
The kebele, or Peasant Associations (PA) in the rural part of the countries, were founded by the 
Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army of Ethiopia, also known as 
the Derg, after the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974. They are the lowest administrative unit. We 
have chosen as matching coordinates the centre of each PA computed with centroids of Voronoi. Note 
that the median area of the EHRS PAs is smaller (50 km2) than the median aRC2 and GHCN+CAMS cells 
(120 km2 and 3,025km2 on average respectively); they hence constitute a matching metric precise 
enough for the climate data resolution.17 
There are three main weather regimes in Ethiopia: the northern part has a bi-modal regime with a long 
rainy season from June to September and a short rainy season from March to May (regime A); the 
western part of the country has a mono-modal regime with rainfall from June to September (regime 
B); and the southern and eastern part has a mono-modal weather regime with rains from February to 
May (regime C) (NMSA 1996, cited in Abebe 2010). The approximate hand-drawn partition of the 
country between weather regimes, according to a map of the Ethiopian National Meteorological 
Agency (1996) reproduced in Abebe (2010), is mapped with long dashed lines in Figure 2.3 (a). Note 
that according to the ARC2 rainfall data for each PA, the partition is slightly different (dotted line).18 
Figure 2.3: Elevation and weather regimes (a) and annual precipitation (b) 
                                                          
16 GHCN Gridded V2 data provided by the NOAA/OAR/ESRL PSD, Boulder, Colorado, USA, from their Web site at 
http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/. 
17 Area weighted precipitation and temperature means would also have been an option for PAs at the junction 
of multiple cells, but given the spatial definition of the climate datasets, it would not have affected the results 
much. 
18 Although the ARC2 dataset would allow estimating the boundaries between weather regimes with more 
precision, it is outside of the scope of the present paper. 
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Figure 2.3 a and b: On the left figure, the long dashed lines are the approximate partition of the country 
between weather regimes according to a 1996 map of reproduced in Abebe (2010) and the dotted lines 
represent an alternative partition matching the ARC2 data at Pas’ locations. The map on the right is the 
average annual precipitation over the period 1990 to 2013. Although it is clear that precipitation is 
concentrated on reliefs because of convective rain, there are great differences in precipitation between PAs 
located at similar altitudes: Geblen receives less than 320mm on average while Yetmen, in the same agro-
ecological zone, receives twice as much. 
Note that the cumulative level of rainfall varies a lot between PAs in regime A (Figure 2.3 b): normal 
annual precipitation19 for Geblen and Harresaw (Tigray region, top North) is only 270 mm while it is 
680 mm in Yetmen (Amhara, central North). The PAs located in weather regime C have a maximum 
amount of cumulative rainfall in March while those located in weather regime A have their maximum 
in August. We plot in Figure 2.3 b the annual precipitation profile for Geblen (regime A), Doma (regime 
C) and Yetmen (regime A). We use the climate data for the peak months in the analysis.  
Figure 2.4: Monthly precipitation 
                                                          
19 Normal computed on 1994 to 2013, Hoefsloot 2013, LEAP software. 
A 
B 
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We use as our dependent variable real consumption per capita as provided in the ERHS. The explicative 
variables are the 3 months smoothed SPEI at peak rainfall month, the agro-ecological zones, the quality 
of the road leading to the next town, the distance to the nearest bank, the number of extension agents 
within the PA and the presence of a non-governmental organisation (NGO) in the PA. Summary 
statistics are presented in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Summary statistics 
 Mean Median 
Stand. 
Dev. Min. Max. 
Real consumption per capita (birr) 77.63 56.79 74.17 0.88 1,109.39 
3-SPEI at peak precipitation month 0.22 0.21 0.91 -1.56 2.21 
Remote from a bank (22 km) 0.42 0 0.49 0 1 
NGO in the PA 0.16 0 0.36 0 1 
Extension agent in the PA 0.76 1 0.43 0 1 
Road improvement 0.59 1 0.49 0 1 
Although the national figures paint a rather positive picture for recent years, micro level evidence from 
the ERHS warrants some caution. While the poverty rate hovers between 45% and 50% until 1995 in 
the ERHS sample, it decreases to 30% in the next 3 rounds (1997, 1999, 2004) before rising again, above 
50% in 2009 (Dercon et al. 2012). The average consumption is 78 birr (Ethiopian currency) per month 
(circa USD 18) if one focuses on the 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 rounds. There are some substantial 
  
69 
 
variations across years: the 1989, 1994 and 1995 average consumption is around 70 birr; the 1997, 
1999 and 2004 average consumption increases to 90 birr while 2009 sees a 34% drop in consumption 
to 60 birr per month. Consumption per capita includes household-produced food and hence is directly 
impacted by weather conditions. Details of the real consumption per capita calculation can be found 
in Dercon and Krishnan (1998). We follow Dercon and Krishnan (1998) in setting the poverty line at the 
income level required to buy 2,400 calories per day, i.e. 50 birr. The vulnerability indices are hence 
linked to climate related food insecurity. 
According to the weather regimes identified above, we focus on precipitation in the months of March 
we are interested in the hydrological conditions affecting agriculture production, we select the three 
month smoothed SPEI values. We use one year lagged SPEI values as the surveys have been conducted 
in pre-harvest periods, i.e. when real consumption is still determined by the previous year’s harvest. 
The average SPEI is 0.21, i.e. conditions were on average slightly wetter than normal. The minimum 
and maximum are respectively -1.57 (2009, in Imdibir) and 2.2 (1994, in Trirufe Ketchema), i.e. dry 
conditions with a 20 years return periods and wet conditions close to a 100 year return period. Note 
that consumption prediction conditional on values outside the sample range will have to be treated 
with caution and can only represent high bound estimates, as it is likely that consumption collapses at 
higher (lower) SPEI values than the one observed. 
The community-level data capture some of the classical development policies. Indeed, road 
improvement allows better market linkages with the rest of the country and hence offers better 
marketing opportunities, larger and more stable sets of products for buying, better price smoothing 
when local production is adversely hit and allows households to enter into new profitable activities 
(Dercon et al., 2012). Extension agents remain a key development mechanism whereby civil servants 
are dispatched among rural communities to offer farm management advice and increase the adoption 
of best farming practices. We express it as a dummy variable equal to one if there is at least one 
extension agent in the PA. Over time, all PAs got an extension agent. The distance to the nearest bank 
is also of interest as they are a key channel in providing saving mechanisms, as ex ante risk 
management and credit for adopting more capital intensive inputs. Furthermore, the distance to the 
nearest bank serves as a proxy of the remoteness or secludedness of a particular PA as banks are likely 
to establish branches in local economic centres. We express it as dummy equal to one if the PA is 
located at more than 22 km from any bank, the latter value being the median sample distance. The 
presence of an NGO or a development agency might not only have an impact on their sectorial activity, 
be it education, health or micro-credit; but they can also be an important provider of jobs for the local 
community. Furthermore, in case of an adverse climatic shock, an NGO might be able to scale up its 
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activity and act as a safety net for the local community. Dercon and Krishnan (2003) showed that food 
aid provided an insurance mechanism.   
2.4 Results 
We start by investigating the functional shape of the relationship between real consumption per capita 
and the standardized precipitation evapotranspiration index (SPEI) with localized polynomial 
regressions. The smoothing fit is plotted in Figure 2.5 along the 95% confidence intervals computed by 
performing 1,000 bootstraps with replacements. The relationship is clearly u-shaped, with a maximum 
at 0.8, i.e. conditions slightly wetter than normal. 
Figure 2.5: Influence of weather on consumption per capita 
 
We start the analysis with a simple pooled OLS quadratic regression of consumption on SPEI in order 
to evaluate the average climate risk exposure in the sample. As the consumption values are very 
skewed, we apply logarithmic transformation on the consumption variable. The regression we 
estimate is given by the following expression:  
log⁡(𝑐𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (30)  
where 𝑐𝑖𝑡 is the real consumption per capita of household 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑆 is the 3-months smoothed SPEI 
at peak rainfall months and 𝛽𝑗, 𝑗 = 1,2,3, are parameters to be estimated. Note that the intercept, 𝛽0, 
is the log of expected consumption under normal conditions, i.e. when the SPEI equals 0. Results are 
presented in Table 2.2, column 1. 
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All parameters are statistically significant (p-value <0.001). The low R2 should not be a concern as 
various other factors determine the between variation in the sample distribution of consumption (the 
size of the land holding, the size of the herd, etc). Nevertheless, a clear pattern emerges from this 
simple regression: consumption has an inverted U shape in SPEI and reaches its maximum at a SPEI 
value of 0.7, i.e. in conditions slightly moister than normal, and decreases sharply in drier conditions, 
crossing the poverty/hunger line at a SPEI value of -1.4, i.e. in severely dry conditions occurring on 
average every 12 years. Consumption can also fall under the poverty line for extreme precipitation 
levels, i.e. a SPEI of 2.8 consisting consistent with an extreme flood event. However, such events have 
only a 0.2% chance of occurring, and hence weight less in farmers’ exposure to climate risk. Note, 
however, that the observed SPEI values in the sample are limited to -1.48 to 2.21, hence predictions 
outside the sample range have to be considered with care.  
Figure 2.6: Real consumption per capita (a) and climate risk exposure (b) 
 
The graph in Figure 2.6 (a) is the fitted consumption line as a function of SPEI. The probability function 
of the SPEI is superimposed in grey in order to get a better sense of the likelihood of each SPEI value. 
The area coloured in orange in Figure 2.6 (b) is the probability mass of falling below the hunger line, 
i.e. 11% in the present case. We also represent the expected shortfall with a 35 years return-period 
drought (blue arrow, 20 birr). A quick calculation indicates that a 10 year return period drought hitting 
a region with 100,000 inhabitants would cost a humanitarian agency on average 800,000 birr (circa 
USD 192,000) per month in cash vouchers/transfers to ensure that basic food requirements are met. 
Table 2.2: Regressions with agro-ecological zones as additional explicative variables 
Climate Risk Exposure Real Consumption per Capita 
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 Dependent variable: log of real consumption per capita 
  OLS 
(pooled) 
OLS 
with fixed 
effects 
Quantile regressions with penalized 
fixed effects   
 I II III 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile 
SPEI 0.174***  0.125*** 0.131*** 0.119
*** 0.137*** 0.147*** 
 (0.017)  (0.017) (0.017) (0.02) (0.017) (0.02) 
SPEI2 -0.125***  -0.128*** -0.053*** -0.085
*** -0.052*** -0.054* 
 (0.016)  (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.02) 
High altitude D  0.102
*** 0.109***  0.046 0.088
*** 0.126*** 
  (0.035) (0.033)  (0.035) (0.03) (0.043) 
Low altitude D  -0.156
*** -0.200***  -0.207
*** -0.111*** -0.083* 
  (0.034) (0.037)  (0.044) (0.031) (0.045) 
High altitude D *SPEI   0.222*** 0.089*** 0.208
*** 0.152*** 0.111*** 
   (0.029) (0.031) (0.036) (0.03) (0.035) 
Low altitude D *SPEI   -0.043 0.016 -0.048 -0.081
** -0.05 
   (0.037) (0.054) (0.056) (0.038) (0.04) 
High altitude D *SPEI2   -0.045* 0.049 -0.005 -0.019 -0.025 
   (0.025) (0.032) (0.033) (0.027) (0.033) 
Low altitude D *SPEI2    -0.010 -0.076* -0.013 -0.098
*** -0.153*** 
   (0.035) (0.044) (0.046) (0.038) (0.045) 
Constant 4.103*** 4.032
*** 4.128*** 4.043*** 3.800
*** 4.074*** 4.391*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.343) (0.022) (0.017) (0.028) 
Observations 5,240 5,240 5,240 5,240 5,240 5,240 5,240 
R2 0.045 0.011 0.074 0.056    
Adjusted R2 0.044 0.011 0.073 0.041    
F Statistic 122.316***  30.077*** 52.287*** 38.131***     
Cluster robust standard error in parentheses,  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01, D stands for dummy variables. 
We then add a series of dummies for the agro-ecological zones, taking the mid-altitude zone (Weyna-
Dega) as base category, and we interact them with the SPEI variables: 
log(𝑐𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑡
2 ∗ 𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑡
2
∗ 𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(31)  
where 𝐾 stands for the lowlands dummy and 𝐷 for the highlands dummy. We test for the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity with a Lagrange multiplier test (Breusch-Pagan) and a F-test of the model 
with fixed effects and against pooled OLS (p-value <0.001). The null hypothesis is rejected in all cases 
with a high confidence level (more than 99.99%); we hence conclude that there are important 
unobserved effects. We then compare the random effects model against fixed effects models with a 
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Hausman test and reject the null hypothesis of convergent estimates, preferring the fixed (within) 
effects model. Lastly, we test for the presence of serial correlation threatening the strict exogeneity 
assumption of the fixed effects model with the Wooldridge test for serial correlation, and fail to reject 
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation (p-value=0.32). We choose, therefore, a fixed effects model 
to take into account the households’ unobserved heterogeneity. The results are reported in Table 2.2, 
column 4. For comparison purposes, we present in column 2 and 3 regressions results with pooled OLS 
when only the altitude dummies are added and where both altitudes and interaction variables are 
added. 
As we see in Table 2.2 column 4, ?̂?1and ?̂?2 decrease compared to Model I, implying that the climate 
sensitivity in the midlands (Weyna Dega) is lower than the average. Furthermore, it appears that the 
quadratic effect of SPEI is null in the highlands as ?̂?6 ≈ −?̂?2, i.e. that expected consumption would 
only increase in SPEI values. This result has to be nevertheless treated with caution given the low level 
of statistical significance of ?̂?6. By contrast, the lowlands are much more sensitive than the Weyna 
Dega as ?̂?4 is negative, highly significant and of greater magnitude than ?̂?2. 
Computing the different indices for each region, the mid-altitude villages have, on average, a poverty 
risk of 1%, while those located in the highlands of 12% and those in the lowlands of 47%. In terms of 
expected shortfall, the average household in the midlands is found to be fully resilient even when 
confronted by a 35 years drought. By contrast, the lowlands have an expected shortfall of 24 birr. These 
results compare well with Deressa et al. (2009) who also found a greater vulnerability in the lowlands. 
We now present the results across a subset of quantiles of the populations estimated with penalized 
quantile fixed effects quantile regressions (Koenker 2004) and implemented with the package rqpd 
(Koenker and Holst Bache 2014). The results are reported in Table 2.2, columns 5 to 7. Climate 
sensitivity does not vary much between agro-ecological zones for the lower quartile in terms of the 
curvature of consumption. The only significant parameter among the interactions is the interaction of 
the SPEI expressed in level with the highlands dummy: poor households in high altitude villages reach 
a maximum consumption in conditions wetter than the rest of the sample. Comparing the interaction 
terms between the lowlands dummy and the SPEI squared, we see that climate sensitivity increases 
for households as consumption per capita increases. It suggests, hence, an important trade-off in the 
lowlands between increase in consumption and decrease in climate sensitivity, the poorer households 
being stuck in a low risk-low consumption trap, a phenomenon described in the literature on the risk-
induced poverty trap.  
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We present in Figure 2.7 (a), (b) and (c) the 3 vulnerability indices across quantiles and agro-ecological 
zones.20 In the lowlands, the lowest quartile is trapped in poverty as its poverty risk is 100%. 
Furthermore, the median households also face a risk of poverty close to 100% while the 3rd quartile is 
slightly above 40%. This contrasts with the results found with OLS where the average household had 
only a 47% risk of poverty. Hence, it is likely that the OLS poverty risk estimate was driven downward 
by the top percentiles of the population. In the midlands and the highlands, the poverty risk is quite 
low for households above the median although still substantial for the 1st quartile. 
The results in terms of the expected shortfall are presented in Figure 2.7 (b). Although the ranking of 
agro-ecological zones in terms of risk is respected, the differences are much smaller. Furthermore, the 
ranking within zones changes a lot, e.g. in the lowlands the median 35-year drought expected shortfall 
is higher than the lower quartile one. The relative risk premium (Figure 2.7 (c)), i.e. the implicit cost of 
risk computed for a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 2, confirms the interpretation of a risk-
induced poverty trap by showing that poor households have a smaller relative risk exposure: they have 
already reduced risk exposure to its maximum at the cost of a decrease in consumption.  
Figure 2.7: Poverty risk (a), expected shortfall (35-year drought) (b), Relative risk premium (c) 
 
As the value of the relative risk premium is largely determined by the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, we performed a sensitivity analysis assuming that the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
follows a gamma distribution (see Figure 2.8 a). The distribution was chosen to reflect findings of Yesuf 
and Bluffstone (2009) based on experimental evidences in Ethiopia. As Holt and Laury (2002) found 
sensibly lower estimates, we allow for risk preferences below the minimum found in Yesuf and 
                                                          
20 Note that the quantile regressions were run in level to compute the indices because it is a priori not clear how 
to deal with the residuals of exponential quantile regressions when computing the conditional quantiles. 
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Bluffstone (2009), i.e. between 0 and 1. We present in Figure 2.8 b the resulting box-plot of relative 
risk premia.  
Figure 2.8: Sensitivity analysis on relative risk premia estimated in the quantile regressions 
 
A policy maker interested in having the greatest impact on average poverty via, for instance, the 
provision of subsidized fertilizers, should look at the poverty risk indicator and target the lowlands. 
Interestingly, the expected shortfall shows that in the case of a serious drought, it might not be the 
poorest quartile of the population which will require most help in the lowlands but instead the median 
households because the latter are more exposed to downside climate shocks. Lastly, the relative risk 
premium shows that the implicit cost of risk bearing is the highest among richer households, 
particularly in the lowlands. Hence, the higher quantile of the population manages to get higher 
consumption at the cost of a large increase in risk and should therefore be willing to swap part of this 
risk against some kind of consumption insurance, be it index based or of the traditional agricultural 
kind. 
Community level characteristics are only available for rounds 4, 6 and 7, i.e. 1997, 2004 and 2009. As 
noted in the data section, the 1997 round was conducted earlier in the season and hence might 
introduce some unobserved heterogeneity. We attempt to control for it by adding a year dummy for 
1997. We focus on the presence of an improvement in the road leading to the next town, the number 
of extension agents within the PA and the distance to the nearest bank, and the presence of a non-
governmental and/or international organization office in the PA. The results are presented in Table 
2.3. 
a. Distribution of the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion used in the sensitivity analysis 
b. Relative risk premia according to 
the risk aversion distribution on plot a. 
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Table 2.3: Regressions with community development factors as additional explicative variables 
 Dependent variable: log of real consumption per capita 
 panel Quantile regressions with penalized fixed effects 
 Linear  
 (1) 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile 
SPEI 0.133*** 0.188*** 0.148*** 0.187*** 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.020) (0.024) 
SPEI2 -0.087*** -0.130*** -0.130*** -0.124*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) 
1997 D 0.163*** 0.137*** 0.207*** 0.139*** 
 (0.033) (0.052) (0.038) (0.049) 
High altitude D  0.086** 0.045 0.082** 
  (0.038) (0.030) (0.033) 
Low altitude D  -0.076** -0.106*** -0.086** 
  (0.036) (0.035) (0.039) 
Bank D -0.232*** -0.284*** -0.341*** -0.324*** 
 (0.041) (0.039) (0.036) (0.042) 
NGO D 0.288*** 0.101** 0.126*** 0.191*** 
 (0.037) (0.049) (0.045) (0.046) 
Extension agents  0.092*** 0.113*** 0.115*** 0.065** 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.026) (0.031) 
Road improvement D 0.054* 0.044 0.090*** 0.150*** 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.034) 
Constant 4.014*** 3.762*** 4.082*** 4.398*** 
 (0.385) (0.042) (0.041) (0.046) 
Observations 3,892 3,892 3,892 3,892 
R2 0.108 
Adjusted R2 0.071 
F Statistic 44.150***     
Cluster robust standard error in parentheses,  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01, D stands 
for dummy variables. 
The 1997 dummy is positive, as expected, because the 1997 round was conducted earlier in the season 
when consumption is higher. The distance to the bank dummy, equal to one if the PA is located at 
more than 22 km from any bank, is strongly negative: the average household in such a PA has an 
expected consumption per capita 21% lower than those in PAs closer to a bank. As mentioned in the 
data section, the presence of a bank might signal that the local economy is particularly dynamic or 
wealthy. It is hence not clear a priori if the positive coefficient on the bank distance dummy does not 
results from endogeneity caused by the effect of an unobserved variable left in the error term. Note 
that the effect is quite stable across quantiles of the population (although lower). By contrast, the 
presence of an NGO office in the PA benefits mostly the median household and above. This might be 
linked to the fact that jobs created by NGOs tend to benefit the better educated and wealthier 
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households, or it might reveal the difficulty for NGOs to reach the poorest of the poor. Interestingly, 
road improvement seems again to be of greatest benefit to richer households as no consumption-
increasing effect linked to road improvement is found significant in the 1st quartile regression. The 
number of extension agents has a positive and significant effect: each additional extension agent 
increases expected consumption by 10% and has the most impact on the median of the distribution. 
Note that the top quartile does benefit the least from the presence of an extension agent. A possible 
explanation is that households at the top of the consumption distribution already know and apply best 
and recommended farming techniques.   
Figure 2.9: Change in poverty risk (a) and Change in expected shortfall (10-year drought) (b) 
  
We present in Figure 2.9 (a) and (b) the impact on poverty risk and on the expected shortfall (computed 
for a 10 years drought) of the variables found significant at different quantiles of the population. As 
expected, the greatest effect is clearly the bank dummy. It is likely that the bank captures the effect of 
living close to a dynamic economic centre where banks choose to open a new branch rather than the 
effect of the bank itself. This large effect might be due to more off-farm opportunities or to the support 
from relatives living in these economic centres. Note that, however, in the case of a 10-year drought, 
poor households living near economic centres are not much less exposed than their counterparts in 
more remote regions, as shown with the expected shortfall. By contrast, richer categories are much 
more exposed in remote parts compared to their counterparts living close to an economic centre. 
NGOs and road improvements have a similar effect on the risk of poverty and expected shortfall. Both 
are, incidentally, positively correlated and it is likely that logistical reasons favour the installation of 
NGOs in PAs with better road access. Again, we see this mirror relationship between poverty risk and 
expected shortfall: these are the poorest households who benefit the most in terms of poverty risk 
reduction but the richest ones in terms of reduction of downside risk.     
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2.5 Conclusion 
This paper introduces a new framework to estimate climate risk exposure at the household level with 
the SPEI as its building block. It is based on the combination of climate data and household 
microeconomic data. The main advantage of this approach is that it is based on locally and frequency 
based weather scenarios allowing different measures of climate vulnerability. Furthermore, as the SPEI 
is computed over several decades, it properly captures climate risk exposure rather than the short-
term, running-season production risk exposure estimated with classic microeconometric methods of 
production risk estimation. A limitation of the proposed methodology is that it is quite demanding in 
terms of the large dataset required. Indeed, the estimation of the climate risk exposure relies on the 
assumption of observing a large range of SPEI values in the sample either thanks to a long panel or 
thanks to a large geographical spread. We note, however, that the number of microeconomic panel 
datasets keeps increasing so that this limitation is likely to fade in coming years.    
Another advantage of this approach is that it is quite simple and hence is able to accommodate 
quantile regressions. Instead of being forced to think about the average household, one can broaden 
the analysis to other parts of the sample distribution. Several indices are proposed to summarize 
climate risk exposure. The most actionable from a policy standpoint is likely to be the expected 
shortfall, also known as the conditional value-at-risk.  
We illustrate the methodology with a case study on Ethiopia using the Ethiopian Rural Household 
Survey (ERHS) and we combine it with SPEI values estimated with the African Rainfall Climatology 
Version 2 dataset and Climate Prediction Center Global Land Surface Air Temperature Analysis 
(GHCN+CAMS). Results show that the PAs located in the Kolla agro-ecological zone are the most 
exposed to climate. The results are in line with Deressa et al. (2009), although we do find greater 
differences between agro-ecological zones. Furthermore, we find that while poor households in the 
most remote PAs are almost as resilient to 10-year return period droughts as poor households living 
in the vicinity of towns (within 20 km), the contrary is true for richer households: the ones living in 
remote parts of Ethiopia are much more at risk than their suburban counterparts. 
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2.7 Appendix: Thornthwaite Potential Evapotranspiration index  
We follow here closely the presentation of the Thornthwaite Potential Evapotranspiration index (1948) 
given in Vicente-Serrano et al. (2010). The monthly PET in millimetre at a given location is obtained in 
the following manner: 
𝑃𝐸𝑇 = 16𝐾 (
10𝑇
𝐼
)
𝑚
 
(32)  
where T is the monthly mean temperature, 𝐼 is a heat index computed as: 
𝐼 =∑(
𝑇𝑗
5
)
1.51412
𝑗=1
 
(33)  
where j=1, …, 12 for the twelve months;   the coefficient 𝑚 is computed as: 
𝑚 = 6.75 ∗ 10−7 ∗ 𝐼3 − 7.71 ∗ 10−5 ∗ 𝐼2 + 1.79 ∗ 10−2 ∗ 𝐼 + 0.492 (34)  
and 𝐾 is a correction coefficient computed as function of the latitude and the month: 
𝐾 = (
𝑁
12
) (
𝑁𝐷𝑀
30
) 
(35)  
where 𝑁𝐷𝑀 is the number of days in the month and 𝑁 is the maximum number of sun hours computed 
as: 
𝑁 = (
24
𝜋
)𝑤𝑠 
(36)  
where 𝜋 is the number pi and 𝑤𝑠 is the hourly angle of sun rising calculated using: 
𝑤𝑠 = 𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑠(−tan𝜑 ∗ tan𝛿) (37)  
where 𝜑 is the latitude in radian and 𝛿 is the solar declination in radian, calculated using: 
𝛿 = 0.4093⁡sin (
2𝜋𝐽
365
− 1.405) 
(38)  
Where J is the average Julian day of the month. 
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3 Disentangling the Benefits from Agricultural Innovations: 
Evidence from a combination of open and double-blind 
experiments in Tanzania 
 
Xavier Vollenweider21, Erwin Bulte22, Salvatore Di Falco23 and Menale Kassie24  
 
 
Abstract 
We provide an assessment of the importance of the role of farmers’ behaviour in driving the increase 
in yield of improved maize seeds. The study is based on the combination of an open and double-blind 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs) conducted in 2013 in two regions of Tanzania with 560 farmers. In 
the open RCT, farmers were told about which types were allocated to them: half of the farmers 
received improved seeds, the other half local seeds. The same was done in the double-blind RCT except 
that farmers were told they had one chance out of two of getting the improved seeds. It allows us to 
disentangle the increase in yield caused by the improved seeds from the increase in yield which 
depends on a change in farmers’ behaviour. Our main empirical contribution is to show that the 
behavioural response to improved seeds plays a central role in driving the increase in yield. In our 
experiment, close to 50% of the increase in yield measured in the open RCT would not have 
materialized without the behavioural response. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Food insecurity is a major problem in sub-Saharan Africa. The productivity of food crops has been low 
and decreasing for more than a decade. In Tanzania, for instance, maize yields went from 1.9 tons per 
hectare (ha) in 2000 to 1.2 tons per ha in 2012 (according to FAOSTAT). Slow adoption of new 
agricultural technologies is widely regarded as a key determinant of the current state of affairs (Doss 
2003; Evenson and Gollin 2003). High yield varieties drove the Green Revolution in Asia and could 
provide increases in agricultural productivity across Africa as well, stimulating economic growth and 
facilitating the transition from low productivity subsistence agriculture to a productive, agro-industrial 
economy (World Bank 2008) . Their uptake in Africa, however, is still limited and far from complete 
(Foster and Rosenzweig 2010). The literature has provided a plethora of explanations, including lack of 
access to information, inputs, credit, or risk preferences (e.g. Diagne and Demont 2007).  Recently, Suri 
(2011) used panel data and a random coefficient model to show that the adoption of hybrid maize is 
simply not profitable for wide swaths of the farming population. If innovations are not sufficiently 
adapted to the needs and requirements of local farmers (Doss 2003), individuals behave perfectly 
rationally when deciding not to adopt. 
In this paper we use a set of field experiments to address the debated issue of the impact of improved 
seeds by probing the benefits associated with the adoption of an open pollinated maize variety in 
Tanzania. Maize is the staple food in the region, and improving productivity in maize is likely to be a 
key impetus for improving local rural development and food security. Assessing the benefits of 
adoption is complicated because of two reasons.  First, gains likely vary across farmers, depending on 
geophysical conditions, farm size, and other characteristics affecting output. Heterogeneous 
treatment effects associated with adoption have been analysed in detail for the case of hybrid maize 
in Kenya by Suri (2011). Second, subjects may adjust their behaviour following adoption (Bulte et al. 
2014; List 2011).  For example, changes in the quality of seeds may invite farmers to allocate more or 
less fertiliser or effort to cultivation. 
To examine the importance of the behavioural response as compared to the pure genetic improvement 
effect, we combine data from two field experiments organised in two regions in Tanzania. In both 
experiments we provide improved maize to groups of farmers. The first experiment is a conventional 
(or open) randomised experiment (randomised control trial, RCT). Farmers are randomly allocated 
either to a treatment group receiving the improved maize or to a control group receiving a traditional 
variety. Both groups are told which type of seeds they received. The second experiment is a double-
blind RCT where neither the participating farmers nor the enumerators are informed about the 
allocation of the two types of seeds. By comparing the outcomes across the two experiments we can 
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distinguish between the genetic improvement and behavioural effects, and obtain a better 
understanding of the sources of the innovation's impact on yield than either experiment could produce 
alone. In addition to obtaining an improved assessment of the impact on yield of this key innovation, 
we disaggregate the total effect of adoption into a pure genetic improvement effect (i.e., the increase 
in yields that may be attributed to superior seeds) and the increase in yields that depends on the 
behavioural response of the farmer to the improved seeds. Indeed, as the information about the 
treatment status is randomized thanks to the combination of an open and double-blind RCT, related 
changes in behaviour as well as their impact on yield can be estimated. 
When assessing the effect of an intervention, one can focus either on its total effect or on its net effect, 
i.e. either on the total derivative or on the partial derivative of the production function that the 
intervention seeks to optimize (Glewwe et al. 2004). Policy makers tend to focus on the total effect of 
the intervention. The behavioural change of participants is factored in as a benefit of the intervention, 
even if it represents a cost for them. An alternative approach is to focus on the net effect of the 
intervention, i.e. net of the additional cost of effort provided by the participants. If the behavioural 
responses are not observed, then the estimates of the net impact of the intervention will be biased 
(Chassang et al. 2012; Duflo et al. 2008) as the estimation will provide an estimate of the total effect 
of the intervention. In the case of improved seeds, failing to account for the opportunity costs of 
labour, or any other complementary inputs, implies that the net benefits of adoption are over- or 
underestimated (depending on whether the behavioural response implies the supply of 
complementary inputs in greater or smaller quantities, respectively). In contrast, if the behavioural 
response is observed, and fully controlled for in a regression framework, then the indirect effects of 
adoption via changes in complementary inputs are not attributed to the adoption. Further 
complicating matters, the behavioural response may be overly optimistic or pessimistic. Farmers may 
easily overshoot or under-supply complementary inputs in the short run, biasing initial assessments of 
(potential) profitability. The crux for distinguishing the total impact from the net impact is to get an 
estimate of the contribution of the behavioural change. The combination of an open and a double-
blind RCT provides such an estimate. 
The use of double blind procedures is still rare in field experiments. To our knowledge, an exception is 
Bulte et al. (2014), who study the productivity effect of improved cowpea seeds.25 Unfortunately, their 
study is affected by significant attrition and small sample size. Seeds were offered to farmers close to 
the planting date, and some farmers had already finalized their cropping plans for the season. 
                                                          
25 Other notable exceptions are found in health economics – see the work on the Work and Iron Status Evaluation 
(WISE) conducted by Duncan Thomas in Indonesia and Boisson et al. (2010) on water filtration devices in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. 
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Moreover, cowpea is a secondary crop in the study region, and some farmer chose not to grow it. We 
build and improve upon Bulte et al. (2014) in different ways in an effort to reduce attrition: we 
distributed seeds earlier in the season, and we used a crop that is the key food staple in the region 
(maize). As a result our attrition rate is fairly low (9%). We also up-scaled the size of the experiment, 
and made some changes to the design (details are provided in section 3.4).26 
The paper is organized as follows: in section 3.2, we provide an overview of the theory behind our 
methodology. In section 3.3, we present our identification strategy. In section 3.4, after a brief 
introduction to the study regions, we describe the two experiments and the data. Section 3.5 presents 
the results and section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Background 
We start by briefly reviewing how a randomized controlled trial (RCT) can provide an estimate of the 
effect of improved seeds. We then distinguish between the effect caused by the improved seeds alone 
from the effect which depends on the behavioural response to the improved seeds, for instance an 
increase in complementary inputs such as fertilisers or labour.  
Say we want to estimate the effect of improved seeds on output with a conventional RCT. Farmers are 
randomly allocated to either of two groups: the first one receives improved seeds, the second one 
local seeds.  
Following the model of Rubin (1974), the potential output of farmer 𝑖, 𝑌𝑖, can be written as: 
𝑌𝑖 = {
𝑌1𝑖⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡if⁡𝜏𝑖 = 1⁡
𝑌0𝑖 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡if⁡𝜏𝑖 = 0
 (1)  
where 𝜏𝑖 = 1 if the farmer receives improved seeds and 𝜏𝑖 = 0  otherwise. This can be expressed as: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑌0𝑖 + (𝑌1𝑖 − 𝑌𝑖0)𝜏𝑖 (2)  
Assuming that the effect of the improved seed is constant for all farmers, 𝑌1𝑖 − 𝑌0𝑖 = 𝜌, equation (2) 
can be re-expressed in regression form as: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝜏𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖 (3)  
                                                          
26 Double-blind implies that seeds should not be recognizable. We followed Bulte et al. (2014) by treating the 
improved and local seeds with a reddish food colorant in the double-blind RCT. We modified their design, 
however, by also coloring the seeds of the open experiment. This was done to avoid that any harvest difference 
could be attributed to the colorant itself. 
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where 𝛼 is the expected output with the local seed, 𝐸(𝑌0𝑖),and 𝜂𝑖  is the random part of 𝑌0𝑖, 𝜂𝑖 = 𝑌0𝑖 −
𝐸(𝑌0𝑖). Expected outputs with improved and local seeds are respectively given by: 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝜏𝑖 = 1) = 𝛼 + 𝜌 + 𝐸(𝜂𝑖|𝜏𝑖 = 1) 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝜏𝑖 = 0) = 𝛼 + 𝐸(𝜂𝑖|𝜏𝑖 = 0) 
(4)  
As the allocation to the improved seeds and local seeds groups has been artificially randomized, we 
have:   
𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝜏𝑖 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝜏𝑖 = 0) = 0 (5)  
And the difference in sample means yields: 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝜏𝑖 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝜏𝑖 = 0) = 𝜌 (6)  
RCTs offer hence a direct way of estimating the impact of improved seeds on output, bypassing the 
traditional pitfall of self-selection bias, a threat to the internal validity of impact studies of improved 
seeds adoption based on observational data27.  
Rational farmers should adjust farm management if the improved seeds change the marginal product 
of the inputs at their disposal (e.g. Bulte et al. 2014). For example, farmers should either work harder, 
re-allocate household labour from other activities towards the targeted plot, hire additional labour or 
apply more fertiliser. There are hence two channels by which improved seeds increases output: the 
                                                          
27 If we were to compare outputs between adopters and non-adopters with observational data, i.e. once farmers 
have decided to adopt or not, a simpler comparison of means would yield the following: 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝜏𝑖 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝜏𝑖 = 0) = 𝜌 + 𝐸(𝜂𝑖|𝜏𝑖 = 1) − 𝐸(𝜂𝑖|𝜏𝑖 = 0) 
= 𝜌 + 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝜏𝑖 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝜏𝑖 = 0)⏟                  
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠
 (i) 
The selection bias is caused by a systematic difference in the conditional output under non-adoption of the 
adopters and the non-adopters. In the case of improved seeds, we can typically expect adopters to be more 
productive than non-adopter even before adoption. In the regression based on equation (3), the dummy variable 
𝜏𝑖  is hence correlated with 𝜂𝑖  so that an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimate of 𝜌 would be biased upward. The 
selection bias has notably been dealt with endogenous switching regressions and propensity score matching 
methods. In the first approach, the decision to adopt and the impact of adoption on output are analysed jointly. 
The identification of the causal effect of adoption on the yield rests on the assumption that at least one variable 
used to explain adoption is not correlated with yield (exclusion restriction). In the propensity score matching 
methods, a set of observable variables is used to build a comparable set of pairs of adopters and non-adopters. 
The assumption is that conditional on these variables, the decision to adopt is random. However, some 
characteristics determining adoption might be unobservable to the analyst, implying that the conditional 
independence assumption is violated. The advantage of randomly allocating farmers to either the improved or 
local seeds group is that it solves the selection bias issue. As farmers are randomly allocated to groups receiving 
either the improved or local seeds, the expected output conditional on non-adoption is equal for both groups. 
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higher genetic potential of the improved seeds, the behavioural response. We illustrate each effect in 
Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1: The effects of technology adoption 
 
Effort,⁡𝑒, is plotted on the horizontal axis of Figure 3.1 and output, 𝑌𝜏𝑒, on the vertical axis, where  𝜏 =
1 with improved seeds and zero with local seeds and 𝑒 = 1 if effort is adjusted to the improved seeds 
and  𝑒 = 0 otherwise. The improved seeds lead both to a vertical shift of the production function and 
an increase in its slope. 
We define the genetic improvement effect, 𝑔,  as the increase in output at the default level of effort, 
𝑌10 − 𝑌00. It is typically the effect of improved seeds if farmers face input constraints preventing them 
from adjusting their effort from 𝑒 = 0 to 𝑒 = 1. 
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We define the effort allocation effect, 𝑙, as the increase in output caused by the increase in effort alone, 
i.e. in the increase in output that could have been obtained with local seeds given an increase in effort 
from 𝑒 = 0 to 𝑒 = 1. 28 The effort allocation effect is the difference between 𝑌01 and 𝑌00.  
Lastly, we define the marginal productivity effect, 𝑚, as the increase in output at the optimal level of 
effort (𝑒 = 1) caused by the increase in the productivity of effort. It is given by (𝑌11 − 𝑌10) −
(𝑌01 − 𝑌00).  
The potential output model of equation (1) can be extended to: 
𝑌𝑖 = {
𝑌11𝑖⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡if⁡𝜏𝑖 = 1⁡and⁡𝑒𝑖 = 1
𝑌10𝑖⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡if⁡𝜏𝑖 = 1⁡and⁡𝑒𝑖 = 0
𝑌01𝑖⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡if⁡𝜏𝑖 = 0⁡and⁡𝑒𝑖 = 1
𝑌00𝑖⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡if⁡𝜏𝑖 = 0⁡and⁡𝑒𝑖 = 0
 (7)  
where 𝑒𝑖 = 1 if the farmer increase effort and 𝑒𝑖 = 0 otherwise, 𝜏𝑖 = 1 if the farmers received 
improved seeds and ⁡𝜏𝑖 = 0 otherwise. The four counterfactuals correspond to the following 
possibilities: the farmer received improved seeds and increases effort, 𝑌11𝑖, the farmer received 
improved seeds and does not increase effort, 𝑌10𝑖, the farmers received local seeds and increases 
effort, 𝑌01𝑖, the farmers received local seeds and does not increase effort, 𝑌00𝑖. 
This can be expressed as: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑌00𝑖 + (𝑌10𝑖 − 𝑌𝑖00)𝜏𝑖 + (𝑌01𝑖 − 𝑌𝑖00)𝑒𝑖
+ (𝑌11𝑖 − 𝑌𝑖10 − (𝑌01𝑖 − 𝑌𝑖00))𝜏𝑖𝑒𝑖 
(8)  
Assuming a constant effect model and letting 𝑌10𝑖 − 𝑌00𝑖 = 𝑔, (𝑌01𝑖 − 𝑌𝑖00) = 𝑙, (𝑌11𝑖 − 𝑌𝑖10 −
(𝑌01𝑖 − 𝑌𝑖00)) = 𝑚, we can express equation (9) as: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝑔𝜏𝑖 + 𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝜏𝑖𝑚 + 𝜂𝑖  (9)  
where 𝛼 = 𝑌00𝑖, 𝑔 is the genetic improvement effect, 𝑙 is the effort allocation effect, 𝑚 is the marginal 
productivity effect and 𝜂𝑖 = 𝑌00𝑖 − 𝐸(𝑌00𝑖). 
The total effect of improved seeds, 𝜌 in equation (6) can hence be decomposed as: 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝜏𝑖 = 1, 𝑒 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝜏𝑖 = 0, 𝑒 = 0) = 𝑔 + 𝑙 + 𝑚 (10)  
                                                          
28 It is therefore called the pseudo-placebo effect in Bulte et al. (2014) following the terminology of Chassang et 
al. (2012). 
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If a large part of the total effect is driven by the behavioural effect (𝑙 + 𝑚), the results of the RCT might 
not hold in another region or in another population sub-group because of differences in input 
constraints and differences in the perceived benefits of the new technology for instance, i.e. the RCT 
might have a low external validity.  
Furthermore, if the interest lies in the increase in output caused by the higher productivity of the 
improved seeds, i.e. the net effect of the improved seeds, the effort allocation effect, 𝑙, should be 
taken out of the equation (10) as it could occur as well with local seeds. The net effect can hence be 
expressed as: 
𝑛𝑒𝑡⁡𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 𝑔 +𝑚 (11)  
In Figure 3.1, the net effect is given by 𝑌11 − 𝑌01.  
3.3 Identification strategy 
There are several possible routes to isolate each effect. An option is to run a regression where we 
control for effort, 𝑒, and interact it with the improved seeds dummy, expressing equation (9) as: 
𝐸(𝑌|𝑒, 𝜏) = 𝛼 + 𝑔𝜏 + 𝑙𝑒 + 𝑚𝜏𝑒 (12)  
where 𝑒 is now a proxy variable for effort and 𝜏 = 1 if the farmers received improved seeds and zero 
otherwise. Even in the relatively simple setting of the production function of smallholders in 
developing countries, controlling for effort might be hard as inputs vary in quantity and quality; effort 
might be adjusted across several dimensions (Giller et al. 2011). A large set of proxy variables should 
be used and interacting them with 𝑚 would greatly increase the number of parameters to estimate, 
reducing hence the power of the test we would like to carry on each parameter. 
Our solution is to opt for an experimental design similar to Chassang et al. (2012) whereby both the 
improved seeds and the probability of receiving them are randomized.  
We summarize the design of the experiment in Table 3.1. Participants were allocated to either of four 
groups.  
Table 3.1: Design of the experiment 
 Improved seeds Local seeds 
Open RCT G1 G2 
Double-blind RCT G3 G4 
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The two first groups were allocated to a traditional open RCT experiment: half received improved seeds 
(G1) and the other half got local seeds (G2). Both groups were told about the type of seeds they got. 
In other terms, farmers in G1 were told they had a probability of 100% of receiving the improved seeds 
and farmers in G2 were told they had a probability of 0% of getting the improved seeds.  
The third and fourth groups were allocated to a double-blind RCT: half received improved seeds (G3) 
and the other half got local seeds (G4). G3 and G4 were told they had one chance out of two of 
getting the improved seeds, i.e. a probability of 50%. 
Our identification strategy rests on two assumptions. First, effort is weakly increasing in the probability 
of receiving improved seeds: 
𝑒𝑖(0) ≤ 𝑒𝑖(0.5) ≤ 𝑒𝑖(1) A1 
where 𝑒𝑖(𝑝) is the effort of a farmer on the experimental plot and is both a function of his type⁡𝑖 and 
the probability of having received improved seeds 𝑝 where 𝑝 has been communicated to him by the 
extension agent in charge of distributing the seeds. We assume hence that effort is weakly increasing 
in 𝑝. 
Second, there are no Hawthorne or John Henry effects29:  the behavioural response to the probability 
of receiving improved seeds is not caused by participants’ awareness of taking part in an experiment. 
It is rather a response to the expected increase in marginal productivity of effort caused by the 
improved seeds and would also take place independent of an experimental setting. 
Let us rewrite the potential output model of equation (7) as: 
𝑌𝑖,𝜏,𝑝 =
{
 
 
 
 
𝜇𝑖(1, 𝑒𝑖(1)) + 𝜀𝑖,1,1⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡if⁡𝜏𝑖 = 1⁡and⁡𝑝𝑖 = 1⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡Group⁡1
𝜇𝑖(0, 𝑒𝑖(0)) + 𝜀𝑖,0,0⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡if⁡𝜏𝑖 = 0⁡and⁡𝑝𝑖 = 0⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡Group⁡2
𝜇𝑖(1, 𝑒𝑖(0.5)) + 𝜀𝑖,1,0.5⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡if⁡𝜏𝑖 = 1⁡and⁡𝑝𝑖 = 0.5⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡Group⁡3
𝜇𝑖(0, 𝑒𝑖(0.5)) + 𝜀𝑖,0,0.5⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡if⁡𝜏𝑖 = 0⁡and⁡𝑝𝑖 = 0.5⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡Group⁡4
 (13)  
where 𝜇𝑖(𝜏, 𝑒𝑖(𝑝)) is the expected output for farmer of type 𝑖 under treatment status 𝜏 and effort 
𝑒𝑖(𝑝). The error 𝜀𝜏𝑝𝑖 represents production shocks such as water deficit or excessive rainfall, pest 
invasion or plant disease. It has expectation 𝐸(𝜀𝜏𝑝𝑖|𝑖) = 0. Each type 𝑖 summarizes all observed and 
                                                          
29 The Hawthorne effect describes a situation in which participants allocated to the treatment group increase 
their effort because they know they are assigned to the treatment group. The John Henry effect describes the 
same situation but for those allocated to the control group. 
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unobserved factors affecting output. In our case, these could comprise farm management skills, access 
to credit and inputs, and farmers’ readiness to adopt new farming practices.  
Figure 3.2: Effects estimated in the experiment 
 
The comparison in means in the open RCT (groups 1 and 2), provides the average total effect of the 
improved seeds: 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝜏𝑖 = 1, 𝑝𝑖 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝜏𝑖 = 0, 𝑝𝑖 = 0) = 𝑔 + 𝑙 + ?̂? (14)  
It is illustrated in Figure 3.2 as the difference between G1 and G2 and was denoted 𝜌 in equation (6). 
By comparing output in the double-blind RCT (G3-G4), we get a lower bound of the net effect of 
improved seeds: 
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𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝜏𝑖 = 1, 𝑝𝑖 = 0.5) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝜏𝑖 = 0, 𝑝𝑖 = 0.5) = 𝑔 + ?̂?
∗ (15)  
where ?̂?∗ ≤ ?̂? because of assumption (A1).  
The lower bound of the net effect of adoption is illustrated in Figure 3.2 as the difference between G3 
and G4.  
By comparing the average treatment effect in the open and double-blind RCTs, we get upper and lower 
bounds of the net effect of the improved seeds adoption: 
𝑔 + ?̂?∗ ≤ 𝑔 + ?̂? ≤ 𝑔 + ?̂? + 𝑙 (16)  
Let us now compare participants with the same seeds, but with different probabilities of receiving 
improved seeds. Comparing group 4 and group 2, i.e. farmers with local seeds in the double-blind and 
open RCTs, we obtain a lower bound of the effort allocation effect: 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝜏𝑖 = 0, 𝑝𝑖 = 0.5) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝜏𝑖 = 0, 𝑝𝑖 = 0) = 𝑙
∗ (17)  
where 𝑙∗ ≤ 𝑙 because of assumption (A1). The lower bound of the effort allocation effect, 𝑙∗, is 
illustrated in Figure 3.2 as the difference between G4 and G2. 
Lastly, by comparing group 1 with group 3, i.e. farmers with improved seeds in the open and double-
blind RCTs, we get a lower bound of the behavioural effect: 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝜏𝑖 = 1, 𝑝𝑖 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝜏𝑖 = 1, 𝑝𝑖 = 0.5) = 𝑙
′ + ?̂?′ (18)  
where 𝑙′ ≤ 𝑙 and 𝑚′ ≤ ?̂? because of assumption (A1). The lower bound of the behavioural effect is 
illustrated in Figure 3.2 as the difference between G1 and G3. 
By comparing output between groups, we can hence get an estimate of the total impact of improved 
seeds, 𝑔 + 𝑙 + ?̂?, a lower bound estimate of the net impact, 𝑔 + ?̂?∗, a lower bound estimate of the 
effort allocation effect, 𝑙∗, and lower bound of the behavioural effect, 𝑙′ + ?̂?′. Table 3.2 summarises 
the effects estimated in the experiment. 
Table 3.2: Summary of the effects estimated in the experiment 
Groups Effects Expression 
G1-G2 Total effect ?̂? + 𝑙 + ?̂? = 𝐸[𝜇𝑖(1, 𝑒𝑖(1)) − 𝜇𝑖(0, 𝑒𝑖(0))] 
G3-G4 Lower bound of net effect ?̂? + ?̂?∗ = 𝐸[𝜇𝑖(1, 𝑒𝑖(0.5)) − 𝜇𝑖(0, 𝑒𝑖(0.5))] ≤ ?̂? + ?̂? 
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G4-G3 Lower bound of labour allocation effect 𝑙∗ = 𝐸[𝜇𝑖(0, 𝑒𝑖(0.5)) − 𝜇𝑖(0, 𝑒𝑖(0))] ≤ 𝑙 
G1-G3 Lower bound of behavioural effect ?̂?∗ + ?̂?∗ = 𝐸[𝜇𝑖(1, 𝑒𝑖(1)) − 𝜇𝑖(1, 𝑒𝑖(0.5))] ≤ ?̂? + ?̂?⁡⁡ 
The model above rests on the assumptions that effort is weakly increasing in the probability of 
receiving improved seeds and that there are no Hawthorne or John Henry effects. While we can test 
the first assumption by investigating if effort does vary between groups, we cannot test the second 
assumption. In order to identify separately the Hawthorne effect and the John Henry effect from the 
effects described above, we would need a third treatment arm where famers would have been 
allocated randomly to more or less intensive follow-up and scrutiny from the research team (e.g. 
McCarney et al. 2007). Lastly, in order to obtain direct estimates rather than lower bound estimates of 
the net, effort allocation and behavioural effects, a different experiment could have been ran. Farmers 
with improved seeds in the double-blind RCT should have been told they had local seeds and vice-
versa. However, it would have raised important ethical questions. This is the reason why we preferred 
the experimental design discussed above.  
3.4 Data 
Maize, along with rice and wheat, is one of the three major crops comprising 70% of world food 
production, and plays a major role in the diet of Sub-Saharan populations. There has been a great deal 
of research effort directed toward improving maize yields since the start of the green revolution in the 
1960s. We can therefore expect to see large increase in yields with modern maize varieties. The 
improved seeds tested in the current study, the Situka-M1, was released in 2001 by Selian Agricultural 
Research Institute(SARI). It has a yield potential of 3-5 ton/ha and its optimal production altitude 
ranges from 1000 to 1500m above sea level. In Tanzania, it can grow in the Eastern and Northern 
regions where our study areas are located. The variety is tolerant to drought, maize streak and grey 
leaf spot diseases, and resistant to Diplodia fungus, Fusarium leaf bright and Puccinia sorghi.  Although 
its yields are often advertised as 4 to 6 ton/ha by the government (Ministry of Agriculture, Food 
Security and Cooperatives. 2009, cit. in Tumbo et al. 2012) or grain dealers (e.g. Suba Agro-Trading & 
Engineering Co. Ltd30), CIMMYT found considerably lower yields, from 2.4 ton /ha in a mid-altitude dry 
environment to 4 ton/ha in a mid-altitude humid hot environment (Magorokosho et al. 2009). 
Naturally, yield does not depend only on the type of seed: input choices, soil quality and weather 
conditions are also key determinants. A given type of seeds is therefore expected to perform 
differently according to the farmer’s skills, his access to inputs and the weather. 
                                                          
30 Website accessed on the 6th of December 2013: http://subaagro.com/index_files/OPV.htm.  
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Agriculture is the main employment sector in Tanzania and represented 80% of the labour force in 
2003 (Eskola 2005). Maize is the major staple crop produced and consumed in Tanzania (Amare et al. 
2012; Shiferaw et al. 2014). It accounts for 45% of the cultivated land and 75% of cereal production  
(Kassie et al. 2014). Virtually all the maize is produced by smallholders (98%, Minot 2010), with 0.8 ha 
per farm on average dedicated to maize. Although the land under cultivation increased by 54% 
between 2000 and 2015 (Kassie et al. 2014), only 18% of land planted with maize was planted with 
improved maize seeds in 2006 and similar figures still apply in the study area (Kassie et al. 2014; Smale 
et al. 2011). Yields are low compared to Europe: 1.5 ton per ha against more than 9 ton per ha in the 
European Union (FADN 2013). The average per capita annual maize consumption is 73kg, contributing 
on average to 33% of calorific needs (Minot 2010). Much of the output is consumed on the farm (Alene 
et al. 2009), so the benefit of improved seeds adoption might be assumed to imply higher household 
food consumption. 
The data are based on two sets of RCTs ran in parallel in the 2013 main growing season. The farmers 
were spread in three districts of Tanzania (Karatu, Mvomero and Kilosa), covering the main agri-
ecological zones of Tanzania. Karatu, in the northern part of Tanzania, is located next to the natural 
Ngorongoro conservation area and to the tarmac road which brings numerous visitors each year to the 
Serengeti national park. Despite the proximity of this tourist attraction, farmers in the surrounding 
villages do not benefit much from this flow of travellers as most do not stop in Karatu. The 399 farmers 
who took part to the experiment in Karatu district live in three villages that are within a maximum of 
20 km of each other. Despite their relative proximity, each one belongs to a distinct agro-ecological 
zone: Changarawe is located at an altitude of 1350m-1450m with a dry climate; Kilimatembo and 
Rothia benefit from wetter conditions and are located at an altitude of 1500m-1600m and 1600m-
1700m respectively. The 290 farmers who took part to the study in the East are spread over two 
districts (Kilosa and Mvomero) and 12 villages. By contrast to the Karatu area, there are no tourist 
activities and these villages are far more remote from one another - the maximum distance between 
each one being close to 140 km. They are located at a lower altitude, between 500m and 1075m and 
are diverse in terms of humidity. Most are distant from any tarmac road and the closest village to the 
regional centre, Morogoro, is still 25 km away from it. 
Kassie et al. found (2014) that one fifth of the farmers adopted improved maize seeds in the study area 
(20% in Karatu, 25% in Kilosa and 17% Mvomero) while Amare et al. (2012) report an adoption rate of 
50% in Karatu. Maize accounts on average for 70% of crop production and constitute 80% of domestic 
food production consumption in the study area (Kassie et al. 2014). Kassie et al. (2014) found yields of 
1.2 t per ha for adopters of improved maize varieties compared to 0.5 t. per ha for local varieties.  
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At the beginning of December 2012, farmers were told by extensions agents, that they would have the 
opportunity to take part to a study on maize yield. Seeds were distributed in January in units of circa 2 
kg (2 tins). Farmers were allocated randomly to four groups. Group 1 got Situka M1 seeds and group 
2, local seeds. Farmers in groups 1 and 2 were told the type of seeds they were using, as in a classical 
open RCT. Farmers in groups 3 and 4 got Situka M1 and local seeds respectively but were not told to 
which category they were assigned nor were the extensions agents in charge of distributing the seeds. 
It is hence a double-blind experiment. The Situka M1 is treated with a pink fungicide powder while 
local seeds are not. In order to make them indistinguishable, we applied a reddish food colorant on 
both types of seeds. Farmers in the double-blind groups were told by extension agents that they had 
one chance out of two of getting a bag with improved seeds. 
Furthermore, farmers in all four groups were told that a reddish colorant had been applied on all types 
of seeds and that they could plant the seeds and manage the plots as they wanted. The size of the plot, 
the soil quality (farmers have multiple small plots of various sizes and qualities), the number of seeds 
per hole, the spacing between rows as well as the number of weeding and threshing are all important 
production choices.  
Co-authors returned six times for two-week stays to monitor the progress of the experiment and 
collect data at different stages of the growing season, the final survey being conducted in July and 
August in the eastern and northern districts respectively. Most farmers in the double-blind groups 
found out the true type of seeds at maturation because the Situka M1 is an early maturing maize breed. 
However, as most production choices were already made at this stage of the growing cycle, this is of 
minor concern for the results. 
The attrition rate was limited (9%). Among the 625 farmers having answered the end-line survey, we 
identified 10% of non-compliers, i.e. farmers in the double blind groups who were told which type of 
seeds they had by the extension agents, farmers who were in the open RCT but were not told the type 
of seeds they got, and farmers who got the wrong type of seeds according to the randomization 
scheme. The final sample therefore includes 560 farmers, of which 348 are located in the North and 
212 in the East. 
We tested if randomization worked by comparing a set of 20 pre-determined socio-economic variables 
such as farm size, gender of the household head, education, and others. The only statistical difference 
we found was the average age of group 3 farmers which was slightly lower than group 4 farmers. The 
difference is nevertheless pragmatically negligible (45 years old v. 48 years old) and likely to be driven 
only by a few outliers (see Table 3.9 in Appendix 3.8). We hence conclude that randomization worked. 
We further tested if non-compliant farmers differ according to this set of 20 variables and failed to 
  
98 
 
reject the null hypothesis that they do not differ from the rest of the sample. Nevertheless, we choose 
to remove them from the sample. Note that the main results of the present study hold true when 
tested on the sample including non-compliers. The effect estimated is hence the Local Average 
Treatment Effect, i.e. the effect on the compliers only. However, given the good balance in terms of 
socio-economic characteristics, the results are likely indicative of the Average Treatment Effect (ATE), 
a term which we will use below when commenting on the estimated effects. 
Table 3.3 presents a set of summary statistics. The sample average harvest on the experimental plot is 
95 kg, the average yield is 0.82 ton per ha (ton/ha), and the average plot size is 0.11 ha. The standard 
deviation of yield is very large at harvest (ton/ha) and the minimum yield is 0 kg in case of crop failure 
and the maximum is 5.53 ton/ha. The top values likely represent enumeration errors: farmers might 
have provided the total harvest quantity on their farm rather than on the experimental plot. Crop 
failures were mostly caused by termite infestation in the East and excessive rainfall in the North (some 
steep plots were washed away by heavy rains).   
The median farm size is 1.2 ha, with a maximum of 8.5 ha, the 75th percentile at 2 ha and the 95% 
percentile at 4 ha. Farmers are hence mostly small-scale subsistence farmers with only a small fraction 
of the sample likely to have important and regular surplus for sale. The average area planted with 
maize measures around 0.5 ha, which means that we provided the seed for close to a quarter of the 
farm’s total maize production. The experimental plot was hence an important part of the production 
process. As farmers were told that we would not take any of the harvest, it is likely that they have been 
managing it with no less care than their usual plots. 
Only one third of the experimental plots have good quality soil, less than half are flat, while close to 
40% of them suffer from soil erosion according to plot measurements done by extension agents. 
Hence, plots tend to be of lesser quality than the ideal plots on which yield estimates are based when 
marketing a new maize breed. Furthermore, field visits of more than 50 plots showed great differences 
in management, in terms of planting decisions and weeding, for instance. 
Table 3.3: Summary statistics 
 Mean St. dev. Median 
Harvest (kg) 95.23 105.49 60.00 
Yield (ton/ha) 0.82 0.85 0.59 
Size of the plot (ha) 0.11 0.05 0.10 
Good soil 0.35 0.48 0.00 
Flat 0.46 0.44 0.46 
Erosion 0.39 0.43 0.39 
Labour (man days) 8.79 6.64 7.40 
  
99 
 
One or no weeding 0.18 0.38 0.00 
Fertiliser (mostly manure) 0.22 0.42 0.00 
Pesticide 0.11 0.32 0.00 
Plot improvement work (soil bund, terrace etc.) 0.29 0.46 0.00 
Intercropping 0.14 0.31 0.00 
Standardized precipitation Index (peak rainfall month, ARC 2 
dataset) 
0.14 0.39 0.23 
Extreme precipitation (self-reported) 0.48 0.50 0.00 
Crop damage due to pest, disease or fungi 0.26 0.44 0.00 
Female headed household 0.12 0.33 0.00 
Age of household head 46.22 12.93 46.22 
Education: one household member up to form IV 0.18 0.39 0.00 
Household size 5.14 2.21 5.00 
Dependency ratio (no of dependent per adult) 0.55 0.68 0.33 
Risk lover (risk experiment)31 0.41 0.49 0.00 
Land owned (ha) 1.22 1.18 0.91 
Land farmed (ha) 1.49 1.22 1.21 
Motorbike 0.15 0.36 0.00 
Rich (self-reported) 0.26 0.44 0.00 
Oxen 0.26 0.44 0.00 
Active role in the community 0.27 0.44 0.00 
Member of a self-help group (Sacco, vicoba, funeral society) 0.38 0.49 0.00 
Member of a social association (e.g. reglious, youth, women) 0.74 0.44 1.00 
Social network for help in cash, in kind or on the farm 
(number of people) 
2.67 3.51 2.00 
Social network for agricultural related information (number of 
people) 
1.77 3.57 1.00 
In terms of labour, households have allocated on average 9 man-days to the experimental plot 
although there are some outliers, probably driven by the same kind of enumeration errors as 
mentioned above. One quarter of households own at least one ox, an important input for land 
preparation, most of them in the North. 
The average household size is 5 people with an average dependency ratio of 50% (one adult for two 
children). Female-headed households represent a substantial minority (12%). In terms of social capital, 
close to 30% of the households count at least one member in a village community organisation, 40% 
are member of a credit union or other self-help group, and 70% are a member of a social group such 
as youth, women or religious associations. We have two proxies for social network: the number of 
                                                          
31 Farmers were presented with a set of six lotteries ranked according to their riskiness (variance) and expected 
gain. Once the farmer had chosen his preferred lottery, a coin was flipped and he received the corresponding 
pay-off. The maximum amount was 4000 Tsh (circa 2 USD). Farmers who took one of the 2 riskiest lotteries were 
classified as risk lover seeking (40% of the sample). See appendix B for the protocol. 
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people the farmer can ask for help in cash, in kind or on the farm and the number of people he can ask 
agriculture-related questions. The median size of the help and information networks is 2 and 1 people, 
respectively. 
Table 3.4 show large differences in key inputs between regions. In the East, farmers worked 50% more 
on their plot than farmers in the North, planted the crop on larger plots, and a greater share of the 
plots were flat with good soils and no erosion. Furthermore, close to 30% of the farmers located in the 
East chose one of their best plots for the experiment while the share drops to 10% in the North.  
Fertilisers were used more often in the North (mostly manure), which is likely driven by the much 
higher share of households holding cattle in the North (40% against 2% in the East). The lower use of 
manure in the East is hence not the result of a choice but of input constraints. Pesticides were used 
more often in the North, suggesting a greater threat from pest damage although actual pest damage 
does not differ between regions but plot visits suggested more termite attacks in the East. 
Experimental plots were more likely to have benefited from improvement work in the North, although 
most of the improvement work is aimed at limiting soil erosion (soil and rock bunds, terracing etc.), 
which is needed less in the East given the flatness of the terrain. Mulching was for instance carried in 
similar proportion in both regions. With the exception of manure, it appears hence that conditions and 
farm management has been more favourable in the East than in the North. 
Table 3.4: Differences in key inputs between regions, comparison in mean 
 East North East-North 
Labour (man day) 7.42 4.88 2.54*** 
 (3.64) (3.21) (0.30) 
Plot size (ha) 0.12 0.10 0.01*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) 
Pesticide use (d.) 0.02 0.17 -0.15*** 
 (0.15) (0.38) (0.03) 
Fertiliser (, d.) 0.05 0.33 -0.29*** 
 (0.21) (0.47) (0.03) 
Good soil (d.) 0.44 0.30 0.15*** 
 (0.50) (0.46) (0.04) 
More fertile plot (d.) 0.28 0.09 0.19*** 
 (0.44) (0.29) (0.31) 
Flat plot (d.) 0.67 0.31 0.37*** 
 (0.47) (0.46) (0.04) 
Erosion (d.) 0.29 0.45 -0.15*** 
 (0.46) (0.50) (0.05) 
Plot improvement (d.) 0.21 0.34 -0.14*** 
 (0.41) (0.48) (0.04) 
One or no weeding (d.) 0.19 0.17 0.01 
 (0.39) (0.38) (0.03) 
p-values of the t-test: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Labour is the pre-harvest labour 
(land preparation, planting, weeding). d. stands for dummy variables. 
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GPS coordinates were taken for each village and were used to match the survey data with the rainfall 
data from the African Rainfall Climatology Version 2 dataset. Weather conditions have been on average 
slightly wetter than normal according to the standardized precipitation index (SPI, Guttman 1999). The 
average SPI value for March precipitation, the month during which most of the rain falls, is indeed 0.27, 
so lies between the bounds of nearly normal conditions (-0.5, 0.5). Some villages in the East, Manza 
and Vitonga, were exposed to relatively dry conditions with a return period of approximately 10 years 
(SPI values of -1.27) while Kilimatembo (North) enjoyed quite wet conditions (SPI 0.9, return period of 
approximately 5 years). According to informal discussions with farmers and extension agents in the 
North, the timing of rain was not optimal this year: rain started very late, then fell so heavily during 
one month that some plots were washed away, and then stopped abruptly, leaving maize plants short 
of the optimal rainfall required for their growing phase. 
3.5 Results 
We start by comparing effort level across treatment groups in order to investigate if assumption A1, 
i.e. effort is weakly increasing in the probability of receiving improved seeds, does hold. We then 
present the average yields32 across groups and regions and proceed to the estimation of the total 
effects, the lower bounds of the net effects, the lower bounds of the labour allocation effects and the 
lower bounds behavioural effects. We left out of the analysis the top 5% of the yield distribution in 
order to limit the effect of outliers. 
3.5.1 Behavioural response to the probability of receiving improved seeds 
Table 3.5 shows the average behavioural response to the change in the probability of receiving 
improved seeds. Under assumption A1, effort should be weakly increasing in the probability of 
obtaining improved seeds. Therefore, average effort among farmers with a probability of 100% of 
getting improved seeds (group 1) should be higher or equal to the average effort of those with a 50% 
probability of getting improved seeds (groups 3 and 4), which , in turn, should be higher or equal to 
the average effort of the farmers with a zero probability of getting improved seeds (group 2). 
We used 9 variables in order to capture effort: pre-harvest labour (man days)33, size of the 
experimental plot (ha), pesticide use (dummy), fertiliser use (dummy), good soil (dummy), flat plot 
                                                          
32 We chose to present the results in terms of yields rather than harvests because it is a more common metric. 
Results do hold as well when using harvests instead of yields. 
33 We want here to measure the effort allocation causing a harvest and not effort allocation caused by a harvest. 
We therefore focus on the pre-harvest labour. 
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(dummy), erosion (dummy), plot improvement (dummy), one or no weeding (dummy). Results are 
shown in Table 3.5.  
In the North, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference in effort between groups: there 
appears to be no behavioural response to the probability of receiving improved seeds. According to 
the model presented in section 3.3, it implies that we should not find any significant difference 
between the open and the double-blind RCT and, as a results, the lower bound of the behavioural 
effects should not be significantly different from zero. 
Table 3.5: Behavioural response to the probability of receiving improved seeds 
 North East 
Difference in 
probability of 
receiving 
improved seeds : 
100%-0% 
(G1-G2) 
100%-50% 
 (G1-DB) 
50%-0% 
(DB-G2) 
100%-0% 
(G1-G2) 
100%-50% 
(G1-DB) 
50%-0% 
(DB-G2) 
Labour (man day) -0.05 0.51 -0.56 1.18* 0.96 0.22 
 (0.76) (0.59) (0.62) (0.63) (0.72) (0.65) 
Plot size (ha) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02** 0.02** 0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
PesticideD -0.07 -0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.02 -0.02 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
FertiliserD  -0.02 -0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.01 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Good soilD 0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
Flat plotD -0.12 -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 -0.07 0.02 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
ErosionD 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.03 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
Plot improvementD  0.05 0.02 0.03 -0.09 -0.05 -0.04 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Few weedingD -0.09 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
G1: Improved seeds in the open RCT (probability of improved seeds=100%), G2: Local seeds in the open 
RCT (probability of improved seeds=0%), DB: double-blind groups (groups 3 and 4) with a probability of 
50% of receiving the improved seeds. p-values of the t-test: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Labour is the 
pre-harvest labour (land preparation, planting, weeding). D stands for dummy variables. 
In the East, by contrast, we do find significant differences in the pre-harvest labour and the size of the 
experimental plot. As expected, farmers with a 100% probability of receiving improved seeds (group 
1) allocated on average more labour to the plot and chose a larger plot than those with a 0% probability 
of receiving improved seeds (group 2). Similarly, farmers with a 50% probability of getting the 
improved seeds (group 3 and 4) chose a larger plot on average than those with a 0% probability of 
getting improved seeds (group 2). Although the difference in terms of labour allocation is not 
significant between the groups with a 100% and 50% chance of getting improved seeds (group 1 and 
the double-blind groups) and between those with a 50% and 0% (double-blind groups and group 2), it 
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has the expected sign: the higher the probability of receiving improved seeds, the higher is the average 
labour allocation. We can therefore expect to find a difference in the results of the open and double-
blind RCTs and a significant behavioural effect. 
Assumption (A1) appears hence to hold across the sample: effort is weakly increasing in the probability 
of receiving improved seeds. We expect that the difference in the behavioural response between 
regions should be reflected in the results of the experiments: the larger behavioural response in the 
East should imply a larger behavioural effect. 
3.5.2 Average treatment effects 
Table 3.6 shows the average yields across treatment groups and regions. Farmers in the East have on 
average higher yields than those in the North. This is consistent with the observation that plots were 
of better quality in the East (larger, better soil, lower erosion, flatter etc.) and the higher labour 
invested on the plots (Table 3.4). However, yields are very low in both cases: 0.59 ton/ha in the North 
and 1.16 in the East, less than half those found in Magorokosho et al. (2009). In both regions, improved 
seeds have a large impact on average yield: they are close to 60% higher than with local seeds. In terms 
of the second treatment arm of the experiment, i.e. the probability of receiving improved seeds, we 
observe that the average yields with improved seeds in the open category (G1) tend to be higher than 
in the double-blind category (G3). By contrast, farmers having received local seeds in the open RCT 
(G2) and the double-blind RCT (G4) have similar yield levels. We test below if these differences are 
statistically significant (Table 3.7). 
Table 3.6: Average harvest and yields 
  Yield (ton/ha)   
 All Local 
G2 & G4 
Improved 
G1 & G3 
 
G1 G2 G3 G4 
Both regions 0.82 0.64 1.01 1.12 0.69 0.87 0.57 
 (0.85) (0.58) (1.03) (1.16) (0.61) (0.81) (0.53) 
North 0.59 0.46 0.73 0.76 0.46 0.69 0.46 
 (0.51) (0.36) (0.62) (0.66) (0.35) (0.57) (0.37) 
East 1.16 0.91 1.43 1.65 0.96 1.13 0.82 
 (1.10) (0.72) (1.34) (1.51) (0.72) (1.03) (0.71) 
G1: Improved seeds in the open RCT, G2: Local seeds in the open RCT, G3: Improved seeds in the 
double-blind RCT, G4: Local seeds in the double-blind RCT. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Following the model presented in section 3.3, the results of the open RCT, i.e. the comparison in mean 
values between groups 1 and 2, provide the average total effect of improved seed: 𝑔 + 𝑙 + ?̂?. As 
expected, the total effect is large. In the North, the average yields with the local and improved seeds 
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are, respectively, 0.46 ton/ha and 0.76/ha, i.e. an increase of 0.31 ton/ha (or 65%) significant at the 
99% confidence level. In the East, average yield with local and improved seeds are, respectively, 0.96 
ton per ha and 1.65 ton/ha, i.e. an increase in yields of 0.69 ton/ha (or 72%). Lastly, at the aggregate 
level, yields increase by 0.44 ton/ha (62%). The total effect is hence very large both in the North and 
the East.  
Table 3.7: Comparison in means 
 Treatment Effects on Yield (ton/ha) East North Both 
regions 
Total effect: G1- G2 𝑔+𝑙+𝑚 0.69*** 0.31*** 0.44*** 
  (0.21) (0.08) (0.11) 
LB of Net effect: G3-G2 𝑔+𝑚∗ 0.31 0.23*** 0.29*** 
  (0.2) (0.08) (0.09) 
LB of Behavioural effect: G1-G3 𝑙′+𝑚′ 0.52* 0.07 0.25* 
  (0.27) (0.1) (0.13) 
LB of Effort allocation effect: G4-G2 𝑙∗ -0.14 0 -0.11 
  (0.15) (0.06) (0.07) 
LB: lower bound, G1: Improved seeds in the open RCT, G2: Local seeds in the open RCT, 
G3: Improved seeds in the double-blind RCT, G4: Local seeds in the double-blind RCT. The 
total effect of improved seeds is given by ?̂? + 𝑙 + ?̂? (G1- G2), the lower bound of the net 
effect by  ?̂? + ?̂?∗ (G3- G4), the lower bound of the behavioural effect by 𝑙′ + ?̂?′(G1- G3) 
and the lower bound of the effort allocation effect by 𝑙∗ (G4- G2). Standard errors in 
parentheses, p-values of the t-test: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
We turn now to the results of the double-blind experiment. Following the model presented in section 
3.3, they provide a lower bound of the net effect, i.e. a lower bound of the average increase in yield 
attributable to the higher productivity of the improved seeds: 𝑔 + ?̂?∗. In the North, the lower bound 
of the net effect on yield is 0.23 ton/ha (a 50% increase), significant at the 99% confidence level. In the 
East, it is 0.31 (a 38% increase), but it is not statistically different from zero. When both regions are 
pooled together, the average lower bound of the net effect is a 53% increase in yield, significant at the 
99% confidence level. 
By combining the results of the open and double-blind RCTs we obtain a lower and upper bounds of 
the net effect. At the aggregate level, the average net effect of improved seeds on yield is hence 
bounded between 0.29 ton per/ha to 0.44 ton/pa; in the North, between 0.23 ton/ha and 0.31/ton 
and in the East, between 0.31 ton/ha and 0.69 ton/ha. The difference between the open and double-
blind RCTs is hence larger in the East, pointing toward a larger role of the behavioural response.  
We  now analyse the effect of the second treatment arm of the experiment, i.e. the change in the 
probability of receiving improved seeds. Following the model presented in section 3.3, the difference 
between group 4 and 2 gives a lower bound of the effort allocation effect, i.e. the increase in output 
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caused by the increase in effort alone,   𝑙′. We do not find any significant difference between group 4 
and 2, which is consistent with the lack of behavioural response to a change in probability from 0% to 
50% reported in Table 3.5. These results contrast with Bulte et al. (2014) where a significant effort 
allocation effect was found (or pseudo-placebo effect according to the terminology used in Bulte et al., 
2014).  
Following the model presented in section 3.3, the difference between group 1 and 3, provides a lower 
bound of the behavioural effect. It is large in the East: farmers being told that they have the improved 
seeds have yield 0.52 ton/ha higher than those who are told they have one chance out of two 
(significant at 90% confidence level). The behavioural effect represents close to 75% of the total effect 
in the East. Although it is not significant in the North, the contribution of the behavioural effect is large 
and significant when both regions are pooled together: 0.25 ton/ha or 57% of the total effect. 
This highlights the importance of effort adjustment in order to reap the whole potential of the 
improved seeds. Farmers facing input constraints either because of limited access to land, fertilisers 
or man power will hence only benefit from a fraction of the potential increase in yield brought about 
by improved seeds.  
We present in Table 3.8 the results of the regression analysis. Detailed results are shown in Table 3.10, 
Table 3.11 and Table 3.12 in the appendix. In model I, the only variables are the group dummies and, 
for the regression at the aggregate level, a dummy equal to one for the farmers in the North. In model 
II, we add controls related to farm management: labour (pre-harvest labour expressed in man days), a 
dummy for weeding (equal to 1 if the farmer conducted only one or no weeding), the size of the 
experimental plot (ha), the soil quality (a dummy equal to one for good soil), pesticide use (dummy), 
fertiliser use (dummy) and plot improvement works such as soil bunds or mulching (dummy). In model 
III, we add controls on production shocks, weather conditions and socioeconomic characteristics with 
the following set of variables: crop damage caused by pests, plant disease or fungi (dummy), extreme 
rainfall (dummy, self-reported), standardized precipitation index in level and square,  a dummy for 
female-headed households, education of the household head (completed form IV, dummy), active role 
in the community such as seating in the village council (dummy) and risk loving attitude measured by 
a short risk preference experiment.34 In model IV, we control for the extent of the social network and 
farmers’ social interactions, i.e. the number of people the farmer can ask about farming related 
questions, the number of people the farmer can ask for help in cash, in kind or on the farm, a dummy 
                                                          
34 Farmers were presented with a set of six lotteries ranked according to their riskiness (variance) and expected 
gain. Once the farmer had chosen his preferred lottery, a coin was flipped and he received the corresponding 
pay-off. The maximum amount was 4000 Tsh (circa 2 USD). Farmers who took one of the 2 riskiest lotteries were 
classified as risk lover (40% of the sample). See appendix for the protocol. 
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equal to one if the farmer consulted anybody about best farming practices, if he is a member of a social 
group (e.g. prayer group) or a member of a self-help group (e.g. credit union).  
Table 3.8: Ordinary least squares regressions results 
  Yield (ton/ha) 
 Model I II III IV 
Both 
regions 
Total Effect: G1-G2 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.43*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) 
LB of Net effect: G3-G4 0.25* 0.25* 0.21 0.21 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) 
LB of Behavioural effect: G1-G3 0.25* 0.25 0.25 0.25* 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) 
LB of Effort allocation effect: G4-G2 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Observations 518 512 512 502 
R2 0.169 0.201 0.284 0.300 
North 
Total Effect: G1-G2 0.31* 0.28* 0.24* 0.24+ 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
LB of Net effect: G3-G4 0.23 0.26 0.24 0.22 
 (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.19) 
LB of Behavioural effect: G1-G3 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.06 
 (0.1) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) 
LB of Effort allocation effect: G4-G2 -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) 
Observations 312 308 308 304 
R2 0.072 0.129 0.173 0.253 
East 
Total Effect: G1-G2 0.69** 0.67** 0.65** 0.64** 
 (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
LB of Net effect: G3-G4 0.31 0.21 0.14 0.24 
 (0.31) (0.32) (0.29) (0.3) 
LB of Behavioural effect: G1-G3 0.52* 0.55** 0.56** 0.53** 
 (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.21) 
LB of Effort allocation effect: G4-G2 -0.14 -0.09 -0.06 -0.12 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) 
Observations 206 204 204 198 
R2 0.085 0.131 0.257 0.282 
LB: lower bound, G1: Improved seeds in the open RCT, G2: Local seeds in the open RCT, G3: 
Improved seeds in the double-blind RCT, G4: Local seeds in the double-blind RCT. The total 
effect of improved seeds is given by G1- G2 (?̂? + 𝑙 + ?̂?), the lower bound of the net effect by G3- 
G4 (?̂? + ?̂?∗), the lower bound of the behavioural effect by G1- G3 (𝑙′ + ?̂?′) and the lower 
bound of the effort allocation effect by G4- G2 (𝑙∗). Standard errors in parentheses (robust to 
clustering at the village level), p-values of the t-test: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
The regressions’ results are consistent with the results of the comparison in means35. We do observe 
a slight decrease of the total effect and of the net effect once controls are added. This is likely due to 
the fact that part of the behavioural effect is controlled by the added variables. However, the low 
bound of the behavioural effect stays highly significant in the East and at the aggregate level, even 
                                                          
35 The slight difference in the results for both regions pooled together between the regression and difference in 
mean analysis comes from the fact that in the former a dummy equal to one for farmers in the North and zero 
otherwise in added. The regression results conducted on each region separately do match as expected the results 
from the comparison in means.   
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after controlling for more than 20 variables (the p-value is just above 0.1 in model II and III at the 
aggregate level).  
This suggests that a simple regression with a set of controls is not able to control appropriately for 
effort. A more complex model where the proxy variables for effort would be interacted with the 
improved seeds dummy could perhaps capture the increase in marginal productivity of effort. 
However, given the number of dimensions along which effort can be adjusted (e.g. quality, frequency), 
it might be challenging to properly account for the increased productivity. The combination of the 
double-blind and open RCT simplify greatly the estimation of various effect of interest: the total effect, 
the net effect, marginal productivity effect and the effort allocation effect.  
3.6 Conclusion 
While it is likely that no single factor can, on its own, explain the puzzle of the low adoption of improved 
seeds in Sub-Saharan Africa (see section 1.5 of the literature review), Suri (2011) showed that some 
hybrid maize seeds might not be profitable for a large part of the population, while Rosenzweig and 
Foster (2010) highlight the fact that many studies may overestimate the benefit of adoption because 
they neglect farmers’ adjustment cost, i.e. they measure the total effect of adoption instead of the net 
effect.  
We tested an improved maize seeds variety in Tanzania, the Situka M1, with a unique combination of 
open and double-blind randomized controlled trials (RCT). In the classic open RCT, by randomly 
allocating participants to a group receiving either the improved seeds or to another one receiving local 
seeds, the traditional issue of self-selection bias in studies based on observational data is bypassed and 
a direct and unbiased estimate of the total effect of the improved seeds is provided. 
The advantage of combining an open and a double-blind RCTs is the randomization of the probability 
of receiving improved seeds. It allows us to disentangle the effect of the improved seeds per se from 
its effects which depends on a change in the management of the farm. The empirical contribution of 
this study is to show that this behavioural response plays a central role in driving the total effect of 
improved seeds. In the Eastern part of our sample, 75% of the total effect of improved seeds would 
not materialize without the behavioural response.  
A second advantage of our design over classical open RCTs is to provide an upper and lower bounds 
estimate of the net effect of improved seeds, i.e. net of the adjustment in effort. At the aggregate level, 
the net effect of improved seeds is between 0.29 ton/ha and 0.44 ton/ha. Given this large increase in 
yield, the low adoption rate of improved seeds in the study area remains puzzling. A possible 
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explanation is the large role of the behavioural response in driving the effect of improved seeds. 
Constraints on complementary inputs, such as low soil plot quality, might limit the scope of the 
behavioural response of some farmers. An interesting extension of the present paper would be to 
investigate the drivers of the behavioural effects as well as the distributional impacts of the improved 
seeds. 
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3.8 Appendix A: Further results  
Table 3.9: Did randomization work? 
 Averages P-values of the t-test 
 G1 G2 G3 G4 1=2 1=3 1=4 2=3 2=4 3=4 
Land owned fully (ha) 2.83 3.01 2.64 2.62 0.53 0.55 0.48 0.25 0.21 0.95 
Land owned (ha) 2.96 3.06 2.76 2.69 0.74 0.52 0.37 0.36 0.25 0.83 
Land farmed (ha) 1.46 1.50 1.43 1.38 0.73 0.81 0.52 0.58 0.33 0.72 
Oxen (d.)  0.23 0.22 0.30 0.29 0.89 0.19 0.29 0.14 0.22 0.81 
Rich (self-reported, d.) 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.23 0.96 0.55 0.61 0.57 0.57 0.29 
Female headed household 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.29 0.17 0.51 0.70 0.73 0.50 
Age household head 44.6 45.5 48.4 47.3 0.51 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.21 0.52 
Dependency ratio (no of dependent per adult) 0.53 0.55 0.58 0.42 0.70 0.51 0.16 0.73 0.06 0.05 
Household size 5.14 5.03 5.10 5.16 0.67 0.90 0.93 0.78 0.61 0.83 
Education head (years of education) 6.01 5.89 6.02 5.88 0.76 0.99 0.76 0.75 0.98 0.74 
Education: one household member up to form IV 0.45 0.47 0.52 0.42 0.67 0.22 0.68 0.40 0.40 0.12 
Education: tow household member up to form IV 0.22 0.21 0.13 0.15 0.91 0.07 0.17 0.09 0.19 0.68 
Social network (number of people) 1.82 1.89 2.13 1.96 0.71 0.23 0.55 0.35 0.78 0.56 
Social network (number of relatives) 2.27 2.49 2.76 2.47 0.41 0.13 0.52 0.35 0.95 0.40 
Member of a social association (e.g. youth, women) 0.78 0.75 0.69 0.72 0.54 0.12 0.30 0.33 0.64 0.63 
Member of a self-help group (e.g. Sacco, vicoba) 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.33 0.81 0.86 0.27 0.96 0.36 0.37 
Active role in the community 0.28 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.39 0.72 0.91 0.65 0.48 0.82 
Oxen (d.) 0.23 0.22 0.30 0.29 0.89 0.19 0.29 0.14 0.22 0.81 
Rich (self-reported, d.) 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.23 0.96 0.55 0.61 0.57 0.57 0.29 
Observations 148 166 121 126       
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Table 3.10: Ordinary Least Squares: Both regions 
 
Dependent variable: Harvest (kg) 
Base category: local seeds in the open RCT I II III IV 
Improved seeds, open RCT 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.43*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) 
Improved seeds, double-blind RCT 0.21+ 0.20 0.18 0.18 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) 
Local seeds, double-blind RCT -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
North -0.57** -0.54** -1.01*** -1.06*** 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.24) (0.25) 
Labour (man day, pre-harvest)  0.00 0.01 0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
One or no weeding  -0.29** -0.20** -0.21** 
  (0.12) (0.08) (0.09) 
Experimental plot size (ha)  0.18 -0.01 0.01 
  (0.58) (0.52) (0.56) 
Good soil (dummy)  0.12 0.12+ 0.11 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Pesticide (dummy)  -0.23*** -0.20** -0.20*** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Fertiliser (dummy, mostly manure)  -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Plot improvement (e.g. soil bund,   0.04 0.06 0.06 
Mulching, dummy)  (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) 
Standardized precipitation Index    0.72** 0.74** 
(peak rainfall month, ARC 2 dataset)   (0.27) (0.29) 
Standardized precipitation Index2   -1.36 -1.31 
   (0.93) (0.94) 
Crop damage due to pest, diseases,    -0.17+ -0.17 
or fungi (dummy)   (0.11) (0.11) 
Extreme precipitation (self-reported,   -0.13* -0.14* 
dummy)   (0.07) (0.08) 
Female headed household (dummy)    -0.03 
    (0.12) 
Basic education (Standard IV,     0.01 
dummy)    (0.07) 
Active role in the community     0.16* 
(dummy)    (0.08) 
Dependency ratio     0.00 
(no of dependent per adult)    (0.10) 
Risk lover (risk experiment, dummy)    -0.02 
    (0.05) 
Information network (number of     0.00 
people the farmer can ask farming related 
question) 
   (0.00) 
Help network (number of people the     0.01 
farmer can ask help in cash, in kind or on the 
farm) 
   (0.01) 
Consulted a farmer or an extension       0.04 
agent on farming practices (dummy)    (0.06) 
Member of a social association     -0.06 
(e.g. prayer groups , dummy)    (0.12) 
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Member of a self-help group     -0.10 
(e.g. credit union, dummy)    (0.09) 
Constant 1.00*** 0.99*** 1.46*** 1.46*** 
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.25) (0.25) 
Observations 518 512 512 502 
R2 0.169 0.201 0.284 0.300 
Standard errors in parentheses (robust to clustering at the village level)* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01   
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Table 3.11: Ordinary Least Squares: North 
Dependent variable: Harvest (kg) 
Base category: local seeds in the open RCT I II III IV 
Improved seeds, open RCT 0.31* 0.28* 0.24* 0.24+ 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Improved seeds, double-blind RCT 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.19 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.21) 
Local seeds, double-blind RCT -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) 
Labour (man day, pre-harvest)  0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
One or no weeding  -0.22* -0.22* -0.20+ 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
Experimental plot size (ha)  -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 
  (0.63) (0.63) (0.66) 
Good soil (dummy)  0.03 0.05 0.09** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 
Pesticide (dummy)  -0.20+ -0.16 -0.15 
  (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) 
Fertiliser (dummy, mostly manure)  -0.09* -0.10 -0.11** 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Plot improvement (e.g. soil bund,   0.13** 0.13** 0.11* 
Mulching, dummy)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Standardized precipitation Index    11.77+ 7.94** 
(peak rainfall month, ARC 2 dataset)   (4.85) (0.83) 
Standardized precipitation Index2   -16.53 -10.86** 
   (7.32) (1.31) 
Crop damage due to pest, diseases,    -0.22* -0.18 
or fungi (dummy)   (0.06) (0.12) 
Extreme precipitation (self-reported,   -0.11** -0.14* 
dummy)   (0.02) (0.04) 
Female headed household (dummy)    -0.09 
    (0.14) 
Basic education (Standard IV,     0.06 
dummy)    (0.05) 
Active role in the community     0.17 
(dummy)    (0.09) 
Dependency ratio     -0.19*** 
(no of dependent per adult)    (0.01) 
Risk lover (risk experiment, dummy)    -0.07 
    (0.06) 
Information network (number of     -0.01 
people the farmer can ask farming related 
question) 
   (0.00) 
Help network (number of people the     0.01** 
farmer can ask help in cash, in kind or on the 
farm) 
   (0.00) 
Consulted a farmer or an extension       0.09 
agent on farming practices (dummy)    (0.06) 
Member of a social association     -0.06 
(e.g. prayer groups , dummy)    (0.12) 
Member of a self-help group     -0.01 
(e.g. credit union, dummy)    (0.09) 
Constant 0.46** 0.48* -1.35 -0.74*** 
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 (0.08) (0.13) (0.59) (0.04) 
Observations 312 308 308 304 
R2 0.072 0.129 0.173 0.253 
Standard errors in parentheses (robust to clustering at the village level)* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
  
  
116 
 
Table 3.12: Ordinary Least Squares: East 
Dependent variable: Harvest (kg) 
Base category: local seeds in the open RCT I II III IV 
Improved seeds, open RCT 0.69** 0.67** 0.65** 0.64** 
 (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
Improved seeds, double-blind RCT 0.17 0.12 0.09 0.11 
 (0.27) (0.28) (0.27) (0.26) 
Local seeds, double-blind RCT -0.14 -0.09 -0.06 -0.12 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) 
Labour (man day, pre-harvest)  -0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
One or no weeding  -0.39+ -0.22 -0.23 
  (0.25) (0.17) (0.20) 
Experimental plot size (ha)  1.37 0.20 1.32 
  (2.35) (1.65) (1.70) 
Good soil (dummy)  0.17 0.12 0.13 
  (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) 
Pesticide (dummy)  -0.67+ -0.62* -0.54 
  (0.38) (0.34) (0.36) 
Fertiliser (dummy, mostly manure)  0.20 0.51 0.52 
  (0.51) (0.43) (0.39) 
Plot improvement (e.g. soil bund,   -0.12 -0.11 -0.07 
Mulching, dummy)  (0.43) (0.35) (0.33) 
Standardized precipitation Index    0.56* 0.57* 
(peak rainfall month, ARC 2 dataset)   (0.27) (0.29) 
Standardized precipitation Index2   -2.51 -2.35 
   (1.80) (1.90) 
Crop damage due to pest, diseases,    -0.01 0.05 
or fungi (dummy)   (0.27) (0.33) 
Extreme precipitation (self-reported,   -0.11 -0.09 
dummy)   (0.25) (0.26) 
Female headed household (dummy)    0.15 
    (0.18) 
Basic education (Standard IV,     -0.09 
dummy)    (0.12) 
Active role in the community     0.11 
(dummy)    (0.12) 
Dependency ratio     0.10 
(no of dependent per adult)    (0.13) 
Risk lover (risk experiment, dummy)    0.01 
    (0.12) 
Information network (number of     0.01 
people the farmer can ask farming related 
question) 
   (0.01) 
Help network (number of people the     0.01 
farmer can ask help in cash, in kind or on the 
farm) 
   (0.02) 
Consulted a farmer or an extension       -0.05 
agent on farming practices (dummy)    (0.13) 
Member of a social association     0.00 
(e.g. prayer groups , dummy)    (.) 
Member of a self-help group     -0.24 
(e.g. credit union, dummy)    (0.17) 
Constant 0.96*** 0.93** 1.64*** 1.48** 
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 (0.13) (0.39) (0.44) (0.60) 
Observations 206 204 204 198 
R2 0.085 0.131 0.257 0.282 
Standard errors in parentheses (robust to clustering at the village level)* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0. 
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3.9 Appendix B : Risk preference experiment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extentionist, please read the following: Imagine you can select 1 of 6 plots. On plot one, you earn 1000 Tsh if the season is bad (HEAD) and also 
1000 Tsh if the season is good (TAIL); on plot two 900 Tsh if the season is bad or 1800 Tsh if the season is good; on plot three 800 Tsh or 2400 Tsh; 
on plot four 600 Tsh or 3000 Tsh; on plot five 200 or 3600 Tsh and on plot six 0 or 4000. In each plot, there is a one chance in two to get the bad 
and good harvest, that is: a good season is as likely as a bad season. Please, take a moment to compare the six different plots and then tell me 
which plot is the best for you.  
 Extentionist: show the boxes below to the farmers and explain him again how it works.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bad harvest 
(Head) 
200
Good 
harvest 
(Tail) 
3600 
Bad harvest 
(Head) 
1000
Good 
harvest 
(Tail) 
1000 
   Bad harvest 
(Head) 
800
 
Good harvest 
(Tail) 
2400 
Bad harvest 
(Head) 
900
Good 
harvest 
(Tail) 
1800 
Bad harvest 
(Head) 
600
Good 
harvest 
(Tail) 
3000 
Bad harvest 
(Head) 
0
Good 
harvest 
(Tail) 
4000 
Plot  1.___ Plot  2.___ Plot  3.___ Plot  4.___ Plot  5.___ Plot  6.___ 
The respondent is asked to choose between the different farming plots (plot 1 to plot 6); Each plot 
gives either the bad harvest yield or a good harvest yield. For instance, plot 2 gives 900 Shillings if the 
season is bad (bad harvest), but it gives 1800 Shillings if the season is good (good harvest).  
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4 Avoiding the ‘Family Tax’:  Social pressure and hiding in 
village economies 
Xavier Vollenweider1 and Salvatore Di Falco2  
Abstract 
Based on the field experiment on maize seeds conducted in Tanzania and presented in chapter 3, we test 
the hypothesis that individuals try to escape forced solidarity when facing favourable conditions. We find 
that farmers who were allocated the improved seeds decrease the number of their social interactions, 
particularly if they have a large number of relatives in the village. We interpret these results as an evidence 
that farmers who were assigned the improved seeds adopted an evasive behaviour to escape the 
redistributive pressure from their social network.  Furthermore, it suggests that the pressure to share 
increases with the size of the social network.  
  
  
                                                          
1 Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom. 
Contact author: Xavier Vollenweider: X.Y.Vollenweider@lse.ac.uk. 
2 Department of Economics, University of Geneva, Switzerland. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Social networks play an important role in the livelihood of rural communities in developing countries 
by providing informal insurance and credit when markets are imperfect or absent (Anderson and Baland 
2002; Coate and Ravallion 1993; Fafchamps 1992; Fafchamps and Lund 2003; Ligon et al. 2002; Rosenzweig 
1988; Townsend 1994; Udry 1994). Households’ expectations of future assistance and transfers are key 
motivations behind participation in these networks. Other explanations may, however, apply. Altruism, 
guilt, social pressure to share resources and potential social sanctions also seem to play a crucial role in 
shaping individual behaviour in networks (Alger and Weibull 2010; Barr and Stein 2008; Foster and 
Rosenzweig 2001; Leider et al. 2009; Ligon 2011; Ligon and Schechter 2012; Platteau 2000). Social relations 
define obligations for the network’s members.3 The more successful members of the network must help 
the least successful or unlucky members of the social network. 
Recently, some observational and experimental evidence has been provided indicating that these 
obligations may trigger an evasive response. Households anticipating that their future income will be 
‘taxed’ by kin and neighbours may alter their consumption and investment decisions. They may, for 
instance, try to escape these obligations by spending more on non-sharable goods and keeping less 
liquidity (Di Falco and Bulte 2011). Individuals may attempt to fend off network requests by ‘pretending 
to be poor’ (Baland et al. 2011) or by concealing their assets and making more investments when not 
observed by kinship members (Jakiela and Ozier 2016). In this paper, we directly analyse the role of 
hiding as an evasive response to social network pressure by using a field experiment in rural Tanzania.4 
We randomly assigned a positive income shock to some farmers by allocating improved seeds to some 
farm households, while others were assigned a traditional low yielding variety. The expected future 
income of households with improved seeds is therefore raised. We found that individuals who were 
assigned the improved seeds reduced their social interactions if they counted a large number of relatives 
within the village. 
In section 4.2, we introduce the experimental design, the main idea behind the study, the variable used as 
proxy of the social interactions and social network. In section 4.3, we introduce a simple model to further 
                                                          
3 In this respect, Scott (1976) and Platteau (1991) refer to the ‘moral economy’. 
4 This is the same experiment used in chapter 3 with the slight difference that we use only the results from the open 
randomized controlled trial, i.e. the farmers who were told which type of seeds they received (i.e. group 1 and 2 in 
chapter 3). 
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the empirical analysis. In section 4.4, we present the econometric strategy, in section 4.5, we present the 
results and we conclude in section 4.6.     
4.2 Data and Design of the Field Experiment 
The field experiment was conducted in two areas of Tanzania, the South East (Morogoro) and the North 
(Karatu) with a sample of 320 farmers.5 Improved (high yielding) maize seeds were allocated randomly to 
half of the sample in 2013. The remaining half received traditional (low yielding) varieties. Maize is a key 
crop for these areas and is basically grown by all farmers mostly for their own consumption. In good years 
or among large farms, surpluses are marketed. The improved variety of Situka-M1 was released in 2001 
by the Selian Agricultural Research Institute (SARI). It has a very high yield potential of 3-5 ton/ha and its 
optimal production altitude range is 1000-1500 m. The traditional variety has a potential of 0.5-1 ton/ha 
under similar conditions. In Tanzania, the improved variety is grown in the South Eastern and Northern 
regions where our study districts are located. It is the second most important open pollinated variety (OPV) 
following the Staha variety grown in our study areas.6 The Situka-M1 is hence well-known and considered 
as a high yielding variety by farmers. Thus, allocating Situka-M1 constituted a positive shock on expected 
income as shown by the results of chapter 3 where harvest was on average 50% higher with the Situka-
M1 than the local variety of seeds. 
The goal of the present chapter is to compare social interactions between the farmers who got the 
improved seeds and the control group’s farmers who got local seeds. Each farmer was asked in the end-
line survey the number of social interactions they have had over the study period according to seven 
categories summarized in Table 4.1. Let us for the moment focus on asking for help on the farm. Asking 
for help on the farm is a very common social interaction in the village. In this way farmers can use extra 
units of labour; this is a direct and tangible benefit of a social network. Asking for help entails one 
important implication: visibility. The people giving a helping hand can guess the farmer’s future harvest. If 
it is a bumper crop, the farmer exposes himself to solidarity requests from those that helped him, and 
from less fortunate members of the community having heard of his bumper crop. Hence there is a choice 
                                                          
5 We use the same experiment as in chapter 3, using here only the data from farmers who knew what type of seeds 
they were given (i.e. group 1 and 2 in the chapter 3) and not the double-blind experiment. Indeed, we want to observe 
the participants’ behaviour when they know that they have a positive income shock. 
6 About 12% of farmers used Situka-M1 during the 2010/11crop calendar. The variety is tolerant to drought, and 
maize streak and grey leaf spot diseases. 
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between, on the one side, asking for help and being exposed to a solidarity tax and, on the other side, not 
benefiting from help and hiding from a solidarity request. A farmer having received improved seeds will 
think twice before asking for help: in the eyes of the community, he might become one of the lucky few 
to whom one turns to in case of hardship. 
The social interactions recorded in the survey vary in terms of the visibility they entail. Discussing the type 
of seeds received in the experiment and asking for help on the experimental plot or, more generally, on 
the farm implies a high visibility. By contrast, asking for help in cash or in kind or for information about 
best practices or output and land market does not require revealing the type of seeds received in the 
experiment (low visibility).  
Table 4.1: Social interactions analysed 
 Visibility Improved Local Diff. 
Discussing the seeds received in the experiment (count) high 3.33 4.05 -0.72 
  (3.70) (5.42) (0.53) 
Asking for help on the farm (count) high 1.74 2.06 -0.32 
  (2.64) (2.87) (0.31) 
Asking for help on the experimental plot (harvest) (d) high 0.10 0.10 -0.00 
  (0.30) (0.30) (0.03) 
Asking for help on the experimental plot (pre-harvest) (d) high 0.36 0.33 0.03 
  (0.48) (0.47) (0.05) 
Asking for help in cash or in kind (count) low 4.19 4.23 -0.04 
  (6.02) (6.58) (0.71) 
Asking for information on best farming practices (count) low 2.41 2.57 -0.15 
  (3.45) (2.91) (0.36) 
Asking for information on markets (output or land) (count) low 2.89 2.31 0.58 
  (6.03) (3.52) (0.55) 
Standard deviations and standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (d) stands for 
dummy variables, (count) stands for the number of people with whom each farmer had one of the social 
interaction. 
Summary statistics on the social interactions variables are presented in Table 4.1. We see that the number 
of people each farmer interacts with oscillates between 1 and 3. Furthermore, while asking for help on the 
experimental plot is relatively common (more than one third of the sample does it), asking for help at 
harvest time is much less common (10 percent). There are no statistically significant differences between 
farmers in the improved and local seeds category. However, the difference in the propensity to ask may 
depend on the size of the social network. Indeed, visibility may come at a greater cost with a large network 
because larger networks may imply larger pressure for sharing. In section 4.3 we will present a 
formalisation of this argument based on expected utility theory. The distributions of the count data 
variables are shown in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of the main variables 
 
The social network variable is based on the number of people each farmer could ask for help or 
information. As each category has been recorded separately, it is likely that some networks overlap (e.g. 
friends ready to give information on best farming practices are ready to give information on output and 
land markets). We have chosen to express the network size as the average size of all social network 
categories in order to reduce the impact of double-counting and capture more closely the number of 
people each farmer knows.7 The social network is measured in three layers: people in general, relatives 
inside the village, and relatives outside the village. We opted for relatives inside the village as it is in this 
layer that solidarity should be the strongest as geographical proximity and kinship are the major 
determinants of risk-sharing network formation (Fafchamps and Gubert 2007).  Farmers can ask for help 
or information on average from 1.5 relatives in the village. Its distribution is shown in Figure 4.1.  
                                                          
7 An alternative strategy is to express the network size as the sum of all social network categories in order to capture 
the intensity or the usefulness of each member of a farmer’s social network: a friend who can help with cash, kind or 
help on the farm is worth more than a friend who can only provide help on the farm. As we found very similar results, 
we therefore present results only in terms of averaged networks. 
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We also controlled for external drivers which could trigger the solidarity within the villages such as pest 
damage and excessive rainfall. Field visits revealed heavy damage to some fields from termites in the South 
East and from fungi and excessive rainfall in the North, close to one quarter of the farmers reported crop 
damage due to pests. The 2013 season was rather wet as half of the farmers reported rain above the 
normal (70% in the North). This is also recorded with satellite observations from the African Rainfall 
Climatology Version 2 dataset (ARC2, Novella and Thiaw 2013): the standardized precipitation index for 
March was 0.64 in the North with a maximum of 0.91 in one village. 
We also tried to limit the effect of omitted variable bias by controlling for socioeconomic characteristics 
possibly correlated with social interactions such as belonging to a self-help group or other economic 
association (e.g. primary society, a rotating savings and credit association or funeral society), for belonging 
to a social group (e.g. a prayer group or a youth organisation), the size of the household, the education, 
female headed household, the age of the household head, the size of the whole farm measure in ha, oxen 
holding, and for living in the North. Lastly, a farmer with improved seeds sowed on a highly visible plot 
(e.g. near the homestead) is more likely to be identified by his peers as expecting a high harvest. This could 
trigger demand for help from his social network even in the absence of a request to help or information 
from his part.  In order to control for the visibility of the plot, we add a variable measuring the walking 
distance from the homestead to the experimental plot (measured in minutes). A more remote plot is less 
observable. Summary statistics are displayed in Table 4.2. Note that the average size of the farm is just 
above 1.5 ha, i.e. most farmers are small-scale subsistence with no surplus for sale. 
Table 4.2: Explicative variables 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Improved seeds(d) 0.47 0.50 
Number of relatives within the village 1.50 1.57 
North(d) 0.59 0.49 
Plot size (ha) 0.11 0.04 
Distance to plot (minutes)  18.86 19.12 
Farm size (ha) 1.58 1.23 
Oxen (d)  0.23 0.42 
Labour (man day)  9.27 6.87 
Pest damage (d) 0.23 0.42 
Standardized Precipitation Index  0.22 0.66 
Female headed household (d)  0.11 0.32 
Age household head(d)  45.74 12.43 
Household size  5.11 2.24 
Secondary education (d)  0.60 0.49 
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Risk averse(d)8  0.22 0.41 
Leadership role in the community(d)  0.31 0.56 
Member of a self-help group (d)  0.39 0.49 
Member of a religious association (d) 0.76 0.43 
(d) stands for dummy variables. 
Despite the low level of attrition (around 9%), we checked that attrition was not correlated with geo-
physical characteristics. We could find no significant association. Furthermore, we compared farmers in 
each group according to a set of demographic, socioeconomic and geophysical characteristics and we 
could not find any statistical difference (Table 4.3). It hence appears that the randomization has worked 
and that the groups of treated and untreated farmers are comparable.9 
Table 4.3: Randomization results: two comparable groups of farmers 
 
Improved 
seeds Local seeds 
p-value of 
a t-test of 
equality of 
mean N 
Number of relatives within the village 1.57 1.43 0.43 313 
Farm size (ha) 1.48 1.42 0.6 286 
Distance to plot (minutes) 17.68 18.84 0.528 300 
Standardized precipitation index: March 0.18 0.27 0.209 314 
Dependency ratio 0.29 0.27 0.402 304 
Age of the household head 45.41 44.42 0.377 286 
Household size 4.86 5.08 0.302 295 
Motorbike (d) 0.17 0.14 0.336 314 
Oxen (d) 0.22 0.23 0.885 314 
Rich (self-reported) (d) 0.26 0.26 0.963 314 
Member of a religious association (d) 0.75 0.78 0.535 314 
Member of a self-help group (d) 0.39 0.4 0.813 314 
Leadership role in the community (d) 0.24 0.28 0.39 314 
No education(d) 0.41 0.39 0.75 314 
Female (d) 0.13 0.09 0.294 314 
Pest damage (d) 0.27 0.19 0.135 314 
                                                          
8 Farmers were presented with a set of six lotteries ranked according to their riskiness (variance) and expected gain. 
Once the farmer had chosen his preferred lottery, a coin was flipped and he received the corresponding pay-off. The 
maximum amount was 4000 Tsh (circa 2 USD). Farmers who took one of the 2 riskiest lotteries were classified as risk 
lover seeking (40% of the sample). See appendix B of chapter 3 for the protocol. 
9 We cannot be sure however that the randomization worked in terms of the longer history of giving and receiving 
help. Nevertheless, as farmers do not differ either in terms of their socio-demographic characteristics, or social 
capital as measured by the dummy variable equal to one if the farmer has a leadership role in the community, by the 
dummy variable equal to one if he is member of a self-help group or a religious association, or by the social network 
size, we assume that the randomization worked in terms of the longer history of help. 
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(d) stands for dummy variables. 
4.3 Conceptual background 
In order to define the notion of evasive behaviour, we present a simple model of the decision to ask for 
help on the farm when confronted to a positive income shock. In our experiment, this positive shock is 
represented by receiving the improved seeds. The model serves as a general motivational device for the 
empirical work. We do not attempt to identify the structural parameters of a behavioural model which 
would be estimated and tested in the empirical section.  
We start with a model where social network is only given a negative role: the larger it is, the larger is the 
probability of being asked for help. Positive effects of social networks, such as their role as a channel of 
financial resources and information, are then discussed. We comment at the end of the section the 
implications of considering other types of social interactions than asking for help on the farm. 
The model has three periods. In the first period, the farmer can ask for help on the farm. In the second 
period, he draws utility from the consumption of the harvest and saves in the form of an asset the potential 
additional income he made from it In the third period, a member of his social network can ask him for 
help, hereafter referred to as a tax. The farmer pursues an asset-smoothing strategy rather than a 
consumption-smoothing one. Therefore, if he is confronted with a tax in the third period, he pays it by 
decreasing consumption rather than drawing down on the savings. Lastly, the farmer does not discount 
future utility and does not consider the utility of saving when deciding about asking for help on the farm, 
he takes into account only the marginal utility of consumption. 
The utility of asking and not asking for help on the farm is given respectively: 
VAsk = U(CH + b) + πAU(cF − d) + (1 − πA)U(cF⁡) (1)  
VNot = U(CH) + πNU(cF − d) + (1 − πN)U(cF⁡) (2)  
where 𝑈(⁡)⁡is a utility function, 𝐶𝐻 is the consumption at harvest time (i.e. at the second period), 𝑏 is the 
added consumption at harvest time due to having asked for help on the farm (e.g. thanks to better land 
preparation, weeding, slashing etc.), 𝜋𝐴 is the probability of being taxed in the third period if one has asked 
for help in the first period, 𝜋𝑁 is the probability of being taxed in the third period if one has not asked for 
help in the first period, 𝐶𝐹 is the consumption level in the third period and 𝑑 is the tax. Both 𝐶𝐻 and 𝐶𝐹 in 
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period 2 and 3 are assumed to be constant, the only source of risk comes from the probability of being 
taxed. 
We assume that improved seeds increases harvest in period 2. This rests on the observation that, on 
average, improved seeds increase yields by more than 60% following the results presented in chapter 3. 
Improved seeds might however not always be adapted to the needs of small scale farmers as, for instance, 
it has been found to be the case of hybrid maize seeds in Kenya (Suri 2011). Furthermore, we showed in 
chapter 3 that a large part of the increase in yield was driven by the farm management. Therefore, 
differences in know-how, plot quality or inputs access could imply that some farmers derive only a low 
benefit from the improved seeds. The Situka-M1, the improved seeds we distributed, is however well 
perceived by farmers who took part in the experiment according to discussions with key informants. 
Furthermore, as it is an open-pollinated variety and not a hybrid variety, it does not require large 
application of costly inorganic fertilisers to increase yield. We therefore assume that receiving improved 
seeds is a positive shock.  
Furthermore, we assume that the productivity of labour with improved seeds is higher than with local 
seeds so that b𝐼 > b𝐿, where the subscripts 𝐼 and 𝐿 denote improved and local seeds respectively. The 
maximum consumption in period 2 is given by CH + b𝐼 + 𝑧. Any additional harvest is sold on the market 
and the resulting income is saved. 
Four additional assumptions are made: 
1. Farmers' harvest is not known precisely by the members of their social network;  
2. Asking for help on the farm implies revealing one's expected harvest to the members of their 
social network;  
3. The probability of being taxed, 𝜋⁡(𝑛, 𝑘, 𝑓), increases with the size of the network, 𝑛, the wealth 
reputation, 𝑘 and the help debt, 𝑓:  
𝜕𝜋(𝑛, 𝑘, 𝑓)
𝜕𝑖
> 0 
(3)  
where 𝑖 is either 𝑘, 𝑛, or 𝑓. The size of the social network, 𝑛, is the number of people the farmer 
has to help in case they ask. The wealth reputation is the amount of saving that the members of 
the social network think the farmer has. A larger harvest increases the wealth reputation. The help 
debt, 𝑓, is the number of times the farmer has asked for help minus the number of times he has 
been asked for help in the past. 
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4. The increase in the probability of being taxed, when the wealth reputation increases, is higher 
when the size of the social network is larger or when the help debt is larger. More generally:  
𝜕2𝜋(𝑛, 𝑘, 𝑓)
𝜕𝑘𝜕𝑗
> 0 
(4)  
 where 𝑖, 𝑗, is 𝑘, 𝑛, or 𝑓 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 
Assumption (1) rests on the observation that in the developing world ‘people consciously try to decrease 
observability of their income and wealth’ by avoiding the disclosure of any information ‘surrounding grain 
storage, livestock, and other assets to their counterparts’ (Fafchamps 1992). In the model below, it implies 
that the expected harvest is not known by the other members of the network. 
Assumption (2) is based on the fact that ‘it is easy for an experienced farmer to guess crop yield by 
observing standing crops at harvest’ (idem).  
Assumption (3) relies on the observations that wealthy members of a social network have a moral duty to 
help the poor and unlucky ones. An increase in the wealth reputation should therefore increases the risk 
of being taxed. Furthermore, people with a large network often play a central role in the village’s 
community life and it is toward them that one turns for assistance when confronted with a shock.10 Lastly, 
by asking for help, one contracts a debt which will need to be paid pack. There is hence a higher likelihood 
to be taxed if one asked for help in the first period.  
Assumption (4) implies that an increase in wealth reputation increases more the risk of a tax when the 
network is larger because the number of people who can tax is larger. The same idea holds for the help 
debt: if someone has a long history of relying on the solidarity of his network, i.e. his help debt his large, 
then we can expect that as soon has his wealth reputation increases, his creditors will come to ask him 
their due. The more numerous they are, the higher is the chance that he will be confronted by a tax.  
                                                          
10 Another way of defending assumption (3) is to restrict the definition of an ‘increase’ in n as an increase in the size 
of the ego-network by the addition of a new member not connected to the previous members of the ego-network. 
A larger network would hence stretch over smaller unconnected ego-networks. Let us imagine a social network 
composed of 3 individuals forming a triangle with each individual represented as a dot in one corner. Let one of the 
three individuals meet two other people and form a separate network with them. Graphically, there are now two 
triangles head to head. The individual who is at the junction can be taxed by 4 people. By contrast, each member of 
his ego-network can be taxed by only two people. Hence, when an ego network increases by unconnected members 
of the ego network, the risk of being taxed increases. 
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The marginal utility of asking for help on the farm is given by: 
Δ𝑉 = U(CH + b) − U(CH) + πAU(cF − d) + (1 − πA)U(cF⁡) − πNU(cF − d) − (1 − πN)U(cF⁡) (5)  
Δ𝑉 = U(CH + b) − U(CH) + (πA − πA)[U(cF − d) − U(cF⁡)] (6)  
Δ𝑉 = U(CH + b) − U(CH) − (πA − πN)[U(cF⁡) − U(cF − d)] (7)  
For notational convenience, we assume that 𝑏 and 𝑑 imply only a marginal change in consumption. We 
hence have: 
Δ𝑉 ≈ 𝑈′(𝐶𝐻)𝑏 − (πA − πN)𝑈
′(𝑐𝐹 − 𝑑)𝑑 (8)  
The marginal cost, 𝑀𝐶, and the marginal benefit, 𝑀𝐵, can hence be expressed as: 
𝑀𝐵 = 𝑈′(𝐶𝐻)𝑏 (9)  
𝑀𝐶 = (πA − πN)𝑈
′(𝑐𝐹 − 𝑑)𝑑 (10)  
The 𝑀𝐵 derives from the marginal increase in consumption brought about by the helping hand, the 
marginal cost derives from the increase in the probability of being taxed. The farmer does not ask for help 
if the 𝑀𝐶 is larger than the 𝑀𝐵: 
Δ𝑉 ≈ 𝑀𝐵 −𝑀𝐶 < 0 (11)  
Equation (11) is the decision to hide: it results from the willingness to sacrifice 𝑀𝐵 in order to decrease 
the risk of being taxed. 
Now, let us investigate the 𝑀𝐵 and the 𝑀𝐶  with improved and local seeds. With local seeds, the MB and 
𝑀𝐶 are given by: 
𝑀𝐵𝐿 = 𝑈
′(𝐶𝐻)𝑏𝐿 (12)  
MC𝐿 =
𝜕𝜋(𝑛, 𝑘, 𝑓)
𝜕𝑓
𝑈′(𝑐𝐹 − 𝑑)𝑑 (13)  
where the subscript 𝐿 is used to denote local seeds. With improved seeds, the 𝑀𝐶 and 𝑀𝐵 are given by: 
𝑀𝐵𝐼 = 𝑈
′(𝐶𝐻 + 𝑧)𝑏𝐼 (14)  
MC𝐼 = (
𝜕𝜋(𝑛, 𝑘, 𝑓)
𝜕𝑓
+
𝜕𝜋(𝑛, 𝑘, 𝑓)
𝜕𝑘
)𝑈′(𝑐𝐹 − 𝑑)𝑑 (15)  
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where the subscript 𝐼 is used to denote improved seeds The effect of improved seeds on 𝑀𝐵 and 𝑀𝐶 is 
hence given by: 
Δ𝑀𝐵 = 𝑀𝐵𝐼 −𝑀𝐵𝐿 = 𝑈
′(𝐶𝐻 + 𝑧)𝑏𝐼 − 𝑈
′(𝐶𝐻)𝑏𝐿 ⋚ 0 (16)  
Δ𝑀𝐶 = 𝑀𝐶𝐼 −𝑀𝐶𝐿 =
𝜕𝜋(𝑛, 𝑘, 𝑓)
𝜕𝑘
𝑈′(𝑐𝐹 − 𝑑)𝑑 > 0 (17)  
The 𝑀𝐶 is higher with improved seeds because of the increase in the probability of the tax. By contrast, 
the difference in 𝑀𝐵 can be positive, negative or null as it depends on the shape of the utility function and 
the difference in marginal productivity of labour between improved and local seeds, 𝑏𝐼 − 𝑏𝐿. In other 
terms, improved seeds might change the decision from asking to not asking because the marginal benefit, 
𝑀𝐵, decreases.  
This is one of the assumptions we will make in the empirical section: the improved seeds do not decrease 
the MB and therefore a decrease in the number of social interactions is an evidence of hiding. 
Furthermore, as we assumed that the network size doesn’t enter in the marginal benefit of asking, when 
𝑛 increases, the difference in the 𝑀𝐶s increases while the difference in the 𝑀𝐵s does not: 
𝜕Δ𝑀𝐵
𝜕𝑛
= 0 (18)  
𝜕Δ𝑀𝐶
𝜕𝑛
=
𝜕𝜋(𝑛, 𝑘, 𝑓)
𝜕𝑘𝜕𝑛
𝑈′(𝑐𝐹 − 𝑑)𝑑 > 0 (19)  
Therefore, we expect hiding to increase as the size of the social network increases:  
𝜕Δ𝑉
𝜕𝑛
≈ −
𝜕𝜋(𝑛, 𝑘, 𝑓)
𝜕𝑘𝜕𝑛
𝑈′(𝑐𝐹 − 𝑑)𝑑 < 0 (20)  
The social network, 𝑛, is only included in the cost side of the model presented in equation (1) and (2), i.e. 
only via an increase in the pressure to share. However, the literature on social networks has provided 
many evidence of positive effects of social networks (for a recent literature review, see Chuang and 
Schechter 2015). It is only recently that studies pointed to a ‘dark side’ of the social network (Di Falco and 
Bulte 2011). The network should therefore also be included in the benefit side of equation (1) and (2).  
For instance, asking for help on the farm is a good way of nurturing the relationships with the members of 
the social network: during fields’ work, farmers share stories and reinforce friendship bonds. The farmer 
hence increases his chances of benefiting from his friends’ solidarity in case of a downturn, such as illness 
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or crop damage caused by pest invasion. Friends could also provide credit for investment on the farm or 
gift on special occasions such as weddings or funerals. Hence, asking for help on the farm does not only 
provide the tangible benefit of an increase in the labour supply, it also helps fostering strong solidarity 
bonds which might provide informal source of insurance and credit.  An additional benefit could hence be 
added in equation (1) and (2). 
Furthermore, the size of the social network and the utility derived from the social network might be 
interdependent: farmers with larger network might value more social interactions. They would hence tend 
to interact more with other people, and hence have a larger social network. In other terms, the benefit of 
asking for help might increases with the size of the social network: 
𝜕𝑀𝐵
𝜕𝑛
> 0 (21)  
Lastly, social networks have been shown to play an important role in technology diffusion by increasing 
farmers’ awareness of new agricultural technologies. Farmers with a larger social network might hence 
have a better know-how of improved seeds cultivation. The increase on harvest brought by a helping hand, 
𝑏𝐼, might hence increase with the size of the social network. Therefore, the difference in 𝑀𝐵 as 𝑛 increases 
might hence be positive: 
𝜕Δ𝑀𝐵
𝜕𝑛
> 0 (22)  
Once the benefit side of the social network is taken into account, the decision to hide does not 
automatically increases as the size of the social network increase: 
𝜕Δ𝑉
𝜕𝑛
≈
𝜕Δ𝑀𝐵
𝜕𝑛
−
𝜕Δ𝑀𝐶
𝜕𝑛
⋚ 0 (23)  
because both 
𝜕Δ𝑀𝐶
𝜕𝑛
 and 
𝜕Δ𝑀𝐵
𝜕𝑛
  are positive. It depends on how  Δ𝑀𝐵 and Δ𝑀𝐶 vary with the network size. 
One of the assumptions we will make, when interpreting the results, is hence that the difference in the 
marginal benefit of asking between farmers with improved and local seeds doesn’t decrease as the social 
network increases. 
As mentioned in section 4.2, we will also investigate other types of social interactions. These social 
interactions entail different degrees of visibility and different degrees of benefits. For instance, discussing 
the type of seeds has a high visibility but no direct tangible impact on the harvest of the experimental plot, 
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i.e. it does not bring any 𝑏𝐼 but it increases the difference in 𝑀𝐶 by 
𝜕𝜋(𝑛,𝑘,𝑓)
𝜕𝑘
.  Asking for information about 
land and output markets or asking for help in cash or in kind do not imply a large visibility nor directly 
benefit the plot so it should not cause any differences in 𝑀𝐵 or 𝑀𝐶.  
As a final note, farmers could choose to substitute highly visible social interactions by less visible ones: 
chatting more about markets rather than about the type of seeds for instance. Therefore, hiding from peer 
pressure by not asking for help on the farm does not imply that the farmers renounce the benefits provided 
by social networks. Furthermore, refraining from asking for help on the farm might go unnoticed and is 
unlikely to be regarded as a violation of the social norms regulating moral economies.11 Indeed, much 
more proactive and blatant hiding strategies have been observed. For instance, Baland (2011) found 
reports that individuals in Cameroon contracted unneeded debts in order to pretend to be poor and fend 
off pressure to share, while Anderson and Baland (2002) found that women in Kenyan slums joined 
rotating savings and credit associations in order to protect their savings from their husbands.    
4.4 Econometric strategy 
We start by considering social interactions which increase the risk of revealing the type of seeds received 
in the experiment, i.e. implying a high visibility: discussing the type of seeds received in the experiment, 
hiring someone for harvesting the experimental plot, or asking for help on the farm. The goal of the 
estimation is to test if farmers having received improved seeds seek to hide this positive shock from their 
kin, i.e. if they seek to escape the social pressure to share. We consider that farmers having received 
improved seeds hide if they decrease the number of social interactions compared to farmers with local 
seeds and the same network size. As detailed in section 4.3, we expect that the social pressure to share 
increases with number of kin. The hiding behaviour should therefore be greater for farmers with a larger 
social network.  
In order to test these hypotheses, we estimate the following regression line:  
𝐷 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑠𝑆 + 𝛽𝑁𝑁 + 𝛽𝐼𝐼 + 𝑪′𝜷 (24)  
                                                          
11 By contrast, refusing to provide help could constitute a violation of the ‘social contract’ (Hoff and Senn, 2006) and 
could lead to large social sanctions: ‘To fail in kinship obligation is to be a witch…, in other words to be the opposite 
of a moral being: a murderer, a bestialist, a lover of death, etc.’ (Bloch, 1974).   
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where 𝑆 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the farmer belongs to the group with improved seeds and zero 
otherwise (local seeds), 𝑁 is the network size, 𝐼 = 𝑁 ∗ 𝑆 the interaction effect between the improved 
seeds dummy and the network size. We also add a set of controls, 𝑪, summarized in section 4.2. 𝐷 is either 
the number of people with whom each farmer discussed the type of the seeds received in the experiment, 
or the number of people asked to help on the farm in general or on the experimental plot at harvest time. 
We run hence three separate set of regressions, one for each dependent variable. 
Under the null hypothesis that farmers with improved seeds did not attempt to hide, the marginal effect 
of improved seeds should be equal to zero: 
𝐻0:⁡?̂?𝑠 + ?̂?𝐼𝑁 = 0 (25)  
Furthermore, under the null hypothesis that hiding does not increase with the size of the social network, 
then ?̂?𝐼 should be not statistically different from zero. We can expect that the 𝛽𝑁 is positive, i.e. farmers 
with local seeds discuss with more people the type of seeds they got if their social network is larger.  
Social interactions which do not involve visibility should not differ between farmers with improved and 
local seeds as theses social interaction do not increase the risk of a family tax. In order to test for this, the 
left-hand side variable of equation (24) is replaced with either the number of people asked for help in kind 
and in cash, or the number of people asked about information on output and land market, or about best 
farming practices.  
Although the seeds' allocation to farmers was randomized and is hence totally exogenous, the network 
variable, 𝑁, might be correlated with some unobserved heterogeneity such as a long history of asking and 
giving help or information, social capital, socio-demographic characteristics or farm management skills. 
We seek to control for this by adding a set of control variables.  
Nevertheless, some important factors left in the error term might still be correlated with the social 
network variable. A priori, this could be a serious concern since the resulting endogeneity implies that the 
estimates of the interaction term are biased. Conventional econometric wisdom indicates that all 
estimates, (𝛽𝑆, 𝛽𝑁, 𝛽𝐼) are biased and inconsistent because of smearing (e.g. Greene 2003). However, 
several authors have recently used interaction effects between exogenous and endogenous variables 
(Abhijit V. Banerjee et al. 2007; Abhijit V Banerjee et al. 2010; Glewwe et al. 2009). Nizalova & 
Murtazashvili (2014) have shown both analytically and with simulations that the OLS estimate of the 
interaction effect is biased but consistent. The condition is that the endogenous variable and the 
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unobserved heterogeneity to which the former is correlated are jointly independent from the exogenous 
treatment, a condition fulfilled thanks the randomization of seed allocation. We assume that our sample 
is large enough to yield consistent estimates. We present in appendix A a step by step derivation of the 
main results of Nizalova and Murtazashvili (2014) in order to offer a comprehensive treatment of our 
identification strategy. In order to limit the effect of having many zeroes in the dependent variable, i.e. 
people who have not asked for help, we will use a zero-inflated Poisson model alongside standard OLS 
regressions. All regression results are presented with standard error, robust to clustering at the village 
level. 
4.5 Results 
We start by analysing a social interaction entailing high visibility and low benefit: discussing the type of 
seeds received in the experiments. The dependent variable is hence the number of people with whom 
each farmer discussed the type of seeds received in the experiment, hereafter number of discussions.  We 
estimated a first Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model where the dependent variable is log-transformed 
because it is highly skewed.  Furthermore, a large number of households did not discuss the type of seeds 
at all. We therefore also estimate a zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) model, more appropriate than an OLS when 
analysing count data with an excess number of zeroes12. 
We tested several specifications. In model (1), the only variables are the improved seeds dummy and the 
number of relative within the village (see section 4.2 for the definition). In model (2), we add an interaction 
term between the improved seeds dummy and the number of relatives. In model (3), we add a dummy 
equal to one for farmers in the north as well as a series of control variables for farmers’ social capital: 
leadership role in the community (dummy), member of a self-help group (dummy) and member of a 
religious association (dummy). In model (4), we add a series of controls on farm and socio-demographic 
characteristics and on the farm inputs: experimental plot size (ha), walking distance to the plot (minutes), 
farm size (ha), oxen (dummy), labour (man day), pest damage (dummy), standardized precipitation index, 
female headed household (dummy), age of the household head, household size, secondary education 
(dummy), risk averse (dummy).  The goal of this set of variable is to limit the risk of an omitted variable 
bias. Table 4.4 shows the results. 
                                                          
12 We tested as an alternative to the ZIP model the Poisson model, but results of the Vuong test show unambiguously 
that the ZIP perform better whatever control variables are added. 
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Table 4.4: Discussing the type of seeds 
Determinants of the Number of People with Whom Each Farmer Discussed the Type of Seeds 
Received in the Experiment 
 Ordinary Least Squares Estimates: 
log-linear model 
Zero-Inflated Poisson Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log count          
Improved seeds (d)  -0.00 0.22 0.21 0.14 -0.20** 0.05 0.03 -0.03 
 (0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19) 
         
Relatives 0.13*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.16*** 0.10*** 0.18** 0.17** 0.14* 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
         
Improved seeds (d) *Relatives   -0.20*** -0.16*** -0.14***  -0.13* -0.13 -0.11 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)  (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) 
         
North (d)   X X   X X 
Social capital controls   X X   X X 
Inputs and socio-demographic 
controls 
   X    X 
         
Constant 1.00*** 0.87*** 0.97*** 0.82*** 1.39*** 1.23*** 1.34*** 0.77** 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.20) (0.14) (0.21) (0.19) (0.33) 
Log odd of asking no one (logit model)        
Improved seeds (d)      -0.18 -0.92* -1.12* -1.19 
     (0.34) (0.51) (0.64) (0.76) 
         
Relatives     -0.21 -0.62** -0.70** -0.73 
     (0.13) (0.30) (0.34) (0.46) 
         
Improved seeds (d) *Relatives       0.65* 0.72* 0.84 
      (0.36) (0.41) (0.54) 
         
North (d)       X X 
Social capital controls       X X 
Inputs and socio-demographic 
controls 
       X 
Constant     -1.41*** -0.96*** -1.95** -1.64*** 
     (0.35) (0.36) (0.82) (0.61) 
Observations 298 300 299 297 313 313 313 313 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.23     
F-test 25.4*** 20.2*** 46.5*** 5.5***     
AIC 595 599 592 551 1910 1892 1815 1755 
BIC 606 614 622 607 1932 1922 1867 1811 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2     0.03 0.04 0.082 0.114 
Wald chi2     18.7*** 21.2*** 20.8*** 58.6*** 
Cluster robust standard errors at the village level in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (d) stands for 
dummy variables. The social network variable is ‘Relatives’: it is the average number of relatives within the village 
each farmer can ask for help or information. List of social capital controls: leadership role in the community (d), 
member of a self-help group(d), member of a religious association(d). List of inputs and socio-demographic controls: 
plot size (ha), walking distance to the plot (minutes), farm size (ha), oxen (d), labour (man day), pest damage (d), 
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standardized precipitation index, female headed household (d), age, household size, secondary education (d), risk 
averse (d). 
Model (1) shows that receiving improved seeds has no significant effect on the average number of 
discussions. The only significant variable is the number of relatives within the village: when the number of 
relatives increases by one, the number of discussions increases by 13%. The addition in model (2) of the 
interaction term between receiving improved seeds and the number of relatives increases slightly the 
model fit (from 0.08 to 0.11)13. The interaction term is highly significant and is negative as expected: while 
farmers with local seeds discuss more if they have numerous kin, it is not the case for farmers with 
improved seeds. The addition of controls in model (3) and (4) does not affect the results: farmers with 
local seeds discuss more if they count more relatives, farmers with improved seeds do not. The ZIP models 
corroborate these findings. The number of relatives decreases the odd of not discussing (logit part of the 
ZIP model), but less so for farmers with improved seeds. The number of relatives increases the number of 
discussions (Poisson part of the ZIP model), but less so for farmers with improved seeds. 
Figure 4.2: Discussing the type of seeds 
                                                          
13 However, both the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criterion (AIC and BIC) increases. Nevertheless, as the main 
interest of the current analysis is in the sign of the interaction term coefficient, we choose to keep it in the model. 
Furthermore, the AIC and the BIC decreases from models (5) to (6) in the ZIP model estimation. 
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Figure 4.2 shows the marginal effects of receiving the improved seeds on the number of discussions 
estimated according to the OLS model (4) and the ZIP model (8). We define hiding as a decrease in the 
number of discussions caused by the improved seeds.  
Note that there is no evidence of hiding among farmers counting only one or no relatives within the village. 
This is expected, as when the social pressure to share is low, there is no incentive to hide. By contrast, if 
farmers count two relatives, those with improved seeds discussed 12% less than those with local seeds. 
Lastly, if they count more than 5 relatives in the village, i.e. when the pressure to share is very high, they 
discuss 50% less when they receive improved seeds (OLS results). Similarly, the ZIP estimates shows that 
hiding becomes statistically significant when farmers count more than 1.5 relatives within the village, i.e. 
it is significant for 40% of the sample. The sample average effect is large: receiving improved seeds 
decreases by 24% the number of discussions (ZIP model, (8)). Lastly, the graphs show that the incentive to 
hide builds up at the number of relatives increases. This is coherent with the hypothesis that larger is the 
number of relatives, larger is the pressure to share and hence larger is the incentive to hide. 
We now investigate another social interaction increasing the risk of disclosing the type of seeds received 
in the experiment: asking for help on the farm. Given the large number of farmers who did not ask anyone 
for help on the farm (43%), we estimated only a ZIP model. The set of controls is the same, except that 
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here we also control for having been asked for help on the farm of others in model (4) and (5). Table 4.5 
shows the results.   
Table 4.5: Asking for help on the farm 
Zero-Inflated Poisson Estimates: Number of People Each Farmer Asked to Come for Help 
on the Farm 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log count (Poisson)      
Improved seeds (d)  -0.15 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.14 
 (0.12) (0.24) (0.24) (0.20) (0.22) 
      
Relatives 0.06 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
      
Improved seeds (d) *Relatives   -0.09 -0.09 -0.12** -0.14** 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) 
      
North (d)   X X X 
Social capital controls    X X 
Inputs and socio-demographic controls     X 
Constant 1.13*** 1.04*** 0.97*** 0.81*** 1.30*** 
 (0.12) (0.16) (0.27) (0.21) (0.46) 
Log odd of asking no one (logit)      
Improved seeds (d)  -0.02 -0.07 -0.09 0.21 0.03 
 (0.21) (0.44) (0.44) (0.34) (0.38) 
      
Relatives -0.23*** -0.25 -0.27 -0.28 -0.43 
 (0.07) (0.18) (0.17) (0.20) (0.30) 
      
Improved seeds (d) *Relatives   0.05 0.08 -0.08 0.03 
  (0.26) (0.28) (0.23) (0.28) 
      
North (d)   X X X 
Social capital controls    X X 
Inputs and socio-demographic controls     X 
Constant -0.05 -0.03 0.38 1.68*** 2.28*** 
 (0.27) (0.41) (0.33) (0.49) (0.84) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.0 0.02 0.02 0.174 0.194 
Wald chi2 2.22 12.28*** 13.10*** 28.98*** 47.84*** 
AIC 1256 1257 1252 1071 1045 
BIC 1278 1287 1290 1127 1101 
Cluster robust standard errors at the village level in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (d) stands for 
dummy variables. The social network variable is ‘Relatives’: it is the average number of relatives inside the village 
each farmer can ask for help or information. List of social capital controls: leadership role in the community (d), 
member of a self-help group(d), member of a religious association(d), being asked for help on the farm of other (d). 
List of inputs and socio-demographic controls: plot size (ha), walking distance to the plot (minutes), farm size (ha), 
oxen (d), labour (man day), pest damage (d), standardized precipitation index, female headed household (d), age, 
household size, secondary education (d), risk averse (d). 
The pattern is similar to the one observed in the case of discussing the seeds. The logit model shows that 
for farmers with local seeds the odds of not asking anyone decreases with the number of relatives, i.e. 
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farmers with a larger number of relatives have a higher propensity to ask than those with smaller number 
of relative. It is also true of farmers with improved seeds, but the increase in the propensity of asking as 
the network size increases is smaller. The Poisson part of the models shows a stronger pattern. The 
number of relatives increases the predicted number of people asked to help on the farm for farmers having 
received the local seeds while the effect of the number of relatives is statistically not different from zero 
for farmers with improved seeds. We summarize the marginal effects of receiving improved seeds in Figure 
4.3 . 
Figure 4.3: Asking for help on the farm 
 
There is less evidence of hiding than in the case of discussing the type of seeds. This is expected as not 
discussing the type of seeds is a relatively cost-free hiding strategy while not asking for help on the farm 
implies either that the household has to increase his own labour provision or that some of the farm tasks 
wo not be performed as well as with the help from others (e.g. less care in planting and weeding). 
Nevertheless, we do find that hiding increases as the number of kin increases. It becomes statistically 
significant for farmers with three or more relatives within the village, i.e. 15% of the sample. The hiding 
behaviour appears hence to take place only among farmers exposed to the largest pressure to redistribute. 
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Farmers taking part to the experiment, as across many places in Sub-Saharan Africa, tends to have several 
plots which can be far away from each other. Therefore, some farmers may ask for help on plots other 
than the plot where they planted the seeds of the experiment. We turn now to the decision to ask for help 
on the experimental plot. 
We start by investigating the decision to ask for help at harvest time, i.e. when there is the highest visibility. 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the farmer asked for help on the farm and 
zero otherwise. We used the same set of explicative variables than presented above. Based on the 
comparison of the log-likelihood, a logit model is preferred to a probit model. Table 4.6 shows the results. 
Detailed results are left in the appendix. 
Table 4.6: Asking for help to harvest the experimental plot 
Logit Estimates: Asking for Help on the Experimental at Harvest times 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Improved seeds (d)  -0.01 0.78 0.77 0.66 0.42 
 (0.29) (0.54) (0.55) (0.55) (0.35) 
      
Relatives 0.28*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.39*** 
 (0.10) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.12) 
      
Improved seeds (d) *Relatives   -0.38** -0.38** -0.37** -0.29** 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.12) 
      
North (d)   X X X 
Harvest (10 kg)    X X 
Controls    X X 
      
Constant -2.67*** -3.21*** -3.43*** -3.69*** -5.94*** 
 (0.39) (0.57) (0.66) (0.74) (1.64) 
Observations 313 313 313 313 313 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.17 
Wald chi2 7.61** 14.3*** 21.6*** 29.3*** 41.20*** 
AIC 205 204 205 206 201 
BIC 216 219 224 228 257 
Cluster robust standard errors at the village level in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01, (d) stands for dummy variables. The social network variable is ‘Relatives’: it is the average 
number of relatives inside the village each farmer can ask for help or information.  List of controls: 
plot size (ha), farm size (ha), oxen (d), pest damage (d), standardized precipitation index, female 
headed household (d), age, household size, secondary education (d), risk averse (d), leadership role 
in the community (d), member of a self-help group(d) member of a religious association(d) walking 
distance to the plot (minutes). 
As expected, an increase in the number of relatives increases the odds of asking for help at harvest time. 
Indeed, a larger kin network increases the opportunity to enter labour sharing agreement where labour is 
pooled and the harvest is done in common, one field after the other. However, there is a clear distinction 
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between farmers having received the improved and the local seeds. Among the formers ones, farmers 
with a large network will ask less on average than those with a small network.  
We also tested if we could find a similar effect on the decision to ask for help for pre-harvest work on the 
experimental plot (e.g. planting, weeding or slashing). The marginal productivity of labour on improved 
seeds fields might higher than on local seeds plots. Therefore, the marginal benefit of the helping hand 
might outweigh the marginal cost of increased visibility. Furthermore, in this earlier phase of the crop 
growing cycle, harvest is more difficult to ascertain and adverse weather or a pest invasion can still 
deteriorate the harvest. Therefore, asking for help in pre-harvest entails less visibility than at harvest time. 
We should therefore observe a lower effect of improved seeds on the decision to ask for help. Detailed 
results are left in the appendix in Table 4.11. The results are summarized in Figure 4.4 (left hand-side) 
alongside the marginal effect of improved seeds on asking for help at harvest time (right-hand side).  
Figure 4.4: Asking for help on the experimental plot 
 
Figure 4.4 shows that while improved seeds have no impact on the decision to ask for pre-harvest work 
however large the number of relatives within the village, this is not the case anymore when it comes to 
help at harvest time. In the latter case, there is clearly a reduction in the probability of asking as soon as 
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the number of relative is large, i.e. there is evidence of a hiding behaviour. The fact that farmers with 
improved seeds and a large social network do not hesitate to ask in pre-harvest times while they abstain 
from it at harvest time suggests that decreasing the visibility of their harvest is important for them. Hiding 
becomes significant for farmers counting at least three relatives in the village, i.e. 15% of the sample.  
We now test if we can find hiding behaviours in social interactions which are not expected to increase the 
risk of a family tax: (1) the number of people asked for help in cash or in kind; (2) the number of people 
asked about information on best farming practices; (3) the number of people asked about information on 
output or land market. Naturally, it could be argued that these social interactions involve also some sort 
of visibility. However, it is much more limited than discussing the seeds received in the experiments and 
asking people for help on the farm.  
The same set of explicative variables is used to analyse the determinants of these social interactions. We 
also used a ZIP model in order to model the excess zeroes. Detailed results are present in appendix in Table 
4.11. Figure 4.5 summarizes the results. 
Figure 4.5: Social interactions not related to the experimental plot 
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We do not find any difference between farmers having received improved and local seeds in terms of the 
probability of engaging in social interaction not related to the experimental plot.  In other terms, there is 
no sign of hiding behaviour however large the kin network is. Allocating farmers to the improved seeds 
group did therefore distort social interactions only in the case where there was a risk of an increase in the 
family tax, i.e. social interactions revealing the positive consumption shock brought about by improved 
seeds distributed in the experiment.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter tests the hypothesis that individuals try to escape forced solidarity when facing favourable 
conditions. We randomly assigned a positive shock by providing farmers with improved maize seeds that 
are more productive than the traditional varieties. Our results, robust to various specifications, show that 
farmers who are assigned more productive seeds decrease the number of their social interactions if they 
face a social pressure to share, i.e. if they count many relatives within the village. This suggests that farmers 
attempt to reduce the burden of decreasing their future consumption in order with other members of the 
social network, which is consistent with the idea that traditional sharing norms may invite evasive 
behaviour.  
The results of the present chapter provide another set of evidence of the existence of evasive responses 
to the social pressure to share. Di Falco and Bulte (2011) find that forced sharing norms in social networks 
diverted investment away from sharable liquid assets and could have a negative effect on growth while 
Jakiela and Ozier (2016) find that sharing norms distorted incentives ‘towards less visible, but potentially 
less profitable, investments, and may consequently slow economic growth’.  
This dark side of social capital echoes the concept of the Laffer curve: increasing tax level increases 
government revenues up to a point where work is discouraged, tax evasion kicks in and government 
revenues drop. A similar phenomenon could be at play in the case of village economies where solidarity 
networks play a central role in income redistribution and forced solidarity is akin to a tax. Some farmers 
might prefer to forsake an increase in output brought about by asking for help in order to reduce the 
likelihood of the tax, particularly if the likelihood of a tax is high because their network is large and their 
wealth status has improved. Indeed, why ask for help if the resulting increase in output will be eaten away 
by friends and family? It might be better to keep a low profile, enjoy the bumper crop harvest brought 
about by the improved seeds and relinquish an even greater harvest as the latter would be taxed by 
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members of their social network. Hence, as in the Laffer curve hypothesis, where higher tax brings about 
smaller revenues, the collision of self-interest and high solidarity might imply that less food is produced 
and available for sharing at the village level. This hypothesis could be investigated in future work.  
Indeed, it is yet not clear if the hiding behaviour identified in the present study has any economic 
consequences. We do indeed find that a farmer with improved seeds asks for less help on the farm if their 
kin network is large, but the hiding behaviour only becomes significant for the 15% of farmers with the 
largest number of relative within the village. Furthermore, as no hiding was found in terms of the pre-
harvest labour, i.e. when labour is expected to have the highest effect on harvest, it is yet not clear if this 
hiding strategies implied a decrease in output. In our experiment, farmers may have been able to hide at 
no cost. 
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4.8 Appendix A: Interaction effect, biased but consistent 
We reproduce below a step by step derivation of the results of Nizalova and Murtazashvili (2014) in 
order to offer a comprehensive treatment of the identification strategy of the present paper.  We want 
to estimate the following model: 
𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝑁𝑋𝑁 + 𝛽𝑆𝑋𝑆 + 𝜀
∗ (26)  
where 𝐼 = 𝑋𝑆𝑋𝑁, 𝜀
∗ = 𝜀 + 𝛽𝐻𝐻 and 𝑋𝑆 is perfectly exogenous. The parameter of interest is 𝛽𝐼 while the 
issue is the correlation between 𝐻 and 𝑋𝑁. The omitted variable bias is given by (e.g. Greene 2003):  
𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚(?̂?) = 𝛽 + 𝛾𝑸 (27)  
where 𝑸 = 𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚[(𝑋′𝑋)−1(𝑋′𝑋)𝜀∗] = 𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚[(𝑋′𝑋)−1(𝑋′𝐻)]. 
Let’s focus on 𝑸. We start by re-expressing 𝑋′𝑋: 
𝑋′𝑋 = (
𝜎𝐼1
2 𝜎𝐼𝑁 𝜎𝐼𝑆
𝜎𝑁𝐼 𝜎𝑁
2 𝜎𝑁𝑆
𝜎𝑆𝐼 𝜎𝑆𝑁 𝜎𝑆
2
) = Λ𝑅Λ 
(28)  
where Λ = (
𝜎𝐼1
2 0 0
0 𝜎𝑁
2 0
0 0 𝜎𝑆
2
), 𝑅 = (
1 𝑟𝐼𝑁 𝑟𝐼𝑆
𝑟𝑁𝐼 1 𝑟𝑁𝑆
𝑟𝑆𝐼 𝑟𝑆𝑁 1
) and 𝑟𝑖,𝑗 is the correlation between variable 𝑖 and 
variable 𝑗, 𝑟𝑖,𝑗 =
𝜎𝑖,𝑗
𝜎𝑖𝜎𝑗
. 
The second pair of matrices can be expressed as: 
𝑋′𝐻 = 𝜎𝐻Λω (29)  
 
where 𝜔′ = [𝑟𝐼𝐻 , 𝑟𝑁𝐻 , 𝑟𝑆𝐻]. Hence, 𝑸 = 𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚[𝜎𝐻(Λ𝑅Λ)
−1Λω] = 𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚[𝜎𝐻Λ
−1R−1ω]. We note that:  
R−1 =
1
det⁡(𝑅)
(
1 − 𝑟𝑁𝑆
2 𝑟𝐼𝑆𝑟𝑁𝑆 − 𝑟𝐼𝑁 𝑟𝐼𝑁𝑟𝑁𝑆 − 𝑟𝐼𝑆
𝑟𝐼𝑆𝑟𝑁𝑆 − 𝑟𝐼𝑁 1 − 𝑟𝐼𝑆
2 𝑟𝐼𝑆𝑟𝐼𝑁 − 𝑟𝑁𝑆
𝑟𝐼𝑁𝑟𝑁𝑆 − 𝑟𝐼𝑆 𝑟𝐼𝑆𝑟𝐼𝑁 − 𝑟𝑁𝑆 1 − 𝑟𝐼𝑁
2
) 
(30)  
where det(𝑅) = 1 − 𝑟𝐼𝑁
2 − 𝑟𝐼𝑆
2 − 𝑟𝑆𝑁
2 + 2𝑟𝐼𝑁𝑟𝐼𝑆𝑟𝑁𝑆. Hence, we can express 𝑸 as a vector of size 3: 
𝑸 = (
𝜎𝐻
𝜎𝐼
𝑟𝐼𝐻(1 − 𝑟𝑁𝑆)
2 + 𝑟𝑁𝐻(𝑟𝐼𝑆𝑟𝑁𝑆 − 𝑟𝐼𝑁) + 𝑟𝑆𝐻(𝑟𝐼𝑁𝑟𝑁𝑆 − 𝑟𝐼𝑁)
1 − 𝑟𝐼𝑁
2 − 𝑟𝐼𝑆
2 − 𝑟𝑆𝑁
2 + 2𝑟𝐼𝑁𝑟𝐼𝑆𝑟𝑁𝑆…
…
) 
(31)  
where we omitted the second and third row as we are interested here in 𝛽𝐼: 
𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚(?̂?𝐼) = 𝛽𝐼 + 𝛾𝑟𝑸𝑰 (32)  
where 𝑸𝑰 is the first row of 𝑸 and 𝛾𝑟  is the probability limit of the coefficient of 𝐼 in an auxiliary 
regression of the omitted variable 𝐻 on the set of covariates (𝐼, 𝑁, 𝑆). 
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Assuming that 𝑋𝑁 and 𝐻 are jointly independent from the randomly assigned 𝑋𝑆, 𝑟𝑁𝑆 = 𝑟𝑆𝐻 = 0, we 
have: 
𝑸𝑰 =
𝜎𝐻
𝜎𝐼
𝑟𝐼𝐻 − 𝑟𝑁𝐻𝑟𝐼𝑁
1 − 𝑟𝐼𝑁
2 − 𝑟𝐼𝑆
2  
(33)  
The joint independence of (𝑋𝑁 , 𝐻) from 𝑋𝑆 implies that 𝑋𝑆 conditional on 𝑋𝑁 is independent from 𝐻. 
Hence, we have: 
𝑟𝐼𝑁 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼, 𝑋𝑁⁡)
𝜎𝐼𝜎𝑁
 
(34)  
=
𝐸(𝑁𝑆𝑁) − 𝐸(𝑁𝑆)𝐸(𝑁)
𝜎𝐼𝜎𝑁
 
(35)  
=
𝐸(𝑆)[𝐸(𝑁2) − 𝐸(𝑁)2]
𝜎𝐼𝜎𝑁
 
(36)  
=
𝐸(𝑆)𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑁)
𝜎𝐼𝜎𝑁
 
(37)  
=
𝜎𝑁𝐸(𝑆)
𝜎𝐼
 
(38)  
From which it follows that 𝑟𝐼𝐻 = 𝑟𝑁𝐻𝑟𝐼𝐻 and therefore 𝑸 = 0 and 𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚(?̂?𝐼) = 𝛽𝐼. 
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4.9 Appendix B: Further results 
 
Table 4.7: Discussing the seeds, details of the OLS results 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates: Number of People with whom Each Farmer Discussed 
the Type of Seeds Received in the Experiment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Improved seeds (d) -0.00 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.14 
 (0.09) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) 
Relatives inside the village 0.13*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.16*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Improved seeds (d)*Relatives inside the village  -0.20*** -0.19*** -0.16*** -0.14*** 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 
North   -0.16* -0.12 -0.10 
   (0.07) (0.09) (0.11) 
Leadership role in the community (d)    0.14* 0.12* 
    (0.07) (0.06) 
Member of a self-help group(d)    0.12 0.08 
    (0.08) (0.09) 
Member of a religious association(d)    -0.15** -0.17** 
    (0.07) (0.07) 
Plot size (ha)     2.77*** 
     (0.51) 
Walking distance to the plot (minutes)     -0.00 
     (0.00) 
Farm size (ha)     0.12*** 
     (0.02) 
Oxen (d)     0.00 
     (0.03) 
Labour (man day)     0.01** 
     (0.01) 
Pest damage (d)     0.19** 
     (0.07) 
Standardized Precipitation Index     0.06 
     (0.07) 
Female headed household (d)     -0.24* 
     (0.13) 
Age     -0.01** 
     (0.00) 
Household size     -0.02 
     (0.02) 
Secondary education (d)     0.12** 
     (0.05) 
Risk averse (d)     0.15* 
     (0.07) 
Constant 1.00*** 0.87*** 0.96*** 0.97*** 0.82*** 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10) (0.20) 
Observations 298 300 298 299 297 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.23 
AIC 595 599 592 551 595 
BIC 606 614 622 607 606 
Cluster robust standard errors at the village level in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (d) stands 
for dummy variables. The social network variable is ‘Relatives’: it is the average number of relatives inside the 
  
150 
 
village each farmer can ask for help or information. 
Table 4.8: Discussing the seeds, details of the ZIP results 
Zero-Inflated Poisson Estimates: Number of People with whom Each Farmer Discussed the 
Type of Seeds Received in the Experiment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log count (Poisson model)      
Improved seeds (d) -0.20** 0.05 0.06 0.03 -0.03 
 (0.09) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19) 
Relatives inside the village 0.10*** 0.18** 0.18** 0.17** 0.14* 
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
Improved seeds (d)*Relatives inside the village  -0.13* -0.13 -0.13 -0.11 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) 
North   -0.41** -0.35** -0.50* 
   (0.17) (0.17) (0.30) 
Leadership role in the community (d)    0.28** 0.28* 
    (0.13) (0.15) 
Member of a self-help group(d)    0.01 -0.03 
    (0.13) (0.14) 
Member of a religious association(d)    -0.02 -0.09 
    (0.16) (0.17) 
Plot size (ha)     2.32*** 
     (0.77) 
Farm size (ha)     -0.00 
     (0.06) 
Oxen (d)     -0.03 
     (0.09) 
Labour (man day)     0.02** 
     (0.01) 
Pest damage (d)     0.11 
     (0.14) 
Standardized Precipitation Index     0.17 
     (0.22) 
Female headed household (d)     -0.19 
     (0.18) 
Age     0.00 
     (0.01) 
Household size     0.03 
     (0.03) 
Secondary education (d)     0.04 
     (0.14) 
Risk averse (d)     0.17 
     (0.16) 
Walking distance to the plot (minutes)     0.00 
     (0.00) 
Constant 1.39*** 1.23*** 1.23*** 1.34*** 0.77** 
 (0.14) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19) (0.33) 
Log odd of asking no one (logit model)       
Improved seeds (d) -0.18 -0.92* -0.91 -1.12* -1.19 
 (0.34) (0.51) (0.58) (0.64) (0.76) 
Relatives inside the village -0.21 -0.62** -0.62* -0.70** -0.73 
 (0.13) (0.30) (0.32) (0.34) (0.46) 
Improved seeds (d)*Relatives inside the village  0.65* 0.63 0.72* 0.84 
  (0.36) (0.39) (0.41) (0.54) 
North   -0.39 -0.03 -0.86* 
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   (0.32) (0.28) (0.46) 
Leadership role in the community (d)    -0.14 0.25 
    (0.25) (0.23) 
Member of a self-help group(d)    -0.56  
    (0.38)  
Member of a religious association(d)    1.62**  
    (0.70)  
Farm size (ha)     -0.54* 
     (0.28) 
Age     0.03* 
     (0.02) 
Household size     0.16 
     (0.11) 
Female headed household (d)     0.93 
     (0.69) 
Secondary education (d)     -0.81 
     (0.60) 
Risk averse (d)     -0.22 
     (0.68) 
Constant -1.41*** -0.96*** -0.96*** -1.95** -1.64*** 
 (0.35) (0.36) (0.36) (0.82) (0.61) 
Observations 313 313 313 313 313 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.082 0.114 
Wald chi2 18.68*** 21.15*** 25.22*** 20.84*** 58.55*** 
AIC 1910 1892 1852 1815 1755 
BIC 1932 1922 1889 1867 1811 
Cluster robust standard errors at the village level in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (d) stands for 
dummy variables. The social network variable is ‘Relatives’: it is the average number of relatives inside the village 
each farmer can ask for help or information. 
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Table 4.9: Asking for help on the farm, details of the ZIP model 
Zero-Inflated Poisson Estimates: Number of People Each Farmer Asked for Help on the 
Farm 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
farm_ask_no      
Improved seeds (d) -0.15 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.14 
 (0.12) (0.24) (0.24) (0.20) (0.22) 
Relatives inside the village 0.06 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Improved seeds (d)*Relatives inside the village  -0.09 -0.09 -0.12** -0.14** 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) 
North   0.09 0.02 0.14 
   (0.25) (0.20) (0.21) 
Leadership role in the community (d)    0.11 0.12 
    (0.15) (0.16) 
Member of a self-help group(d)    0.34*** 0.37*** 
    (0.10) (0.08) 
Member of a religious association(d)    -0.36** -0.45*** 
    (0.15) (0.10) 
Plot size (ha)     -5.00** 
     (2.26) 
Farm size (ha)     0.06 
     (0.06) 
Oxen (d)     0.08 
     (0.08) 
Labour (man day)     -0.00 
     (0.01) 
Pest damage (d)     0.14 
     (0.15) 
Standardized Precipitation Index     -0.12 
     (0.29) 
Female headed household (d)     0.02 
     (0.28) 
Age     0.00 
     (0.00) 
Household size     -0.05 
     (0.05) 
Secondary education (d)     -0.06 
     (0.24) 
Risk averse (d)     -0.02 
     (0.21) 
Walking distance to the plot (minutes)     -0.00 
     (0.00) 
Constant 1.13*** 1.04*** 0.97*** 0.81*** 1.30*** 
 (0.12) (0.16) (0.27) (0.21) (0.46) 
inflate      
Improved seeds (d) -0.02 -0.07 -0.09 0.21 0.03 
 (0.21) (0.44) (0.44) (0.34) (0.38) 
Relatives inside the village -0.23*** -0.25 -0.27 -0.28 -0.43 
 (0.07) (0.18) (0.17) (0.20) (0.30) 
Improved seeds (d)*Relatives inside the village  0.05 0.08 -0.08 0.03 
  (0.26) (0.28) (0.23) (0.28) 
North   -0.67** -0.67 -0.60 
   (0.27) (0.44) (0.52) 
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Leadership role in the community (d)    1.06** 0.00 
    (0.52) (.) 
Member of a self-help group(d)    0.50 0.36 
    (0.50) (0.49) 
Member of a religious association(d)    -0.51* -0.56* 
    (0.28) (0.29) 
Farm size (ha)     -0.11 
     (0.18) 
Age     -0.01 
     (0.01) 
Household size     0.06 
     (0.09) 
Female headed household (d)     -0.48 
     (0.45) 
Secondary education (d)     -0.45 
     (0.34) 
Risk averse (d)     0.98** 
     (0.43) 
Constant -0.05 -0.03 0.38 1.68*** 2.28*** 
 (0.27) (0.41) (0.33) (0.49) (0.84) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.0 0.02 0.02 0.174 0.194 
Wald chi2 2.22 12.28*** 13.10*** 28.98*** 47.84*** 
AIC 1256 1257 1252 1071 1045 
BIC 1278 1287 1290 1127 1101 
Cluster robust standard errors at the village level in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (d) stands 
for dummy variables. The social network variable is ‘Relatives’: it is the average number of relatives inside the 
village each farmer can ask for help or information. 
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Table 4.10: Asking for help on the experimental plot a harvest times, details of the Logit model 
Logit Estimates: Asking for Help on the Experimental Plot a Harvest times 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Improved seeds (d) -0.01 0.78 0.77 0.66 0.42 
 (0.29) (0.54) (0.55) (0.55) (0.35) 
Relatives inside the village 0.28*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.39*** 
 (0.10) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.12) 
Improved seeds (d)*Relatives inside the village  -0.38** -0.38** -0.37** -0.29** 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.12) 
North   0.36 0.52 1.64** 
   (0.48) (0.55) (0.81) 
Harvest (10 kg)    0.00 0.00* 
    (0.00) (0.00) 
Plot size (ha)     1.51 
     (2.25) 
Farm size (ha)     -0.18 
     (0.25) 
Oxen (d)     -0.49 
     (0.64) 
Pest damage (d)     0.57 
     (0.51) 
Standardized Precipitation Index     -0.17 
     (0.50) 
Female headed household (d)     -0.75 
     (1.00) 
Age     0.00 
     (0.02) 
Household size     -0.05 
     (0.15) 
Secondary education (d)     0.30 
     (0.43) 
Risk averse (d)     0.32 
     (0.39) 
Leadership role in the community (d)     0.78*** 
     (0.25) 
Member of a self-help group(d)     0.16 
     (0.40) 
Member of a religious association(d)     1.74*** 
     (0.48) 
Walking distance to the plot (minutes)     0.02*** 
     (0.01) 
Constant -2.67*** -3.21*** -3.43*** -3.69*** -5.94*** 
 (0.39) (0.57) (0.66) (0.74) (1.64) 
Observations 313 313 313 313 313 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.17 
Wald chi2 7.61** 14.3*** 21.6*** 29.3*** 41.20*** 
AIC 205 204 205 206 201 
BIC 216 219 224 228 257 
Cluster robust standard errors at the village level in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (d) 
stands for dummy variables. The social network variable is ‘Relatives’: it is the average number of relatives 
inside the village each farmer can ask for help or information. 
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Table 4.11: Social interactions involving less visibility, details of the regressions results 
 Zero-Inflated Estimates:  
 Number of people asked by each farmer: Logit 
Estimates:  
 for help in 
kind or in 
cash  
About best 
farm 
practices 
About 
market 
(output or 
land) 
Asking for 
help on the 
experimental 
plot: 
planting or 
weeding 
 Poisson model Logit model 
Improved seeds (d) -0.05 0.25* 0.41* 0.31 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.22) (0.21) 
Relatives inside the village 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.23*** 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) 
Improved seeds (d)*Relatives inside the village -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
North -0.11 0.11 -0.12 2.49*** 
 (0.18) (0.21) (0.39) (0.39) 
Been asked (d) 0.45*** 0.49** 0.35  
 (0.17) (0.20) (0.37)  
Plot size (ha) 1.46 -2.65*** -2.29 2.17* 
 (1.43) (1.00) (2.22) (1.32) 
Farm size (ha) -0.04 0.03 0.15* 0.10 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) 
Oxen (d) 0.24* 0.28*** 0.04 -0.16 
 (0.14) (0.07) (0.22) (0.31) 
Labour (man day) 0.01 0.00 0.01  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  
Pest damage (d) -0.33*** -0.29* -0.57*** 0.99 
 (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.66) 
Standardized Precipitation Index 0.05 -0.26*** 0.14 -0.51 
 (0.12) (0.07) (0.17) (0.37) 
Female headed household (d) 0.35* -0.02 -0.08 -0.69* 
 (0.20) (0.17) (0.17) (0.37) 
Age 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Household size 0.04 -0.06** -0.03 -0.12*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
Secondary education (d) -0.08 0.12 -0.13 -0.08 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.22) (0.35) 
Risk averse (d) 0.16 0.09 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.20) (0.15) (0.16) (0.37) 
Leadership role in the community (d) 0.09 0.01 0.06 -0.01 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.32) 
Member of a self-help group(d) 0.21* 0.32** 0.08 -0.01 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.27) (0.33) 
Member of a religious association(d) 0.08 -0.14 0.12 0.59** 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.18) (0.25) 
Walking distance to the plot (minutes) 0.01*** -0.00 0.00 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 0.34 0.61 0.78* -3.36*** 
 (0.41) (0.42) (0.40) (0.51) 
Log odd of asking no one (logit model)     
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Improved seeds (d) 0.22 0.64 0.52  
 (0.38) (0.94) (0.47)  
Relatives inside the village 0.06 -0.99 -0.33**  
 (0.19) (0.98) (0.13)  
Improved seeds (d)*Relatives inside the village -0.18 0.06 0.04  
 (0.25) (1.31) (0.16)  
North 0.08 0.63 0.81**  
 (0.39) (1.10) (0.36)  
Been asked (d) -3.62*** -4.63*** -3.95***  
 (0.49) (0.70) (0.45)  
Farm size (ha) 0.07 -0.41 0.23  
 (0.18) (0.52) (0.19)  
Age -0.01 -0.01 0.01  
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)  
Household size 0.19*** -0.15 -0.03  
 (0.06) (0.21) (0.11)  
Leadership role in the community (d) 0.47 0.27 -0.15  
 (0.35) (0.69) (0.30)  
Female headed household (d) 0.06 -0.91 0.23  
 (0.65) (1.04) (0.41)  
Secondary education (d) -0.37 1.65*** 0.37  
 (0.38) (0.43) (0.48)  
Risk averse (d) 0.87*** 0.70 -0.01  
 (0.33) (0.82) (0.52)  
Constant 0.37 0.95 0.31  
 (0.95) (1.07) (0.75)  
Observations 313 313 313 313 
McFadden's R2 0.23 0.20 0.25 0.14 
Wald-test 160.72*** 101.13*** 188.5*** 47.47*** 
AIC 1543 1175 1154 374 
BIC 1599 1231 1210 430 
Cluster robust standard errors at the village level in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (d) stands for 
dummy variables. The social network variable is ‘Relatives’: it is the average number of relatives inside the village 
each farmer can ask for help or information. 
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5 Agri-environmental Schemes and Risk exposure: a case 
study from Ireland 
Xavier Vollenweider1 
Abstract 
We estimate the impact of an Irish agri-environmental scheme (AES) on farmer’s risk exposure with the 
moment-based approach of Antle (1983) applied to a panel dataset covering the 2006-2009 period. The 
AES does not have a large impact on risk exposure; it even slightly decreases the variance of the net gross 
margin distribution. We then compute the risk premium across farm categories and find that the greatest 
benefit in terms of risk premium reduction goes to sheep farmers. The benefit of joining the AES is mostly 
driven by an increase in the expected gross margin. The dairy sector, the most intensive sector of Irish 
agriculture, is also the one which benefits the least from the scheme. This is consistent with the 
observation that dairy farmers are under-represented in the scheme. 
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5.1 Introduction 
We present here a set of evidence of the impact of agri-environmental schemes (AES) on farmer risk 
exposure. The republic of Ireland provides an interesting case study as its AES, the Rural Environment 
Protection Scheme (REPS), is universal - i.e. all farmers can enter the scheme, not only the ones located in 
an environmentally sensitive area - and is voluntary (Emerson and Gillmor 1999). The goal of REPS is to 
incentivize farmers with financial rewards to adopt environmentally friendly practices over a five-year 
period. The aim of the present study is to estimate the impact of joining REPS on farmers’ risk exposure. 
Several factors could explain the link between AES and risk exposure.  
First, some production standards imposed by AES, such as a reduction in fertiliser and pesticide application 
rates, might have a direct impact on risk exposure. Organic and low input farmers have indeed been shown 
to be more exposed to production risk than conventional farmers (Berentsen et al. 2012; Finger 2014; 
Gardebroek 2006; Serra et al. 2008). We might therefore expected REPS farmers to be more exposed to 
production risk than those staying out of the scheme.  
Second, Morris et al. (2000) report a concern among English farmers that the rigidity of the AES reduced 
their ability to take remedial action in case of pest infestation or severe weed events. AES contract length 
was found to negatively affect the decision to join because it tied farmers’ hands over a long period of 
time (Peerlings and Polman 2009). According to these findings, joining an AES would increase risk 
exposure. 
Third, the change in agricultural practices required to take part to an AES is generally perceived as a risk 
that younger farmers were more willing to take (Wynn et al. 2001). Corroborating the increase in risk 
linked to non-conventional farming, organic farmers have been shown to be less risk averse than non-
organic farmers (Gardebroek 2006; Serra et al. 2008). It is however yet unclear if joining an AES is 
objectively riskier or if it is perceived as such by farmers because of the uncertainty linked to changes in 
long established farming practices. Our aim is to test the impact of REPS on farmers’ risk exposure. 
As the entire farming population of Ireland is eligible for REPS, the analysis is performed across all the 
major farm categories in Ireland. Our impact analysis is based on the moment-based approach of Antle 
(1983). REPS is introduced in section 5.2. We present the model and the estimation strategy in section 5.3 
and 5.4. The data are presented in section 5.5 and the empirical implementation in section 5.6. Results 
follow in section 5.7 and we conclude in section 5.8. 
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5.2 The Rural Environment Protection Scheme 
European Council Regulation 2078/92 required member states to implement policies fostering the 
adoption of environmentally sustainable agricultural production practices. The response of the Irish 
government was the design, in consultation with farming and environmental groups, of the Rural 
Environment Protection Scheme (REPS, Emerson and Gillmor 1999). REPS came into operation on the 1st 
of June 1994. Its three objectives are to incentivize farmers to: (1) produce food in an extensive and 
environmentally friendly manner; (2) to protect biodiversity, endangered species and wildlife habitat and 
(3) to preserve the landscape (DAFF 2005; Emerson and Gillmor 1999). 
In order to benefit from the REPS subsidy, farmers have to draw up a five-year production plan so as to 
implement a comprehensive set of eleven mandatory measures, extending from waste management, 
fertilizer use and stocking rate, to the protection of wildlife habitats, historical remains and the 
improvement of the visual appearance of the farm (Emerson and Gillmor 1999). Over the period 1994 to 
2009 - the year of its closure to new entrants -, there were four successive reforms of REPS. There has not 
been major change in the overall design of the policy, although additional payments for farms above 40 
hectares (ha) and other supplementary measures were introduced in 2005. The goal of the scheme was 
thus to reward financially, over five years, the more environmentally virtuous farmer. Noncompliance with 
the agreed-upon farm management plan could lead to fines and ultimately to the exclusion from the 
scheme.  
The first version of REPS, REPS I, reached its target of 45’000 farmers enrolled. It did not, however, attract 
the most intensive and polluting farmers (Murphy et al. 2014). Farmers were dissatisfied with REPS II as 
payments were considered too low and the administrative burden rate too high (Murphy et al. 2014). As 
a result, the target of 70’000 farmers was not attained, with just over 30’000 farmers participating. 
Nevertheless, the participation of dairy farmers (who tend to operate more intensive and polluting farms) 
increased. These farmers might have used REPS II as a risk management instrument following the loss of 
income caused by the foot-and-mouth disease epidemic in 2001  (Murphy et al. 2014). The uptake of REPS 
III, initiated in 2005, attracted many more farmers than earlier versions. Murphy et al. (2014) report that 
the Irish Farmers Association endorsed the new REPS even before it was introduced while contemporary 
newspapers relayed a sense of urgency to enrol before the program closed to new entrants.  
In REPS III, two additional biodiversity measures had to be adopted out of a choice of 16 possible measures. 
Subject to the fulfilment of their action plan, farmers received: 200 euros per hectare for the first 20 ha; 
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175 euros per ha for the next 20 ha up to 40 ha; 70 euros/ha for the next 15 ha up to 55 ha and 10 euros 
per ha for areas over 55 ha. The last two payment tiers were a novelty in REPS III and contributed to its 
appeal. Higher payments were given to environmentally sensitive areas and supplementary measures such 
as organic farming practices lead to additional payments.  
The introduction of the Single farm payment in 2005 and the ratification of the Nitrate directive in 2006 
may have reduced the opportunity cost of joining REPS. Indeed, some of the accompanying measures, 
mandatory for receiving the Single Farm Payment, were already present in REPS (Murphy et al. 2014). 
Furthermore, the decoupling of subsidy from output level might have reduced the incentive to 
overproduce, favouring production plans more compatible with REPS (O'donoghue and Howley 2012). In 
REPS IV, applied from 2008 until 2009, farmers using more than 170kg of nitrogen per ha could apply for 
a derogation under the Nitrate directive. The goal was to further increase the participation of intensive 
farmers. Furthermore, farmers could choose among a larger option of biodiversity conservation measures. 
In the present study we focus on the period 2006 to 2009. Most farmers were under the REPS III contract 
over this period. REPS payments were relatively stable over the years covered in our study, with an average 
of 6500 euros per participating farmer. Almost half of the farms in the sample were taking part in the 
scheme. 
5.3 Theoretical background 
Our goal is to estimate the impact of REPS on farmers’ risk exposure by investigating the conditional 
distribution of their net gross margin. Net gross margin is defined as the difference between gross output 
and direct costs net of REPS subsidy. Gross output might be affected by weather, pests or diseases and 
other random factors, while prices swings might affect input costs and output value. The net gross margin 
can hence be expressed for each farm by a conditional distribution function: 
𝐹(𝜋|𝝁𝒊𝒕)⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇 (1)  
where 𝜋 is the net gross margin defined as a random variable and 𝝁𝒊𝒕 = (𝜇1𝑖𝑡 , … , 𝜇𝑚𝑖𝑡) is a vector of the 
𝑚 central moments characterizing the net gross-margin distribution for farmer 𝑖 at time 𝑡 (Gardebroek 
2006). The conditional distribution function is thus assumed to be the same for all farmers, but the 
moments of each farmer’s conditional distribution are allowed to differ between farmers, and are related 
to farm characteristics and input choices. The first moment is the expected net gross margin. The second 
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moment is the variance of net gross margin, and gives a sense of the spread of the net gross margin a 
farmer can expect. The third moment captures the asymmetry of the distribution of the possible gross-
margins, negative values implying the presence of downside risk. The econometric strategy to estimate 
these central moments is presented in the next section. 
In order to assess the riskiness of each farmer’s conditional distribution, we rely on two indicators 
summarizing these moments. The first one is the coefficient of variation, defined as the standard deviation 
of the conditional distribution divided by its mean, √𝜇2𝑖𝑡 𝜇1𝑖𝑡⁄ .  
The second indicator is the risk premium, 𝑅𝑖𝑡. It can be interpreted as the implicit cost of risk bearing, i.e. 
the maximum price one is ready to pay to get rid of all risk. Following Pratt (1964), the risk premium 
satisfies: 
𝐸𝑈(𝜋𝑖𝑡) = 𝑈[𝐸(𝜋𝑖𝑡) − 𝑅𝑖𝑡] (2)  
where E stands for the expectation operator, and 𝑈 is a utility function we will define below.  
Rearranging and approximating the last expression by its Taylor expansion of degree three (e.g. John M 
Antle 1987; Chavas and Holt 1996b), we can express the risk premium as: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 ≈
1
2
𝐴𝑃𝜇2𝑖𝑡 ⁡−
1
6
𝐷𝑆𝜇3𝑖𝑡 (3)  
where 𝜇𝑚𝑖𝑡 is the 𝑚 central moment for 𝑚 = 2,3 of farmer 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝐴𝑃 is the coefficient of absolute 
risk aversion (Pratt 1964) for mean-preserving spread aversion, and 𝐷𝑆 is the coefficient of downside risk 
aversion (Menezes et al. 1980) for mean-spread-preserving skewness preferences. The risk premium 
depends on: 
 the set of risk preference parameters, 𝐴𝑃and 𝐷𝑆; 
 the variance of the conditional net gross margin distribution of each farmer, 𝜇2𝑖𝑡; 
 the third central moment of the conditional net gross margin distribution of each farmer, 𝜇3𝑖𝑡. 
Several models have been applied for the estimation of risk preferences, either based on recursive 
estimation (John M Antle 1987; 2010; Foudi and Erdlenbruch 2011; Groom et al. 2008; Simtowe et al. 
2006), or on joint estimation of preferences and technology parameters (Chavas and Holt 1996b; 
Koundouri et al. 2009; S. C. Kumbhakar 2002; S. C. Kumbhakar and Tveterås 2003; S. Kumbhakar and 
Tsionas 2010; Love and Buccola 1991; Pope and Just 1991; Saha et al. 1994; Saha 1997; Vollenweider et 
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al. 2011). As regards the structure of risk aversion, the results point toward declining absolute risk aversion 
(Bar-Shira et al. 1997; Chavas and Holt 1990, 1996b; Saha et al. 1994), and increasing relative risk aversion 
(Bar-Shira et al. 1997; Saha et al. 1994). 
Lence (2009) calls into question the validity of estimating risk aversion with agricultural production data, 
particularly when shocks are not large or the sample is small. Just and Just (2010) show that although the 
models can be locally identified, they are not globally identified: an infinite set of pairs of technology and 
utility functions can equally well fit the data.  
These last two papers are a serious blow to the field of risk preference estimation with production data. 
Hence, we use a more straightforward approach whereby we assume a given parametric form for the 
utility function and present the risk premium according to the various degrees of risk aversion commonly 
found in the literature.  
Following the literature on risk preference estimation, farmers are assumed to exhibit Declining Absolute 
Risk Aversion (DARA). Thus, we model the utility function with a power utility function:  
𝑈(𝑥) =
𝑥1−𝛾
(1 − 𝛾)
 (4)  
where 𝛾 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Farmers hence exhibit DARA and constant relative risk 
aversion. Although it has been found that the degree of risk aversion differs between farmers, notably in 
the case of organic vs. conventional farmers (Gardebroek 2006; Serra et al. 2008), we will assume that the 
overall structure of risk preferences and the parameter of relative risk aversion remain unchanged in and 
out of the scheme.2 Nevertheless, as farmers exhibit DARA, an increase in expected net gross margin 
decreases their level of absolute risk aversion. We present below the estimation strategy for recovering 
the central moment of each farmer’s conditional net gross margin distribution. 
                                                          
2 Nauges et al. show that changes in subsidy policies might have an impact on producers risk preferences (Kounduri 
et al., 2009). In a different context, an increase in violence linked to civil conflict in Burundi have been shown to 
decrease risk aversion (Voors et al., 2012). 
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5.4 Estimation Strategy 
We rely on the ‘moment-based’ approach of Antle (1987) to estimate the expected net gross margin, its 
variance and skewness as defined in equation (1) and the marginal effect of REPS on them. We follow 
below closely his derivation (see also Gardebroek 2006).  
Let us define the probability density of net gross margin as 𝑓(𝜋|𝒙𝒊𝒕) where 𝜋 is the stochastic net gross 
margin and 𝒙𝒊𝒕 is a vector of farmer’s 𝑖 input and characteristics at time 𝑡. The moments of the net gross 
margin can be written in general form as (John M Antle 1987): 
𝜇𝑖𝑡1(𝒙𝒊𝒕) = ∫𝜋 𝑓(𝜋|𝒙𝒊𝒕)d𝜋 (5)  
𝜇𝑖𝑡𝑚 = ∫(𝜋 − 𝜇𝑖𝑡1(𝒙𝒊𝒕))
𝑚
𝑓(𝜋|𝒙)𝑑𝜋 (6)  
where 𝜇𝑖𝑡1(𝒙𝒊𝒕) is the first moment, and 𝜇𝑖𝑡𝑚(𝒙𝒊𝒕) are the 𝑚 moments for 𝑚 ≥ 2. The moments are hence 
a function of a vector of inputs and farmer characteristics, 𝒙𝒊𝒕. Assuming a linear relationship between the 
moment and the variables, both equations in (5) and (6) can be expressed as: 
𝜇𝑖𝑡1(𝒙𝒊𝒕) = 𝒙𝒊𝒕𝜷𝟏 (7)  
𝜇𝑖𝑡𝑚(𝒙𝒊𝒕) = 𝒙𝒊𝒕𝜷𝒎 (8)  
We will test in the empirical section several specifications for 𝒙𝒊𝒕𝜷𝟏 and 𝒙𝒊𝒕𝜷𝒎. Antle (1983) and 
Gardebroek (2006) use a quadratic equation. As the net gross margin is random, we can write the first 
moment as the following regression equation: 
𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝒙𝒊𝒕𝜷𝟏 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 (9)  
where 𝜋𝑖𝑡 is the net gross margin of farmer 𝑖 at time 𝑡,  𝒙𝒊𝒕𝜷𝟏 is the expected net gross margin at time t 
and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 an error term with expectation equal to zero. Based on equation (9), we have 𝐸[(𝜋𝑖𝑡 − 𝜇𝑖𝑡1)
𝑚] =
𝐸(𝑣𝑖
𝑚) ≡ 𝜇𝑖𝑡𝑚, for  𝑚 ≥ 2.  
The regression equation for the 𝑚 central moment is given by: 
(𝑣𝑖𝑡)
𝑚 = 𝒙𝒊𝒕𝜷𝒎 + 𝑣𝑖  (10)  
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Letting 𝒙𝒊𝒕 contain a binary variable equal to one for farmers having joined REPS and zero otherwise, we 
can estimate the impact of REPS on expected net gross margin, variance and skewness. Furthermore, we 
can use the estimated moment function in equation (9) and (10) as a building block for the risk premium 
given in equation (3). Note that equation (10) corresponds to an assumption that there is 
heteroskedasticity in the moment equations. The estimates of 𝜷𝟏 and 𝜷𝒎 are hence not efficient, but they 
are still consistent. Therefore the difference in variances and skewness of net gross margin between REPS 
and non-REPS farmers are estimated consistently (Gardebroek 2006).  
5.5 Data  
We rely on data from the Irish National Farm Survey to conduct the analysis. This is an annual survey 
collected by Teagasc, a semi-state research body of the Republic of Ireland and feeding into the European 
Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). We selected the 2006 to 2009 years because the system of 
subsidies is comparable over this period. Indeed, the 2005 Common Agricultural Policy reform unified a 
large part of Pillar I farm support under the single farm payment. Furthermore, most farmers over the 
period were part of the third version of REPS III (Murphy et al. 2014). The number of farms in the dataset 
oscillates between 860 and 1052 per annum, and farms took part to the survey 3 years in a row on average. 
Farming activities are divided into 6 categories according to the FADN convention. The sample is composed 
of specialist dairy (17%), dairy and other (8%), cattle (21%), cattle and other (23 %), sheep (11%), tillage 
(9%). 
We use as dependent variable the farm net gross margin, i.e. the difference between gross output and 
direct costs minus the REPS subsidy. Gross output is the sum of the livestock gross output, the crop gross 
output, farm subsidies, other farm income as well as inter enterprise transfers3. Direct costs include the 
purchased feed concentrate, bulky feed, hired casual labour, the value of the fertilisers and pesticide (or 
other crop protection) used, machinery hire cost, veterinary costs and other miscellaneous expenses. 
The explanatory variables are the capital expenditure (capital expenditure during the year less capital sales 
and capital grants4), land (the utilised agricultural area of the farm in hectares), labour (total number of 
                                                          
3 The gross output is ‘total sales less purchase of livestock, plus value of farm produce used in the house plus receipts 
for hire work, service fees etc.  It also includes net change in inventory which for cows, cattle and sheep is calculated 
as the change in numbers valued at closing inventory prices.  All non-capital grants, subsidies, premia, headage 
payments etc are also included, as are income from land and quota let’ (RERC, 2009). 
4 Major repairs to farm buildings, plant and machinery and land improvements are included. 
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labour units working on the farm5), a diversification index (Berry 1971) based on the share of each source 
of gross margin within total gross margin6, a series of dummy variables on main farming categories (Dairy, 
Cattle, Sheep, Tillage). Farms are classified according to dominant enterprise. As farms often have multiple 
enterprises, for instance cattle and dairy, individual farmers might change categories over the years.  
Table 5.1: Variables used in the analysis 
 REPS 
farmers 
Non-REPS 
farmers 
Difference 
Gross margin 43,685.35 40,640.30 3,045.04*** 
 (26,489.07) (31,662.43) (977.91) 
Gross margin net of REPS subsidies 37,549.90 39,828.20 -2,278.29** 
 (26,229.03) (30,861.61) (958.87) 
REPS subsidy 6,452.45 0.00 6,452.45*** 
 (2,066.36) (0.00) (47.78) 
Capital 8,280.43 8,321.75 -41.32 
 (14,396.34) (15,344.23) (498.75) 
Land 45.04 43.28 1.76** 
 (20.92) (23.58) (0.75) 
Labour 1.13 1.17 -0.04*** 
 (0.40) (0.44) (0.01) 
Berry diversification index 0.43 0.46 -0.03*** 
 (15.63) (14.11) (0.50) 
Cattle (d) 0.50 0.44 0.06*** 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.02) 
Tillage (d) 0.09 0.08 0.01 
 (0.29) (0.27) (0.01) 
Sheep (d) 0.15 0.08 0.07*** 
 (0.36) (0.27) (0.01) 
Dairy(d) 0.26 0.41 -0.14*** 
 (0.44) (0.49) (0.02) 
Observations 1,907 2,066 3,913 
Standard deviation in parentheses in column 1 and 2, standard error of the t-test of 
comparison of means in parentheses in column 3, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
                                                          
5 1’800 hours per year is worth one labour unit, but one person cannot work more than one labour unit even if he/she 
works more than 1’800 hours per year. People under 18 years of age are given the following labour-unit equivalent: 
16-18 years = 0.75; 14-16 years = 0.50. 
6 Gross margin sources are classified in 9 categories: Dairying, cattle, sheep, pigs, poultry, horses, crops, hire of 
machinery revenue, other current receipts. The Berry diversification index is expressed as: 
𝐵 = 1 −∑𝑠𝑘
2
9
𝑘=1
 
where 𝑠𝑘
2 is the share of each source 𝑘 in gross margin. 
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Table 5.1 presents summary statistics over the whole period (2006-2009). The third column presents the 
average difference between REPS and non REPS participants. REPS farmers tend to have a higher gross 
margin than non-REPS farmers, however the difference is mainly driven by REPS subsidy as REPS farmers 
have a lower net gross margin. There are no differences in labour or capital between both categories. 
The literature show contrasting evidence on the role of farm size on the decision to join an AES. Some 
studies finds a strong positive role (e.g. Damianos and Giannakopoulos 2002; Mazorra 2001), others a 
negative one (e.g. Vanslembrouck et al. 2002), while still other find no impact (Wynn et al. 2001). This 
heterogeneity in findings might be due to the coexistence of large extensive farms and intensive farms, 
the former having a lower opportunity cost to join the AES as suggested by Murphy et al. (2014) because 
their default farm management practices are more in accordance with REPS requirements. In our sample, 
landholding is slightly larger on REPS farms. 
The largest differences between REPS and non REPS farmers are in terms of shares of sheep and dairy 
farms. The share of sheep farms is higher in the REPS category while the share of dairy farms is higher in 
the non-REPS category. This likely reflects the cost of joining REPS which tends to be lower for sheep farms 
and higher for dairy farms as the former tend to have extensive farming practices (<170 kg of nitrogen per 
ha) and the latter intensive farming practices (>170 kg of nitrogen per ha). In other terms, the default farm 
management of sheep farms are in accordance with REPS.  
Table 5.2: Socio-economic variables and farm characteristics 
Variable REPS 
farmers 
Non-REPS 
farmers 
Difference 
Farm family income 24,701.79 22,138.24 2,563.55*** 
 (20,351.70) (23,572.17) (719.72) 
Farm family income per capita 13,889.65 12,709.55 1,180.11*** 
 (11,386.32) (13,589.90) (409.98) 
Age between 25 and 44 0.63 0.55 0.08*** 
 (0.83) (0.80) (0.03) 
Age above 65 0.40 0.54 -0.14*** 
 (0.66) (0.75) (0.02) 
Number of household members with third  0.20 0.17 0.03* 
          level education (0.53) (0.48) (0.02) 
Good soil  0.49 0.53 -0.04** 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.02) 
Bad soil  0.11 0.09 0.02* 
 (0.32) (0.29) (0.01) 
Herd size on dairy farms 39.26 47.76 -8.51*** 
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 (22.20) (25.16) (1.39) 
Observations 1,907 2,006 3913 
Standard deviation in parentheses in column 1 and 2, standard error of the t-test of comparison of means 
in parentheses in column 3, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
We present in Table 5.2 a series of socio-demographic and farm characteristics variables. The farm family 
income, i.e. gross margin minus over-head cost7, is higher among REPS participants. They also tend to be 
younger. This is coherent with the fact that younger farmers tend to have a higher likelihood of joining AES 
because they are ready to take the risk of adopting the new farming practices required in the AES (Wynn 
et al. 2001). The average number of household member with a third level education is also higher, in line 
with Dupraz et al. (2003) who showed that education generally encourages participation in AES. REPS 
participants tend to have lower quality soils, which might reflect their lower opportunity cost in joining 
REPS as intensive farming is less profitable on poor quality soils (Hynes and Garvey 2009). Similarly, herd 
size on REPS dairy farms are smaller, suggesting that smaller scale exploitations joins REPS while larger 
one stay out, pointing toward an adverse selection process in REPS as suggested by Hynes and Garvey 
(2009). 
5.6 Empirical implementation 
The moments of net gross margin presented in equations (9) and (10) are estimated sequentially. Although 
sequential estimation is not the most efficient approach, it is consistent. It was originally applied by Antle 
(1983) and more recently by Kim and Chavas (2003), Gardebroek (2006), Di Falco and Chavas (2006, 2009), 
Bangwayo‐Skeete et al. (2012) and by Gardebroek et al. (2010) to the related Just and Pope framework for 
production risk estimation. 
Outliers are identified as observations with a net gross margin greater than the yearly farm category 
average by 3 standard deviations (1% of the sample). The explicative variables are labour, capital, land, a 
diversity index, a series of dummy variables for the three farm categories (Cattle, Sheep, Tillage; Dairy 
being the base category), a dummy for REPS participation as well as a series of time fixed effects. We also 
added a series of interaction terms between the REPS dummy and the farm category dummies in order to 
let the impact of REPS on expected net gross margin and higher moments vary across farm categories. 
                                                          
7 Over-head cost include cost of land rental, car, electricity, telephone, interest payment, depreciation of the 
machinery, machinery operating expenses, depreciation of the building, building repairs and upkeep, depreciation of 
land improvement work, land general upkeep, accountants and other consultant’s fees and other miscellaneous 
expenses. 
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Table 5.3: Specification tests 
  AIC BIC 
 Quadratic  83996.78 84128.81 
Expected net gross margin, 𝜇𝑖𝑡1 Quadratic without interaction 84028.64 84122.95 
 Linear 84028.64 84122.95 
 Quadratic  161244.7 161370.4 
Variance, 𝜇𝑖𝑡2 Quadratic without interaction 161293.8 161407 
 Linear 161290.9 161385.2 
 Quadratic  104668.6 104792.3 
Skewness, 𝜇𝑖𝑡3 Quadratic without interaction 104662.8 104767.9 
 Linear 104658.4 104744.9 
For the labour, capital and land variables, we tested three functional forms: a quadratic, a quadratic 
without interaction, and a specification where the variables enter only in level. Table 5.3 shows the results 
of the Bayesian and Akaike information criteria tests (respectively BIC and AIC) for the three first moments. 
For the first central moment, the quadratic is preferred according to the AIC while, according to the BIC, 
the quadratic functional form without interaction is better. In order to minimize mis-specification errors, 
which could cascade across the whole model via the use of the residual of the first moment equation for 
the estimation of the second and third moments equations (see section 5.4), we privileged results given 
by the AIC as it penalizes model complexity less compared to model fit. Furthermore, the quadratic form 
provides a Taylor second order approximation of any unknown expected net gross margin function (e.g. S. 
C. Kumbhakar and Tveterås 2003) and should thus, on average, produce a better fit to the data than the 
quadratic without interaction. AIC and BIC results agree for the second and third moments: the quadratic 
is preferred for the second moment and the linear specification for the third. The specifications of the first 
three moments are given in equations (11) to (13): 
𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽01 +∑𝛽𝑗1𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
3
𝑗=1
+
1
2
∑∑𝛽𝑗𝑘1𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡
3
𝑘=1
3
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽𝑅1𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 +∑𝛽𝑐1𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡
3
𝑐=1
+∑𝛽𝑅𝑐1𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡
3
𝑐=1
+ 𝛽𝑑1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 +∑𝛽ℎ1𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑡
3
ℎ=1
+ 𝛼1𝑖 + 𝑣1𝑖𝑡 
(11)  
(𝑣1𝑖𝑡)
2 = 𝛽02 +∑𝛽𝑗2𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
3
𝑗=1
+
1
2
∑∑𝛽𝑗𝑘2𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡
3
𝑘=1
3
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽𝑅2𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 +∑𝛽𝑐2𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡
3
𝑐=1
+∑𝛽𝑅𝑐2𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡
3
𝑐=1
+ 𝛽𝑑2𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 +∑𝛽ℎ2𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑡
3
ℎ=1
+ 𝛼2𝑖 + 𝑣2𝑖𝑡  
(12)  
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(𝑣1𝑖𝑡)
3 = 𝛽03 +∑𝛽𝑗3𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
3
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽𝑅3𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 +∑𝛽𝑐3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡
3
𝑐=1
+∑𝛽𝑅𝑐3𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡
3
𝑐=1
+ 𝛽𝑑3𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 +∑𝛽ℎ3𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑡
3
ℎ=1
+ 𝛼3𝑖 + 𝑣3𝑖𝑡 
(13)  
where 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡 is  land, capital and labour for 𝑗 = 1,2,3 respectively, 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 is a dummy equal to one if the 
farmer is a REPS participant, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡 is a binary for the sheep, cattle and tillage categories for the subscript 
𝑐 = 1,2,3 respectively (the base category is dairy), 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the Berry diversification index,⁡𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑡 are time-
fixed effects for ℎ = 2007,2008,2009, 𝛼𝑚𝑖 are the farm fixed effects and 𝑣𝑚𝑖𝑡 an error term for moments 
𝑚 = 1,2,3.  
Equations (10) to (12) are estimated with a fixed effect estimator (within effect). We tested with a Durbin-
Wu-Watson if REPS was endogenous and failed to reject the null of no endogeneity (p-value= 0.325). We 
did find some correlation in the error terms, but as the panel is short, this should not affect too largely the 
results. We use robust standard error to clustering at the farm level. 
5.7 Results 
Table 5.8 in the appendix shows the results of the estimation of the first moment of net gross margin and 
Table 5.4 shows the marginal effects. Out of the 9 variables of the quadratic function of labour, land and 
capital, three are found to be significant. We nevertheless chose to keep all the variables of the quadratic 
function (i.e. land, labour and capital in level, square and their interactions) in order to conserve flexibility 
in the expected net gross margin function.8 The other estimated parameters are very significant and the 
R-squared is reasonably high: 30% of the within variation is explained by the model. 
Table 5.4 shows the marginal effects on the moments of farmers’ net gross margin distributions. The effect 
of capital investment in machinery is minor as 1 euro invested increases net gross margin by only 2.5 cents. 
This low return on capital might reflect over-capitalisation of the farms. Land, by contrast, has a positive 
                                                          
8 Kumbhakar and Tveterås (2003) estimated a related model of production risk with a quadratic function. They notes: 
‘[t]he idea of dropping insignificant variables is not pursued […] due to several problems. First, it destroys the 
flexibility of the mean output function. Second, dropping one insignificant variable caused other insignificant 
(significant) variables to be significant (insignificant) due to high multicollinearity (which is always present in flexible 
functions) and the use of a system approach. Furthermore, we found no natural order to select variables for exclusion 
in the present model’. 
  
170 
 
effect on net gross margin; an additional hectare increase net gross margin by 160 euros. Diversification 
also increases net gross margin. All the farm category dummies are negative as expected because the base 
category, the dairy sector, is the most profitable sector of the Irish agriculture. Switching from dairy 
production to another system is therefore on average not profitable. 
The average effect of REPS on expected net gross margin is negative: farmers joining REPS lose on average 
3'000 euros. This might be due to an increase in the direct costs incurred to comply with the REPS plan as 
well lower output caused by the reduction in fertiliser use and stocking rate. Nevertheless, the cost of 
joining REPS appears to be more than compensated by the REPS subsidy (7'060 euros on average). Hence 
REPS III provided more than adequate compensation for possible revenue loss and the increase in cost due 
to compliance with the REPS production plan. This likely explains the large success in the uptake rate of 
REPS III. 
The impact of REPS differs however across categories. Dairy farms are those who benefit the least from 
REPS; it decreases their expected net gross margin by 7'000 euros while the average subsidy in the dairy 
category is 7'500 euros. As dairy farms are the most productive and intensive farm category, production 
constraints (e.g. reduction in stocking rate and fertiliser use) might cause higher compliance costs and 
revenue losses from REPS participation. This low average net benefit of joining REPS (circa 500 euros) is 
consistent with the observed low participation rate of dairy farmers. Being tied up over 5 years in farm 
management plan as well as the administrative burden of joining REPS might not have been adequately 
compensated by the REPS subsidy. 
By contrast, sheep farms, the most extensive production system, is the one benefits greatly from joining 
the scheme. Joining REPS causes a drop of 4’000 euros in expected net gross-margin of sheep farmers, but 
it is largely compensated by the REPS subsidy equal, on average, to 7’850 euros. As they are more likely to 
meet limitations in nitrogen usage by default, joining REPS implies a lower cost than for other farm 
categories. As noted by Hynes and Garvey (2009), the design of REPS might have created an adverse 
selection whereby farms for which REPS measures do not constitute a large change in their farm 
management join, while the more intensive and polluting ones, i..e the dairy farms, do not. Murphy et al. 
(2014) report that sheep farms are over-represented in the REPS compared to the share of sheep farms in 
Irish agriculture. The effect of joining REPS on cattle and tillage farms does not differ significantly from the 
sample average, i.e. it decreases gross margin by 3’000 euros while the average REPS subsidy in both sector 
is, respectively, 6’400 and 7’850 euros.  
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Table 5.4: Marginal effects on the moment of net gross margin 
Marginal effect Mean Variance 
capital 0.025* -142.829 
 (0.014) (141.421) 
labour -1,029.500 755,921.037 
 (1,823.398) (18,822,286.615) 
land 158.226** 523,155.405 
 (68.629) (758,625.301) 
diversification 59.068** 19,883.734 
 (26.737) (178,561.798) 
cattle farms -5,038.581*** -57,284,248.785*** 
 (1,873.306) (22,280,288.567) 
tillage farms -6,294.716* -87,557,742.616*** 
 (3,383.684) (31,226,220.979) 
sheep farms -4,063.329** -52,363,719.018** 
 (1,730.428) (20,891,646.485) 
REPS average -2997.076*** -14782600* 
 (922) (8400618) 
REPS for dairy farms -6,789.095*** -41,505,350.737** 
 (1,760.024) (18,093,153.704) 
REPS for cattle farms -544.90 9689194.1 
 (1165.9) (7459878) 
REPS for sheep farms  4110.354** 43167074*** 
 (1935.625) (14308620) 
REPS for tillage farms -1811.099 -10687388 
 (1935.625) (14308620) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, standard errors in parentheses 
Table 5.8 in the appendix shows the regression results for the second central moment defined in equation 
(12). Three of the nine variables in the quadratic function of labour, land and capital are significant while 
all the other variables are significant. The r-squared is 7%, a figure in line with other studies (e.g. 
Bangwayo‐Skeete et al. 2012; Gardebroek et al. 2010).  
Table 5.4 presents the marginal effect for the second moment equation. Capital, labour and land have no 
effect on variance while shifting from the dairy sector to another sector decreases net gross margin 
variance. REPS is found to be risk-diminishing on average. At the farm sector level, REPS decreases variance 
for the dairy farms. The smaller variance for REPS farmers, although statistically significant, might however 
be driven by the smaller expected gross margin. We will investigate this further by computing the implicit 
cost of risk bearing for various degree of risk aversion.  
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Results for the third moment were not conclusive: the only parameters found to be significant are the year 
dummies and the diversification index. The latter increases skewness, i.e. it decreases the amount of 
downside risk as expected. Diversifying farm income sources across multiple enterprises might indeed help 
reduce the risk of a big loss caused by an adverse price swing of a single commodity, for instance. However, 
results of the third moment must be considered with care. Indeed, they rely heavily on the parametric 
assumption that the moments of the net gross margin distribution function can be modelled as a linear 
combination of variables. Furthermore, specification errors in the first moment equation are raised to the 
power three in the third moment equation, making the results very sensitive to any mis-specification in 
the first moment. Even though results are expected to be consistent, the number of observations required 
to achieve consistency may be very large. Along with Gardebroek (2006), we decided not to include the 
third moment in the computation of the risk premium presented below. Results for the third moment 
equation are nevertheless available in Table 5.8 in the appendix. 
Table 5.5 displays the sample average central moment of farmers’ net gross margin distributions as well 
as the results of t-test of comparison in means between REPS and non-REPS farmers. REPS farms have an 
average expected net gross margin 7'000 euros smaller than non-REPS farms (Table 5.1). Again, it suggests 
that less profitable farms tend to have a higher participation in REPS, underlying the role of REPS as an 
income support mechanism. REPS farmers also have a lower variance than non-REPS farmers on average, 
confirming the results found above. However, the coefficient of variation is only marginally smaller for 
REPS farmers (21% against 23%) and the difference is not statistically significant.   
Table 5.5: Central moments of the net gross margin distribution 
 REPS Non-REPS REPS-NON REPS 
Expected net gross margin   40,748 47,444 -6,696*** 
 (30,360) (38,325) (1,126) 
Variance 52,288,395 63,812,123 -11,523,728*** 
  (59,754,849) (67,384,120) (2,148,041) 
Skewness 3,896,695,231 12,421,218,599 -8,524,523,368 
 (202,870,556,290) (201,048,547,121) (6,576,589,135) 
Coefficient of variation 0.2072 0.2283 -0.07 
 (1.8623) (0.1671) (0.0064) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, standard errors in parentheses 
Table 5.6 shows the sample average risk premium for REPS participants and non-participants according to 
various degree of risk aversion as well as the results of t-tests of means comparison. We do not consider 
skewness in the computation of the risk premium because of the lack of significant estimates in the third 
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moment equation. Furthermore, the sample average skewness does not differ statistically between REPS 
and non-REPS farmers (see Table 5.5). The risk premium is therefore defined as: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 ≡
1
2
𝐴𝑃?̂?2𝑖𝑡 (14)  
where ?̂?2𝑖𝑡 is the variance of net gross margin at time 𝑡.  The Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion, 𝐴𝑃, depends on the coefficient of relative risk aversion, 𝛾. The literature on risk aversion 
estimation presents a wide range of estimates, from -0.10 in India (John M Antle 1989) to 7.62 in the US 
(Chavas and Holt 1996a). The most common values chosen in studies comparable to the present one 
oscillate between 2 and 3 (e.g. Di Falco and Chavas 2006; Finger 2014; Ligon and Schechter 2003), we 
present the results with 𝛾 ranging from 1 to 5 (risk premium is zero for 𝛾 = 0). 
The risk premium is presented both in terms of net gross margin and gross margin with the REPS subsidy. 
In the latter case, we first add the value of the subsidy from REPS to the estimated expected net gross 
margin. We then compute the risk premium. 
Table 5.6: Risk premium 
 Sample average risk premium net of REPS 
subsidy 
Sample average risk premium with REPS 
subsidy 
Risk 
aversion 
𝛾 
REPS farmers Non-REPS 
farmers 
Difference REPS 
farmers 
Non-REPS 
farmers 
Difference 
1 717 757 -40* 583 757 -174*** 
  (660) (647) (23) (518) (647) (20) 
2 1,434 1,514 -80* 1,166 1,514 -348*** 
 (1,320) (1,294) (45) (1,035) (1,294) (41) 
3 2,151 2,271 -120* 1,749 2,271 -521*** 
 (1,980) (1,940) (68) (1,553) (1,940) (61) 
4 2,868 3,028 -160* 2,333 3,028 -695*** 
 (2,640) (2,587) (91) (2,071) (2,587) (82) 
5 3,585 3,784 -200* 2,916 3,784 -869*** 
 (3,300) (3,234) (113) (2,589) (3,234) (102) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, standard errors in parentheses 
The differences reported in Table 5.6 show that the implicit cost of risk is lower for REPS farmers, although 
the difference is small. Once the REPS subsidy has been added to the expected net gross margin of REPS, 
the difference in risk premium is increases slightly, it is between 348 euros and 521 euro for moderate 
levels of risk aversion (𝛾 = 2,3). The additional benefit of REPS in terms of risk reduction is hence quite low 
on average (5% to 7% of the average value of the REPS subsidy).  
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Table 5.7: Differences in risk premium between REPS and non REPS farmers in the different farming 
categories 
 Sample average difference in  risk premium net 
of REPS subsidy 
Sample average difference in  risk premium with 
REPS subsidy 
Risk 
aversion
𝛾 Dairy Cattle Sheep Tillage Dairy Cattle Sheep Tillage 
1 -59** -56 -199* -86 -132*** -237*** -436*** -163*** 
  (30) (47) (120) (64) (29) (42) (101) (58) 
2 -118** -112 -398* -172 -264*** -473*** -872*** -327*** 
 (60) (94) (240) (128) (57) (83) (202) (116) 
3 -176** -168 -598* -258 -396*** -710*** -1,308*** -490*** 
 (89) (141) (360) (191) (86) (125) (304) (174) 
4 -235** -223 -797* -343 -528*** -946*** -1,744*** -654*** 
 (119) (188) (480) (255) (115) (166) (405) (231) 
5 -294** -279 -996* -429 -661*** -1,183*** -2,181*** -817*** 
 (149) (235) (601) (319) (144) (208) (506) (289) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, standard errors in parentheses 
Table 5.7 shows the difference in risk premium between REPS participants and non-participants across 
farm categories. The greatest benefit in terms of risk reduction is in the sheep sector. For a degree of 
relative risk aversion equal to 3, the benefit amounts to 1'300 euros in the reduction of the implicit cost of 
risk bearing, i.e. an increase in the benefit from REPS of 16% compared to the sole subsidy (7'865 euros on 
average). By contrast, the additional benefit brought by REPS for dairy farmers represent only 5% of the 
amount of the REPS subsidy.  
The low effect of REPS on risk exposure might be the result of the flexibility in the design of the scheme. 
Each farmer designed their own production plan in accordance with a farm adviser accredited by the 
government. This flexibility in the design of the policy rather than a one size-fits-all approach might have 
allowed farmers to design plans minimizing the impact of REPS on their risk exposure. Furthermore, most 
REPS participants are extensive farms on which no major changes are required in terms of fertiliser or 
pesticide use. Although we did find that REPS decreases the variance of the net gross margin distribution, 
there were no statistical differences in the coefficient of variation between participants and non-
participants while differences in the risk premium computed with the net gross margin were economically 
very small.  REPS had, therefore, mostly an impact on gross margin distribution via the increase in expected 
gross margin caused by the subsidy. 
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5.8 Conclusion 
Studies on the impact of organic farming and low-input agriculture have shown that these production 
systems were riskier than conventional ones. Furthermore, the literature on adoption of agricultural 
environmental scheme (AES) has found that many farmers perceived agri-environmental schemes as risk-
increasing. This does not appear to be the case for REPS as it slightly decreases, on average, both the 
variance of net gross margin and the implicit cost of risk bearing. This is true for all farm categories. 
Most of the benefit in joining REPS is driven by an increase in expected gross margin. We found that joining 
REPS implied an average decrease in net gross margin of 3'000 euros. As the subsidy is on average 7'000 
euros, the participants in REPS benefited from the scheme. REPS acted hence as a gross margin support 
subsidy. 
However, the benefit of joining REPS varies between farm categories. Sheep farmers tend to benefit largely 
from the scheme while the gain is minimal for dairy farmers. The former ones benefit not only in terms of 
increased expected gross margin, they also benefit from a significant decrease in risk exposure. This might 
explain their over-representation in REPS compared to the other farm types. Hynes and Garvey (2009) 
showed that REPS suffered from adverse selection: the less polluting farmers participate (e.g. sheep 
farmers), while the most polluting farmers do not (e.g. the dairy farmers). As intensive farmers are 
generally the most profitable farms and face high compliance cost with AES measures, increasing their 
participation only via an increase in the subsidy might be hard to achieve and very expensive. An option 
would be to link AES with risk management schemes as proposed in the case of organic farmers by Serra 
et al. (2008). This could decrease the perceived riskiness of joining AES and increase the net benefit.  
The moment-based approach adopted in the current paper provides a direct route for the estimation of 
all central moments of the distributions of gross margin at the farm level. We did not however find 
significant results in terms of the skewness of net gross margin. The lack of significant results for skewness 
might be caused by two factors. First, the sequential estimation strategy is sub-optimal in terms of 
efficiency. A maximum likelihood approach could increase the efficiency of the results. Furthermore, a 
dynamic approach could produce further insights on the impact of REPS on risk exposure. Indeed, the cost 
of joining an AES might vary over the duration of the AES contract while the implementation of AES 
measures is generally progressive over the overall length of the contract. It remains however to be shown 
that dynamic panel data methods are applicable to the methods of moments. This could constitute an 
interesting follow-up of this paper. 
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The second reason for a lack of significant results for the third moment is likely inherent to the use of the 
residuals of the first moment regression as dependent variables in the higher moments equations. Any 
misspecification in the first moment is put to the power three for the third moment equation. Thus, the 
results might be very sensitive to the specification and not very informative of the actual skewness of net 
gross margin. An interesting extension of the current paper would be to apply the methodology of climate 
risk exposure estimation exposed in chapter 2 in order to investigate the impact of AES on downside 
climate risk exposure. The prerequisite for such an approach is to have access to farm GPS coordinates. 
Unfortunately, this was not possible in Ireland at the time of the writing because of the strict rules on data 
confidentiality.  
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5.10 Appendix 
Table 5.8: Estimates of the net gross margin moments equations   
 Mean Variance Skewnesse 
(rescaled by 1 mio) 
capital -0.0169 186.2 876077.3 
 (0.0214) (249.4) (683770.4) 
capital2 -5.43e-08 -0.0000454  
 (8.10e-08) (0.000911)  
labour -9210.1** -74228454.4 1.52365e+11 
 (4438.9) (52314472.3) (1.10796e+11) 
capital×labour 0.0310** -596.6***  
 (0.0132) (175.6)  
land 111.7 419530.0 -1.29425e+09 
 (99.13) (964758.7) (1.46642e+09) 
capital × land 0.0000835 8.303***  
 (0.000346) (3.022)  
land ×  land -0.330* -1018.4  
 (0.180) (2008.4)  
land × labour 62.65 62903.2  
 (54.78) (333385.3)  
labour ×  labour 1708.2 31683436.1**  
 (1283.5) (15303934.2)  
diversification 59.07** 19883.7 6924.8*** 
 (26.74) (178561.8) (1759.1) 
REPS -6789.1*** -41505350.7** -2.59249e+10 
 (1760.0) (18093153.7) (1.41397e+11) 
cattle -8100.8*** -78487590.9*** 1.28648e+11 
 (2207.3) (25039336.6) (1.82355e+11) 
REPS ×  cattle 6379.7*** 44070623.7** 8.82768e+10 
 (1987.1) (18234172.6) (1.57853e+11) 
Tillage -6917.1* -89706524.6*** 4.60331e+11** 
 (3609.3) (33275915.4) (2.14258e+11) 
REPS ×  tillage 1296.6 4466190.4 -2.35216e+11 
 (3347.0) (30593272.8) (3.02152e+11) 
sheep -7884.5*** -83493565.2*** 1.66581e+11 
 (2311.0) (26067852.7) (2.07045e+11) 
REPS× sheep 7961.0*** 64702617.5*** -5.50756e+10 
 (2320.5) (20222066.7) (1.77489e+11) 
2007 8121.8*** 32457453.4*** -5.40840e+10 
 (490.2) (4707567.1) (3.29716e+10) 
2008 4723.9*** 18803710.1*** 2.17755e+10 
 (476.4) (4771971.3) (3.11914e+10) 
2009 -8441.8*** 59624028.6*** 3.99888e+11*** 
 (551.6) (6366744.1) (4.08223e+10) 
Constant 51028.0*** 117464769.3** -6.11541e+11*** 
 (5344.6) (57509185.4) (2.12922e+11) 
Observations 3973 3708 3575 
R2 0.301 0.073 0.078 
Fixed effect estimator with standard errors robust to clustering at the farm level in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
